The right to an impartial adjudication under English and American law by Bhuiyan, Rabia
Durham E-Theses
The right to an impartial adjudication under English
and American law
Bhuiyan, Rabia
How to cite:
Bhuiyan, Rabia (1977) The right to an impartial adjudication under English and American law, Durham
theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9571/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATION 
UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 
RABIA BHUIYAN 
~hesis submitted for the award of the degree 
of Bachelor of Civil Law in the University 
of Durham. 
Submitted 1977 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
(it) 
PREFACE 
This thesis relates to a topic which is frequently the 
concern of lawyers and judges and a subject of great 
controversy in both England and America. What is 
attempted is a comparative study of the Rule against 
Interest and Bias in England and in the United States in 
the light of modern developments. The thesis has been 
divided into seven chapters. The first chapter starts 
with the meaning and a short introduction of the principle 
followed by a historical background of the rule. In the 
second chapter, I have tried to outline the present scope 
and applicat~on of the rule. Chapter III concentrates 
on the particular cases on pecuniary interest both under 
English and American law. While in the fourth chapter, 
I have tried to deal with the various types of bias and 
application of the rule in particular cases. The fifth 
chapter concentrates on the exclusion of the rule by 
factors such as Departmental Bias, Rule of Necessity and 
so on. Effects of the breach of the rule and remedies 
available are dealt with in the sixth chapter. In the 
seventh and concluding chapter, I have conc·entrated on 
certain problems arising in the subject and suggested 
some answers. So far as the American portion of my work 
is concerned, necessities of time and space and 
availability of materials have forced me to concentrate 
mainly on federal law, and to confine within reasonable 
limits the references to American primary materials. I 
pursued my research in the Durham University Library, 
Middle Temple Library and the Institute of Advanced Legal 
(iii) 
Studies, University of London. 
I am greatly indebted to my Supervisor, Mr. Colin R. 
Munro, for his constant guidance, advice and encouragement 
throughout the progress of my work here in this 
Department. I am also grateful to Professor M.J. Goodman, 
who initially supervised my work, for his valuable 
suggestions and advice and to all the Staff who encouraged 
me throughout the progress of my work here. I should 
also like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks 
towards Dr. P. St. J. Langan, Barrister, Professor D.J. 
Bentley of the University of East Anglia, Mrs Carol 
Harlow of the University of London for the suggestions and 
advice I received from them. I also wish to thank my 
parents for their support and my husband for being the 
source of inestimable encouragement and for giving so 
freely his time in helping to bring this work to fruition. 
My thanks are also due to the Librarians and Staff of 
the Durham University L,ibrary, Lincoln's Inn Library, 
Middle Temple Library and the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies for the assistance and facilities I received from 
them and finally my gratitude goes to the Ford Foundation 
for their financial assistance to make this research 
possible. 
This thesis is up to date to October 1977. 
Rabia Bhuiyan. 
(iv) 
THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAE, ADJUDICATION 
UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW. 
ABSTRACT 
Deeply rooted in Anglo-American Jurisprudence is the 
concept that when factual issues arise in an adjudicatory 
proceeding whether before a court or an administrative 
authority, they must be tried impartially i.e. without 
any interest or bias. Impartiality is essential not 
only for safeguarding the rights, liberty and property 
of citizens, but also for maintaining their faith in the 
due administration of justice. The rule that n·no man 
shall be a judge in his own cause"' is a fundamental 
principle of natural justice and has become the rule 
against interest ana bias. Once it was regarded as 
immutable, universal and even as being supreme over 
statute law. Now it is considered as no more than a 
principle of common law applied in the interpretation of 
statutes which often authorities or Parliament itself will 
try to exclude whenever it frustrates their wishes. English 
judges try to uphold this rule by means of prerogative 
writs and private-law remedies, though the effectiveness 
of these is limited by technicalities and procedural 
difficulties. Further, the judges are powerless when the 
legislature denies the rule. 
On the other hand, the Americans who inherited this 
principle as a part of English common law have preserved 
its supremacy through their Constitution. Building upon 
the ndue process" concept and strengthened by particular 
statutes, the American courts have constructed an 
(v) 
important edifice of impartiality. Their statutory 
procedure and guidelines for disqualification and 
comprehensive judicial review have added a strength and 
character to the concept distinct from English law. 
Despite these differences, English and American courts 
are producing substantially similar results. The basic 
principle is the same, the limitations upon it are 
similar but American procedures are more formalised, and 
more effective. For the proper development of English 
law, the existing remedies should be reformed and the 
introduction of disqualifying statutes on the American 
model should be considered. 
- vi -
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION 
A) THE·MEANING OF THE RULE: ENGLAND 
ltFor the same reason no man in any case ought to be 
received for Arbitration, to whom greater profit or honour 
or pleasure ariseth out of victory of one party, than of 
the other; for he hath taken (though an unavoidable bribe, 
yet)' a bribe, and no man can be obliged to trust him". 
- Thomas Hobbes -
A concept which is fundamental to English and American law 
is the right of a litigant to have his case determined by an 
impartial judge. The rule that a judge must be free from 
interest or bias is often expressed in the form of the 
maxim that "no man should be a judge in his own cause" or 
"~ judex in !.!! ~~~·. Under English law this rule is 
hallowed by usage as one of the basic principles of natural 
justice.(l) Though the use of the term natural justice has 
been subject to criticism,( 2 ) it has been held in a recent 
1. Leeson v. General Council of Medical Association (1889) 43 
Ch.D. 366, 383 (Bowen L.J. in emphasizing that the 
substantial elements. of natural justice must be found to 
be present in the inquiry expressly referred to two basic 
principles of procedure i.e. that the tribunal must be 
honest and impartial in arriving its decision (nemo judex 
in re sua) and must give the party an opportunity of 
being heard {audi alteram partem). 
2. Lord Shaw said that the term "natural justice"· is "a high 
sounding expression" "harmless", if it "means that a 
result or process should be just" but otherwise "confusing 
or nvacuous"· (Local Government Board v. Arlidge, £1915J 
A.C. 120 at P.l38. According to Professor Dowrick the use 
of the term natural justice in referring to the ~ judex 
in !,!! ~ and audi alteram partem principles which have 
evolved as canons of fair trial by the common lawyers and judges would be misleading, Justice According to the 
English Common Lawyers, Chap. 3 p.41 et seq. 
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case that "there is no better rule of natural justice than 
the one that a man shall not be a judge in his own 
cause". (3) 
U.S .A. 
In the United States, the Constitutional gurantee of due 
process embodies the right of a litigant to have his 
controversies resolved by an impartial adjudicator.C4) 
The American Constitution does not define due process of law. 
The courts have defined it in a number of ways. Due 
process means according to the settled course of judicial 
proceedings,C5) or in accordance with natural, inherent 
and fundamental principles of justice. (6 ) The concept of 
due process under American law has two aspects, substantive 
and procedural.(?) Procedural due process is the American 
counterpart of English natural justice. The requirement of 
an impartial decision makeT is an essential component of 
~rocedural due process. (B) "A fair trial by a fair tribunal 
is a basic requirement of due process· •••• i'To this end no 
man can be a judge in his own cause and no man is permitted 
to try cases in which he has an interest in the outcome".(9) 
3. Per Lord Widgery C.J. in R.v.Altrincham Justices Ex parte 
Pennington 1 Q.B {S97§/ 549 at P. 552. (D.C •. ). 
4. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the USA constitution (discussed later). 
5. Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 18 
How. 272, 276. (1856-)' 
6. Holden v. Hardy, 169 u.s. 366. 
7. 16 Am. Jur. 2d§ 548. Procedural due process includes the 
two principles of natural justice, impartiality and hearing. 
B. Hortonville Education Association v. Hortonville Joint 
School Dist. No.I.(Wis. 197$), 225 N.W. 2d 658 reversed 
on other grounds 49 Led 2d I. (U.S.Sup.Ct.). 
9. In re Murchison, 349 u.s. 133, 136.(1955). 
- 3 -
However it would be inappropriate to say much about the 
meaning or extent of the rule against impartiality at the 
opening of the inquiry, since this must be established at 
more length later. Before doing this, the development of 
the rule under English and American law has to be 
discussed. 
- 4 -
a THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 
ENGLAND 
The idea of impartial trial has been propounded by English 
judges and jurists from an early Period. The contemporary 
version of a fair trial by an impartial tribunal that exists 
under the English and American legal systems is the 
culmination of a long development that took place in these 
two countries. Impartiality on the part of judges was 
considered to be essential in order to protect citizens' 
rights and interests. Thus there is some early authority 
to the effect that even the King could not be a judge in 
his own case i.e. in cases of high treason (where he was 
prosecutor, or at least the offended Party. (l) In an 
assize by two justices when pending the assize one justice 
died and one of the parties himself became judge, it was held 
that he could not be a judge in his own cause.( 2 ) 
( 3 )' It was decided in the Earl of Derby's case that the 
Chamberlain of Chester, being sole judge of equity, could 
not decree anything wherein he himself was party, for he could 
not be a judge, in propria causa, but in such cases where he 
1. L. Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown (1216 - 1377) 
47-49. 
2. (1371} 45 Lib.Ass. 3. 
3. Earl of Derby's case (1613) 12 Co. Rep. 114. 
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was a party, the suit should be heard in Chancery, coram 
domino rege.< 4 ) In Foxham Tithing's case an order of 
sessions was quashed because one of the justices was 
surveyor of the high way, and he joined in making the order 
and his name was put in the caption.<5) 
The litigant 1 s right to have an impartial ·judge was also 
propounded by mediaeval jurists. The author of "Glanvill"" 
in the 12th century conceived that trial in the King's court 
should be conducted in accordance with justice and truth and 
that there no man would be driven away because of judge's 
partiality to friends.< 6 ) As early as the 13th century 
Bracton wrote in his "De Legibus" that a judge was not to 
hear a case if he was suspected of partiality because of 
consanguinity, affinity, friendship or enmity, or any other 
relationship which might influence his judgment.<?) It 
appears that under canon law also judges could be recused on 
similar grounds.C8) Again Bracton writes that jurors can be 
challenged because they are friends or enemies of the parties, 
or if they have themselves made some claim in the 
subjectmatter of the suit or are re·lated to either party by 
4. Earl of Derby's case op. cit. 
5. 2 Salk 607; 14 Vin. Ab. 576. Similarly in Company of 
Mercers v. Ironmongers of Chester v. Bowker 1 Stra. 639 a 
member of the company became mayor and member of the 
court before judgment and for that reason the judgment was 
reversed in the Court of Quarter Sessions and the 
reversal was affirmed in the Kings Bench. 
6. De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae (circa 1187) 
ed. Woodbine (1932)" pp. 23-24. 
7. De Legibus, f412. 
8. Codex Juris Canonici; (Canons 1613 - 1614 Recusal of judges on grounds of pecuniary interest kingship, 
friendship, enmity, advocacy etc.)-
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ties of affinity or consanguinity, or are treated as one of 
the family of either of the parties, or are their 
counsellors, and so on.(9) Salmond is of the opinion that the 
list of causes for which a juror could be challenged given by 
Bracton has obviously been influenced by the canon law.(lO} 
Nevertheless, Holdsworth observes that the English lawyers 
and judges neither borrowed the rules wholesale nor tried to 
apply them in their entirety, as the jury were more than 
witnesses and with the development of jurors the rules as to 
the competency of jurors also developed on native lines.(ll) 
How far canon law principles influenced English judges 
and lawyers is hard to say. On the other hand it is clear 
that English judges and lawyers were moving independently 
towards the idea of a fair and impartial trial by applying 
their own commonsense and reason. Earlier decisions show 
that under common law jurors were disqualified for 
relationship, but judges were not. Because of the principle 
9. Bracton, De Legibus, f.ll8a. 
10. Salmond, Essays in Jurisprudence,29; "canon law rejected 
the testimony of infamous persons •••• of persons 
connected with either party by consanguinity and 
affinity, or belonging to the household of either party, 
of enemies of either party •••"' see w.s. Holdsworth, A Hist~of English Law-Vol.lX··p.l86 (citing Salmond, op.cit.). 
11. The development of the rules to ensure that the jury 
came de vicineto i.e. that the jury must come from the 
immediate neighbourhood of the place in which the facts 
in issue occurred. They gradually cease to be 
witnesses and had become judges of the facts, - w.s. 
Holdsworth A History of English Law, Vol - I p. 332. 
The canon law rules were later applied in a modified 
form to ensure competency of witnesses at common law -
History of English Law,Vol. IX p. 186 et seq. 
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that "favour shall not be presumed in a judge",(l2) it was 
not until 1866 in R. v. Rand that relations~ip as a ground 
for disqualification of judges was finally settled. (l3) In 
Brett and Rowley the report records that: "Brett of 
Newcastle commenced a suit in the court, and afterwards made 
judge of the court of the town and good, because he was not 
the sole judge, for the court was holden before Brett".<l4 ) 
The judgment was given by the court and not by him. 
Nicholas Bacon's ~' a recognizance was made to Sir 
Nicholas Bacon and to two others and it was taken and 
In Sir 
recognized before him. The recognizance as to him was held 
void because of his pecuniary interest but to the other two 
it was held good enough. (l5J On the other hand, in City of 
London v. Wood(l5a) where an action of debt for fine was 
brought in the L.ord Mayor 11s court for a refusal to serve in 
the office of Sheriff, though the Lord Mayor's interest in 
the fine was indefinitely small, it was held that the action 
could not be maintained of which he was even nominally the 
Chief Judge, even though it was proved that the Lord Mayor. 
did not actually sit in the court and sittings in fact took 
place before ·the Recorder. Hatsell, one of the Barons of the 
Exchequer,ruled that an action cannot be brought by mayor and 
comm0nal~ in a court held before the mayor and alderman; for 
though the mayor be not sole plaintiff nor sole judge, yet is 
12. Brookes v. Earl of Rivers (1668) Hard 503, a brother in 
law relationship existing between the judge and one of 
the parties did not disqualify. But in an earlier case 
Vernon v. Manners (1572}2 Plow. 425, the entire jury 
were struck out because the Sheriff who summoned the jurors was related to one of the parties in the 9thdegree. 
13.. (1866)'. :L.R. 1· ·Q.B •.. · 
14. 2 Dyer 220b, 14 Vin. Ab. 574. 
15. (1563.) 2 Dyer 220b. 
15a. (1701) 12 Mod. 669. 
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he essentially plaintiff and judge - na thing against 
natural justice".(l6) Holt C.J. said: 
"It is against all laws that the same person should be 
party and judge in the same cause, for it is manifest 
contradiction; for the party is he that is to complain to the 
judge and the judge is to hear the party; the party 
endeavours to have his will, the judge determines against 
the will of the party and has authority to enforce him to 
obey his sentence; and can any man act against his will or 
enforce himself to obey?n(l6) 
On the other hand in Marwick v. City of London it was 
held that an appeal properly lay from the Sheriff's court in 
London to the Court of Hustings though the Lord Mayor was the 
chief judge of the court and the action was brought on a bond 
given to the Lord Mayor who was plaintiff in the original 
cause. T.'he Court of Hustings in London is the only court 
where a writ of error of a judgment given in the Sherriffts 
court lies. The Lord Mayor of London is not the sole judge 
of the Court of Hustings, for by the constitution of that 
court it may be held by six aldermen in his absence.<l7) The 
rule of necessity was also recognised by the judges. If an 
action be sued in bank against all the judges there; in such 
case for necessity be. their own judges.<l8) Nevertheless in 
earlier cases judges differed in their opinion. It is 
interesting to note that in an unnamed case Lord Holt said 
that the Mayor of Hereford was laid by the heels for sitting 
in judgment in a case involving the rights of his own lessee 
though by charter he was the sole judge of the court and no 
other party was competent to sit. The Mayor was in effect 
acting as judge in his own cause and upon complaint of this 
16. 12 Mod. 669, 672, per Holt C.~ at 687. 
17. Marwick v. City of London (1707) 2 Brown P.c. 409. 
18. 8 H.6. 19.b; 14 Vin. Ab. 573. 
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matter to the court, it granted an attachment and committed 
the Mayor for the proceedings.(l9) 
In fact the attention of the earlier judges was 
directed primarily to the attainment of a practical and 
legally sound result in the case at hand. Even Acts of 
Parliament were read in the light of reason and convenience 
i.e. to be so understood that neither injustice nor 
absurdity ensued. In certain instances the courts had 
disregarded the express words of the statutes. In Dr. 
Bonham's case, a clause in a patent confirmed by statute 
had conferred upon the Royal College of Physicians power to 
fine and imprison unlicensed physicians practising in 
London - half the fine to go to the college and half to the 
King. Acting under this statutory authority the censors 
of the college had fined and imprisoned Dr. Bonham who 
retaliated by bringing an action of false imprisonment 
against him. The words of the first clause of the act were 
straightforward. Such a provision Coke and his companion 
judges considered as injustice since censors were at the 
same time, judges, ministers and parties. 
sense of justice led Lord Coke to declare: 
The powerful 
11The censors cannot be judges, ministers and parties; judges 
to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; 
19. Mayor of Hereford's case referred to in Anon. (1697) 
1 Salk 396. Until 1938, the High Court could direct 
a criminal information to issue against a magistrate 
who corruptly adjudicated a matter in which he showed 
wilful partiality or had pecuniary interest. Criminal 
information (other than ex-officio) was abolished by 
statute(S.l2 of the Administration of Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1938) and ex-officio 
information by Section 6(6) of the Criminal Law Act 
1967. 
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and parties to ha¥e the moiety of the forfeiture, quia 
alequis non debet esse judex in propria causa, imo iniquum 
est aliquem suae rei esse judicem: and one cannot be judge 
and attorney for any of the parties ••• when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right or reason, or repugnant, 
or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul 
it and adjudge such Act to be voidn.(20) Likewise Hobart 
C .J. declared in Day v. Savadge that "'even an Act of 
Parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man 
judge in his own cause is void in itself, for jura naturae 
sent immutabilia and they are leges legumn.(21) 
In the last two cases, the rule that no man should be a 
judge in his own cause was regarded as universal and 
immutable, and a link was drawn between the rule and the 
concept of natural justice. 
20. Dr. Bonham 1 s case (1610) 8.co.Rep. 107 a, 118 a. 
According to some authorities, Coke's use of the 
word nvoid" in the sense of "ineffective"· is more 
frequent - e.g. S.E~ Thorne, A Discourse • The 
section of an act which is inconsistent with another 
portion of it need only be considered as ineffective~ee 
pp-86-88 (n.l86, 187)~ According to some authorities 
it is doubtful whether a court ever held a statute 
void only because it made a man judge in his own 
cause e.g. T.F.T. Plucknett, Bonham 1s Case and 
Judicial Review, 4o Harv. L. Review 30. 
21. Day v. Savadge (1614) Hobart 85, 87. 
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The term natural justice in its widest sense was 
formerly used as a synonym for natural law, law of reason 
or laws of God. Its origin may be traced back to the Greek 
philosophers. Natural justice or natural law was thought 
(22) 
to be universal, unchanging and everlasting. However, 
the theories of natural justice as propounded by Greek and 
Roman Philosophers had little effect on English lawyers. (23) 
22. A Stotic philosophical conception as early as 312 B.C; 
see Cicero (106-'+3B .c.)' De Republica-III (XXII.,33). 
In classical Rome "Jus Naturale" or natural law 
played a decisive part in adopting positive law to 
changing situations. See A.P• D\Entr~ves, Natural Law, 
(1951) p. 21 et seq. For a historical survey of 
natural justice see H.H. Marshall, Natural Justice 
·Chapter~. (1959). Throughout the middle ages this law 
of reason which was sometimes equated with law of God, 
was regarded by the civil and canon lawyers as the 
basis of all laws. Whenever they faced with any 
problem for which the positive law was. silent they 
resorted to law of nature. Similar practice was 
adopted by the English Common law judges and lawyers. 
Yelverton c.J. said in 1470 (Y .B.8: Edw. IV 21)' "We 
shall do in this case as the canonists and civilians 
do where a new case comes up concerning which they 
have no existing law, than they resort to the law of 
nature which is the ground of all laws and according 
to what they consider to be most beneficial to the 
common weal they do, and so also we shall do ••••• ,.. 
Here the identity bet'l.veen the use made by canon and 
civilians of the law of nature and the use made by 
the common lawyers and judges of reason is in terms 
admitted. JUdges decided cases according to i.e. 
what they thought to be fair and beneficial to all 
concerned. In some English cases, natural law was 
identified with the laws of God, e.g. in Calvin 1's 
~ (1607) 7 Co.Rep. la, 13a. · 
23. F.E. Dowrick, Justice according to English common 
lawyers, Chap. 4 P.47. 
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Gratian eci·1ated natural law with divine laws, <24) St. 
Thomas Aquinas thought that natural law was ·nothing else 
than the participation of eternal law in the rational 
creatures - "Et talis participatio legis aeternae in 
rational! creatura lex naturalis decitur"(25) and 
comprises those precepts .that mankind is thus able to 
formulate, namely, the preservation of one's own good, the 
fulfilment of those inclinations "which nature has taught 
to all animals" etc. But unfortunately none of the· great 
exponents of natural law included this rule that "no mcm 
should be a judge in his own causet~ as a precept of 
natural law. (26) According to Professor Dowrick the 
principles of "natural justicen as employed by the High 
Court when it supervises the exercise of judicial and 
quasi-judicial powers by administrative tribunals "are 
not demonstratively deductions actually made by the judges 
in the last two hundred years from the precepts of the 
natural law or the old and new testaments, but are more 
obviously the historical deposits of those considerations 
which go to make the common lawyers' notion of fair 
trial" .<27)Nevertheless it may be submitted that some 
24. Decretum Gratiani I,VIII,2. 
25. St. Thomas Aquinas., -summa Theologica' ; A. P • .D. 
\Entreves .,~Aquinas selected political writings·; 
. 114, 115, (Art 2. concl.): P. 123. (Art.2.concl). 
26. See F.E. Dowrick. op.cit. chap.3 "Justice as Fair 
triaL" - p. 42. 
27. op.cit. chap. 4 "Natural Justice" p. 66. 
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C k (28) (29) earlier judges such as o e, Hobart, and even 
Holt( 30) tried to link this rule with natural justice 
and held it as being supreme over the Acts of Parliament. 
But this contention that an Act of Parliament was not 
binding if it was contrary to reason did not survive 
far into the nineteenth century. The inroads that 
parliamentary sovereingty had made by the eighteenth 
century are clearly visible in Blackstone.<31) ·Judges 
have since then been unwilling to accept the view that 
if an Act of Parliament makes a man judge in his own 
28. Dr. Bonhams case , supra • 
29. Day v. Savadge , supra • 
30. Holt C.J. said in City of 1ondon v. Wood "And what 
my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case •••• is 
far from any extravagancy, for it is a very 
reasonable and true saying that if an Act of 
Parliament should ordain that the same person 
should be party and judge or •••••• judge in his 
own cause it would be a void Act of Parliament" 
(1701) 12 Mod. 669 at 687. 
31. "Thus if an act of Parliament gives a man power to 
try to all causes that arise within his manor of 
Dale, yet if a cause should arise in which he himself 
is party, the act is construed not to extend to that, 
because it is unreasonable that any man should 
determine his own quarrel. But, if we could conceive 
it possible for the Parliament to enact that he 
should try as well his own cause as those of other 
persons, there is no court that has power to defect 
the intent of the legislature, when couched in 
such evident and express words, as leave no doubt 
whether it was the interest of legislature or no"· (Comm.,I.91) 
- lit -
cause, the courts might disregard it. "We sit here 
as servants of the Queen and the Legislature ••••• If 
an Act of Parliament has been obtained improperly, it 
is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it: 
but so long as it exists as law, the courts are bound to 
obey it". (32 ) Finally, it may be submitted that the 
early common law rule of disqualification was clear and 
simple. A judge was disqualified for pecuniary or 
proprietary interest.<33) But the first suggestion 
that a judge can be disqualified because of bias itself, 
whatever its source, other than those recognised under 
common law, was made by Blackburn J. in R.v. Rand. The 
learned judge said that a judge would be disqualified 
"whenever there is a real likelihood that the judge would 
from kindred or any other cause, have a bias in favour of 
one of the parties it would be very wrong in him to act: 
and we are not to be understood to say, that where there 
is a real bias of this sort this court would not 
interfere ••• •t(34) 
32. Lee v. The Bude and Torrington Junction Railway 
Company (1871) L.R. 6.C.P. 576 at 582 (Per Willes J). 
English cases have consistently supported this view to 
the present time: Pickin v. British Railways Board 
Cl974J 1 All E.R. 609. (H.L.). 
33. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (Proprietors of) (1852) 
3 H.L.C. 759. 
34. R.v. Rand (1866) L.R. l.Q.B. 230, 232-33. Judges 
were disqualified under the new doctrine when they 
were "substantially" even though not pecuniarily 
interested: R.v. Meyer (1875) I Q.B.l73. The doctrine 
has been developed and used liberally and flexibly by 
the English Courts, e.g. Frome United Breweries Co. v. 
Bath Justices .L 1926:1 A .C. 586. (justices who opposed 
renewal of licences took part in the hearing of the 
application for licences. 
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u.s.A. 
The rule against interest and bias is as deep-
rooted under American law as under English. The key to 
the development of this rule is the provision of due process 
clauses in the federal and state Constitutions. (35) ~ 
The restriction imposed upon the congress by the due 
process clause in the Fifth Amendment has been extended to 
limit the powers of the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment which declares that no state ·shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law". (36) The due process concept as it has been 
interpreted by the American courts imposes certain 
procedural requirements which must be follm..red not only by 
judges but also by administrative adjudicators whether or 
not they are made mandatory by statute. 
35. Besides the provision of the ndue process clause" in 
the Federal Constitution many of the State Constitutions 
have clauses like "without due process of lawn. For 
example, the constitution of the State of Illinois 
states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law" - Art.I, Bill 
of Rights, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State 
of Illinois (1970). Many state constitutions use the 
phrase "due course of law" (constitution of the State 
of Kansas, Bill of Rights s.18 (as amended); and Art 
I, Bill of Rights, Section 12, Constitution of the 
State of Indiana 1851 (as amended).Extracts taken from 
Constitutions of the ynited States, National and State. 
36. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S.A. Constitution states 
that no man shall be "deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law". The amendment 
was proposed by the Congress in September 1789 and 
ratified in December 1791. The Fourteenth Amendment, 
applying the same rule to the states was proposed in 
June 1866 and declared ratified in July 1868. 
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The con_cept of due process of law did not, of course, 
originate in the American system of constitutional law. 
It was brought from England to America as a part of the 
English common law. The clause has been repeatedly 
declared by the American courts to be the exact equivalent 
of the phrase 11 law of the land't as used in Magna Carta. (37) 
Due process of law means process according to the law of 
the land. Mr. Justice Curtis said 11The words 11'due process. 
of law" were undoubtedly intended to convey the same 
meaning as the words "by the law of the land 11 in Magna 
Carta. (38) As the American Constitution does not contain 
any further definition of what due process of law is, the 
courts generally consider two factors - firstly, whether 
the act complained of violates the constitutional 
provisions: and secondly, whether it violates the settled 
37. 
38. 
Dent V. West Virginia 129 U.s. lllf-, 124. (1889) 
The paraphrase of the words of the famous 39th 
chapter of King John's charter of liberties 
(sometimes called 29th chapter) reads as follows: 
11
'The body of no free man shall be taken, nor 
imprisoned, nor disseised, nor outlawed-nor 
banished, nor destroyed in any way and the King 
shall not go or send against him by forces except 
by the judgment of his peers and by the law of 
the land". 
Murray's Lesseesv. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 
18 How. 272, 276 (59 U.s. 272 1856) Coke in his 
commentary on these words said that they meant 
•tdue process of law" - (Coke - 2 Institute, 50, 
commentaries on the 29th chapter of Magna Carta. 
It is said that when first adopted in Magna Carta, 
the phrase "law of the landn had reference to the 
common and statute law then existing in England, 
and when embodied in the constitution in America, it 
referred to the same common law as previously 
modified and as far as suited to the wants and 
conditions of the people - Knoxville Iron Co. v. 
Harbison 183 u.s. 13. (1901) 
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usages and principles of judicial procedure which existed 
under English law and were recognised by the colonial 
courts prior to the adoption of the Federal and State 
Constitution. "The article is a restraint on the 
legislative as well as on the executive and judicial 
powers of the Government, and cannot be construed as to 
leave Congress free to make any process "due process of 
law" by its will ••• we must examine the constitution 
itself to see whether this process be in conflict with 
any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must 
look to those settled usages arid modes of proceedings 
existing in the common and statute law of England, before 
the emigration of our ancestors and which are shown not to 
have been unsuited to their civil and political condition 
by having been acted on by them after the settlement of 
this country".C39) The principle that no man should be a 
judge in his own cause along with the settled usages and 
procedures existing in the common law of England at the 
time of adoption were introduced into the American system. 
In order to ascertain whether a particular procedure 
fulfilled the due process requirement, the courts examined 
the usages and procedure prevalent under English law. So 
trial before a tribunal financially interested in the result 
of its decision constituted a denial of due process of law 
just as it constituted a breach of natural justice under 
39. Per Mr. Justice Curtis in Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken 
Land and Improvement Co, (supra ) approved and 
quoted in many later cases e.g. Holden v. Hardy 169 
U.s. 366 at p. 390 (1898). 
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English law.(4o) The Supreme Court said in Tumey v. 
Ohio: (4l) 
rtThere was •••••• no usage at common law by which 
justices of the peace or inferior judicial officers were 
paid fees on condition that they convicted the defendants, 
and such a practice certainly cannot find support as due 
process of law in English precedent", then, after 
reviewing a number of English and American cases the court 
continued: 
"From this review we conclude, that a system by 
which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when 
he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by 
custom in the general practice either at common law or 
in this country that it can be regarded as due process of 
law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that 
they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de 
minimis non curat lex". The writings and commentaries 
of Coke, Blackstone and other English legal scholars 
exerted great influence over American judges and lawyers.(42) 
4o. Tumey if. Ohio 273 U .• s. 510; Landfear v. Mayor 4 La. 97. 
41 •. Tumey v. Ohio 273 u.s. 510, 526, 531. 
42. For example in Tumey v. Ohio, Supra at 526, reference 
to Blackstone (Book 3rd page 400) was made by the 
Supreme Court of the United States: "Blackstone's 
commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory 
exposition of the common law of England" - 195 
U.S. Schick v. United States, 65, 69. (1904). 
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The principle enunciated in Dr. Bonhams case was followed 
in American cases. Under American law, quite apart from 
the statutory provisions, it is the general rule that 
officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity 
are disqualified from adjudging because of their interest 
in the controversy to be decided.C43) According to the 
opinion of an American writer: nThis maxim persists today 
even without the aid of statute. Recently the impartial 
tribunal seems to have become a part of that standard 
known as due process". (44) 
However it should not be supposed that every form of 
procedure settled in English law at the time of emigration 
to America and practised by the early colonists is an 
essential element of due process of law today. "The strict 
common law rule was adopted in this country as one to be 
enforced where nothing but the common law controlled, and 
citizens and taxpayers have been held incompetent to sit in 
suits against the municipal corporation of which they have 
been residents ••••••••• however, ••••• the strict rule 
seemed to be inconvenient, impracticable and unnecessary 
and the view was taken that such remere or minute interest 
in the litigation might be declared by the legislature not 
to be a reason for disqualification of a judge or jurorn.C45) 
So it cannot be said that every form of procedure settled 
in English law at the time of emigration to America and 
43. For example City of Naperville v. Wherle 173 N.E. 165 
(1930) Sup.Ct. of Illinois (at p.l66). 
44. Robert N. Covington 13 Vanderbilt Law Review 712, 
727 (1960). 
45. Tumey v. Ohio, supra: at 529. 
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practised by the early colonists is an essential element 
of due process of law. In that case the procedure of 
the early colonists would be fastened upon American 
jurisprudence like a ttstraight jacket" rendering it 
incapable of progress or improvement.(46) As a member of 
the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
n· •••••••• Expressing as it does in its ultimate 
analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just 
treatment which has been evolved through centuries of 
Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization,"· 
due process cannot be imprisoned within the 
treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a 
profound attitude of fairness between man and man and more 
particularly between the individual and government "due 
process .. is compounded of history, reason, the past course 
of decisions and stout confidence in the strength of the 
democratic faith which we p-rofess" • ( 47) The American 
judges arrived at a conclusion using their own sense of 
justice or notion of a fair and impartial trial. 
Therefore, while the basic principle is the same, its 
application and the detailed rules derived from it sometimes 
differed in the two countries, as we shall see. In many 
cases, the American courts did not follow English path. 
46. Twining v. New Jersey 211 u.s. 78, 101 (1908). Due 
process does not require a proceeding according to the 
common law or any particular formi matters of procedure 
being subject to legislative regu ation provided the 
essential elements of due process are preserved: 
Kessler v. Thompson (ND) 75 N.W. 2d 172. 
47. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comrn. 2 v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 162-3 (1950)._ 
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Early co~on law in the United States adopted the 
grounds for disqualification then existing in England such 
as pecuniary interest<48) or relationship.(49) But while 
the English courts disqualified judges for bias and 
prejudice(50) almost all American courts refused to 
recognise a general right of disqualification when a judge 
is prejudiced.(51) Accordingly, statutes came to be 
enacted enabling litigants to disqualify biased judges in 
situations not covered by earlier law.<52 ) In analogizing 
from courts to administrative bodies, the tendency has been 
to apply the same rules formulated for judges. This has 
meant that administrative decisions have been overturned 
when the adjudicator is pecuniarily interested(53) or was 
48. Commonwealth v. McLane, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 427 (1855). 
49. Paddock v. Wells, 2 Barb, 331 N.Y. Ch.(l847). 
50. For example: R.v. Rand L.R. 1 Q •. B. 230, 232, 233 
(1866- real bias), R.v. Meyer 1 Q.E.D. 173 
(1875- real bias). 
51. E.g. (1895) Jones Y. State 61 Ark, 88, 32 S.W. 81: 
52. (1894) Clyma v. Kennedy, 29 Atl.539(1894-) Congress 1m 1911 
granted the right to litigants to disqualify judges 
for personal bias or prejudice in the United States 
district courts by adding section 21 to the Judicial 
code of 1911. The current provision is 28 u.s.c.§ 
144. 
53. For example, in Re city of Rochester, 208 N.Y. 188, 
101 N.E. 875 (1913) commissioners were disqualified 
from acting in eminent domain proceedings whose lands 
would be assessed for purchase price. 
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so biased for other reasons that his decision demanded 
reversal. (54) 
54. National Labour Relations Board v. Phelbs (1943) 
136 F. 2d 562: n... a fair trial by an unbiased 
trier of facts is of the essence of the 
adjudicatory process as well when the judging is 
done in an administrative proceeding by an 
administrative functionary as when it is done in a 
court by a judge ••••• n· (Hutcheson, Circuit Judge 
u.s. Ct. of Appeals, 5th circuit). at p. 563. 
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CHAP!'ER II 
MODERN APPLICATION OF THE RULE ENGLAND 
Today, the rule that no man should be a judge in his 
own cause has become a rule against bias and pecuniary 
interest. ~he rule applies whether the adjudicator is a 
judge or an administrative official. It has been held 
that the same rule prima facie applieS to members of 
administrative tribunals as applies to judges when judicial 
functions are carried out. One guiding principle adopted 
for the application of the rule to the administrative bodies 
was that the members were in a similar rtjudicial positionn 
to judges, so that they must not be both accuser and judge,(!) 
or must not have any pecuniary interest or real bias.(2) 
Consideration of the extent of the application of the 
rule against bias and interest to the exercise by ministers, 
administrative tribunals or other bodies of their powers 
under statutory authority, is a question of some difficulty. 
The question arises whether such an authority in arriving 
at its decision acted or ought to have acted impartially 
and fairly i.e. in accordance with the rules of natural 
justice. 
The rule against bias and interest is merely a common 
law doctrine for the interpretation of statutes. Unlike 
American law, the rule has no specific constitutional or 
statutory safeguard. So '"hile American judges act with 
1. R.v. London County Council, ~. Akkersdyk, ~. 
Fermenia L 1892 ::7 l Q .B. 190. 
2. R.v. London County Council, ~Empire Theatre (1894) 71 
L,.T. 638. 
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constitutional and statutory authority, English judges 
seek to carry out the true intention of Parliament. English 
judges contend that Parliament intends that power should 
be exercised in a fair and impartial manner and that in the 
absence of any statutory provision as to how the person 
who to decide is to proceed "the justice of the common law 
will supply the omission of the legislature".(3) 
In order to apply the rules of natural justice, 
some courts have emphasized that a duty to act judicially 
in accordance with the rules of natural justice arises by 
implication in the exercise of administrative power 
affecting the rights and interest of subjects.(4) On other 
occasions courts have treated the essential criterion as a 
procedural one: anybody with a duty to determine a dispute 
bet,.,reen two parties by means of a procedure analogous to a 
court is acting judicially and so must conform to the rules 
3. Byles J. in Cooper v. tA/andsworth Board of Works (1863) 
14 C.B.N.s. 180, at P. 194. Nevertheless "before this 
unusual kind of power is exercised it must be clear 
that the statutory procedure is insufficient to 
achieve justice and to require additional steps would 
not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation" 
-Wiseman v. Borneman Cl971.7 A.C. 297 at 308 (Per 
Lord Reid). 
4. Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 
In R.v. Electricity Commissioners ~1924~ 1 K.B. 171, 
205, Atkin, L.J. suggested that u·any body of persons 
having legal authority to determine questions affecting 
the rights of subjects and having the duty to act 
.judiciallyu .C emphasis addedJ was subject to rules 
of natural justice. However, this notion of 
superadded duty to act judicially was criticised by 
Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin: ~1964~ A.C. 40 at 
?. 74 at seq., (discussed later). 
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of natural justice. (5) In Errington v. Minister of Health, 
it was held that the Minister's function under the Housing 
Act 1930 in confirming a clearance order after a public 
local inquiry was made was quasi-judicial in nature and he 
was bound by the rules of natural justice. (6 ) But 
the meaning of "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" in this 
context was very imprecise, and both were criticised as 
suffering from obscurity of meaning. 
Wade commented:(?) 
Thus Prof. H.W.R. 
"The administrative function had to be miscalled 
•judicial' for the supposed reason that it was only to 
judicial functions that the principles of natural justice 
applied • • • • • • In the sphere of natural justice it was ••• 
••••••• a meaningless and dangerous shibboleth. The 
argument goes round in a circle; natural justice must be 
observed when the function is judicial; and the function 
is called judicial where natural justice is required to be 
observed". Diplock L.J. observed that even a town clerk 
could be said to exercise a "quasi-judicial" function 
because in attending meetings "like a judge he wears a wig''~ 8 ) 
5. Errington v. Minister of Health ~1953~ 1 K.B. 249. 
6. Ibid. This case has made it clear that minister and 
inspector's function under the Housing Acts are quasi 
judicial; they are bound by the rule against bias and 
interest (See Griffith and Street, Principles of 
Administrative Law, 5th ed. 1973, p. 183). 
7. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (2nd ed.) pp. 171-72. 
8. Wednesbury Corporation v. Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government No. 2. ~1966_7 2 Q.B. 275, 305. 
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In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning 
the House of Lords threw doubt on the applicability of the 
rule against bias to any kind of administrative acts at all. 
L.ord Thankerton said: 
"My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word 'bias' 
should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper 
significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from 
the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires 
from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are 
commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such 
as an arbitratoru.(9) In later cases, courts arrived at 
various anomalous decisions, where, for example grant or 
revocation of licences by administrative authorities was 
thought not to be subject to the rules of natural justice. 
In NaKKUda Ali v. Jayratne(lO) the Privy Council held that a 
textile trader could be deprived of his trading licence in 
breach of natural justice. The authority was not 
determining a question but simply withdrawing a privilege 
and there was no ground for holding that the authority was 
acting judicially or quasi-judicially. 
The uncertainty thus prevailing over this area of law 
was cleared away in 1964 by Ridge v. Baldwin,a most 
remarkable decision on natural justice which dealt at large 
with natural justice problems.(ll) The case concerned the 
9. [1948} A.C. 87 at p. 103 discussed in chapter on 
"Exclusion of the Rule". 
]Q. Cl951J A.C. 66. 
lL £1964-7 A.C. 4o. Normally if one rule of natural justice 
applies, both apply. But see note 32 - 34 of this 
discussion. 
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dismissal of a Chief Constable by a Watch Committee under 
Section 191 (4)' of the Municipal Corporation Act 1882, 
who neither informed him of the charges nor gave him any 
hearing. His appeal to the Home Secretary was dismissed. 
His claim for a declaration that his dismissal was void for 
breach of natural justice failed both in the High Court and 
Court of Appeal. In the Court of Appeal Harman L.J. said: 
nThe defendants were not deciding a question between 
the two opposing parties •••••• The defendants were acting 
in exercise of their administrative functions just as they 
were when they made the appointment under Section 19l(I) 
(of the Act of 1882)". (l2) But the House of Lords held 
that the Watch Committee was under an obligation to observe 
the rules of natural justice which they had failed to 
observe in this case. The meaning of 'judicial' was 
re-interpreted. According to Lord Reid,power to make a 
decision affecting the rights of a subject carries with it 
a corresponding duty to act judicially. There is no 
superadded duty to act judicially. His Lordship emphasised 
that any exercise of power which affects the rights, 
property or tenure of an office or membership of a union 
is subject to the rules of natural justice. This case is a 
landmark in the process of judicialization of administrative 
12. [1963] 1 Q.B. 539, 577. 
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acts. In ·l·ater cases the scope of the rule was further 
extended.Cl3) However courts are no longer concerned 
with the meaning of "judicial" or rtquasi-judicial" but have 
turned their attention instead to the concept of "acting 
fairly". The observance of the rule is now thought to be 
essential to ensure "fair play".Cllt) In recent years, the 
term natural justice has been made synonymous· with 
"fairplay" or "fairness" and the courts prefer to use the 
term "duty to act fairly" or "with fairness" instead of 
nduty to act judicially" (or "in accordance \vith rules of 
natural justice")' in relation to functions that are not 
analytically judicial but administrative. (15) There is some 
authority to suggest a degree of difference exists between 
the two terms · "natural justice"· and "fairness". For 
example, in Pearlberg v. Varty(l6) Lord Pearson said that a 
body with judicial or quasi-judicial function is required 
13. Lord Denning emphasised in R.v. Gamin~ Board, Ex p. 
Benaim and Khaida (1970) 2 Q.B. (C.A. 417 at P.lt30 that 
former"heresy" that the principles of natural justice 
apply only to judicial proceedings v1as "scotched" by 
Ridge v. Baldwin. The rules of natural justice apply 
generally in licensing cases and in particular to the 
Gaming Board. In Schmidt v. Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs (1969] 2Ch. 149, 170 (application for 
extension to stay was rejected without hearing). Lord 
Denning held that the rules of natural justice apply to 
a case where a person's 'right' 'interest' or 
'legitimate expectation' is at a stake. 
14. Edwards v. S.O.G,A.T • .Cl971..7 Ch. 35lt, 382. 
15. R.v. Birmingham City Justice, Ex p.Chris Foreign Foods 
(Wholesalers) Ltd • .ll970:? 1 W.L.R. llt28. 
16. ~1972~ a ALL.E.R. 6 at 17(concerned a decision of the 
Income Tax Commissioners). But·fairness obviously 
includes rules of natural justice, at least impartiality. 
See Re Godden ~1971~ 2 Q.B. 662 (C.A.). Such a 
distinction has been criticised by Professor Paul 
Jackson. See Paul Jackson, Natural Justice, P. 36, 37. 
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to act with,rules of natural justice whereas in case of a 
body performing administrative function, there is no 
presumption of acting with rules of natural justice, though 
there is an obligation to act with It fairness••. But the 
consensus of opinion is to regard thes~ phrases as 
synonymous. It is said that natural justice, after all, 
"is but fairness writ large juridically".Cl7) Again in 
Re Godden, the Court of Appeal used these phrases 
synonymously. L.ord Denning M.R. said: (18) 
"The decisions leading to a compulsory retirement are 
of a judicial character and must conform to the rules of 
natural justice •••••••• when a medical practitioner is 
making a decision which may lead to a man being compulsorily 
retired he must act fairly't. 
This case also illustrates that a duty to act fairly 
essentially includes a duty to act impartially. Fairness 
(or natural justice) was not observed as the doctor could 
not act impartially. Another example is R.v. Birmingham 
City Justice Ex parte Chris, Foreign Food (Wholesalers) 
Ltd.,(l9) a justice of the peace had ordered food to be 
destroyed as unfit for human consumption. Lord Parker C • J. 
said that it was quite unnecessary to classify the justices' 
function in deciding whether he had acted fairly, and added 
17. Furnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board ~1973~ l ALL 
E.R. 4oo at P. 412 (Per Lord Morris). 
18. R.v. Kent Police Authority Ex p.Godden ~1971~ 2 Q.B. 
662, 669 (C.A.). 
19. £1970J l W.L.R. 1428, 1432·, 1433. 
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that the rules of natural justice were in a case such as 
this limited to openness, fairness and impartiality. 
In short it may be submitted that at present the rule 
against interest and bias not only applies to courts and 
judicial bodies( 20) but also to administrative bodies and 
tribunals. (2l) It may be said that the rule is applicable 
to any administrative authority dealing with a person's 
(22) 11 right .. , ninterest" or "legitimate expectation". 
Natural justice has no application "to what have been 
called pure master and servant cases in which there is no 
element of public employment, or service, no support .by 
statute nothing in the nature of an office or a status 
which is capable of propection". (23) But pure master and 
servant cases should be distinguished from those cases where 
some incidents of relationship is governed by statute or 
20. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (Proprietors of) (1852) 
3H.L.C. 759 (Pecuniary interest)l R.v. Altrincham 
Justices Ex parte Pennington ~1~7~1 Q.B. 549 
(likelihood of bias as the Justice had an active interest 
in the organisation which was the victim of the offence). 
21. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) L,td v. Lannon 
~1969~ 1 Q.B. 577 (C.A.) (bias of Chairman of the 
rent tribunal). See also R.v. Preston supplementary 
Benefits Appeal Tribunal Ex p. Moore; R.v. Sheffield 
Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunals, Ex p. Shine 
./:1975..:7 1 W .L.R. 624 (C .A.). 
22. 
23. Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation l:l971~ 1 W.L.R. 1578, 
1596 (H.L.). 
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some element of status is involved. In Malloch v. Aberdeen 
Corporation, the dismissal of a teacher was held void by the 
House of Lords as being in breach of natural justice. 
Though the teacher could be dismissed at pleasure under the 
statute, the statute provided that the dismissal should 
be preceeded by three weeks' notice. The majority of the 
House of Lords implied into the provision the requirements 
of natural justice. (24 ) Similarly the requirement of 
impartiality applies to an educational institution( 25) just 
as it does to a trade union.C26) Courts have frequently 
expressed their view about the impossibility of excluding 
rules of natural justice by contract. Such a contract 
was held to be contrary to public policy.C 27) Now the 
T_rade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 provides the 
Statutory Safeguard ~the rules of natural justice which 
must be observed by every trade union and employers' 
association in hearing or determination of any question 
whether in relation to an alleged offence, an appeal or a 
dispute. <28 ) Similarly, the inspectors carrying on 
24. Supra. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Ward v. Bradford Corporation (1971) 704.G.R.27 
(Expulsion of a student on disciplinary ground), Tee 
rule is l~ss rigidly applied here. See aiscuss1on 1n 
Chap~ IV and n. 39 of this Chapter. 
Taylor v. National Union of Seamen ~1967~ 1 ALL E.R. 
769 (Union Secretary was infact prosecutor and judge). 
Here too, the rule seems to apply less rigidly, see 
discussions in Chapter III & IV. 
E.g. JL.ee v. Sh01.vmen's Guild of Great Britain .C.l95'2J' 
2 Q.B:-)29, 342. In Edwar~v. S.O.G.A.T. ~1970_7 3 ALL 
E.R. 689, b95, Lord Denn1ng denied that a union "can give 
itself by its rules an unfettered discretion to expel a 
man or to withdraw membership. The reason lies in the 
man 1 s right to work". 
28. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 S.6 (13). 
Schedule I Part II deals with unfair dismissal. 
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investigations _under the Companies Act 1948 are required 
to act fairly although their functions are not judicial or 
quasi-judicial but only administrative.(29) In Re 
Pergamon Press, the Court of Appeal emphasized the gravity 
of the consequences of the publication of the inspector's 
report which required the inspectors to act fairly.C29) 
However the conceptions which are indicated when natural 
justice is invoked or referred to are not comprised within, 
nor to be confined within, certain hard and fast rigid 
rules. (30) 11 Nat~ral justice is but fairness writ large and 
juridically. It has been described as 'fair play in 
action'. Nor is it a leaven to be associated only with 
judicial or quasi-judicial occasions. But ••••••••••• the 
requirement of natural justice must depend on the 
circumstances of each particular case and the subjectmatter 
under consideration".C31) 
29. In Re Pergamon Press Ltd., Cl970J 3 ALL E.R. 5'35' (C.A.). 
But see Maxwell v. Department of Trade and Industry 
Cl974.J 2 ALL E.R. 122, (C .. A.): "That which fairness 
calls for in one kind of inquiry may not be called for 
in another •••••••.• " (Per Lawton L.J. at 132). 
30. Wiseman v. Borneman ~1971~ A.C. 297, 308, 309. 
31. Furnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board Cl973:/ 1 ALL 
E.R. 4oo, at P. 412 (P.C., ·per Lord Morris). The 
Privy Council held that natural justice did not apply 
to the suspension by the defendant of a teacher 
pending proceedings. Although suspension might involve 
a hardship, it was not a penalty., There was 
opportunity for the teacher to present his case at the 
subsequent hearing, albeit after his suspension. The 
procedure laid down in the regulation was not unfair. 
For a criticiam of this case see M.J. Grant, nNatural 
Justice and Prima Facie casen, N.L.J. (1973) p. 694. 
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At present some reports of professional persons also come 
under the scope of this rule.<32 ) It now seems that the 
scope of the rule against bias and interest is wider than 
the principle of audi atteram partem. For example,a 
person is entitled to get an impartial decision from a 
professional expert(32) even if he has no right to a 
hearing before such person.C33) In a recent case Megarry 
J. said: nit is the position of independence and skill that 
affords the parties the proper safeguards, and not the 
imposition of rules requiring something in the nature of 
a hearing". (3lt) Conversely where a hearing is required by 
statute or under law it is essential that the hearing must 
be impartial. The requirement of a hearing is not met if 
the adjudicators sit with blinded eyes or cottoned ears, 
nor is it satisfied if their eyes are open but their minds 
are shut. Perhaps the present law could be accurately 
explained in this way: 
" ••••••• there is a tendency for the court to apply 
~this principle:7 to all powers of decision unless the 
32. E.g., R.v. Kent Police Authority, Ex p. Godden, supra. 
33. Hounslow L.B.C. v. Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. 
Ll971J Ch. 233. 
34. Ibid, PP• ~59 - 260. 
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circumstances suffice to exclude them11 .C35) 
' 
Finally it may be submitted that the rule against interest 
and bias is flexible in its application, like the due 
process clause under American law. (36) English Courts 
sometimes give more importance to public policy rather than 
the question of actual bias. The object is to clear 
everything which might engender suspicion or distrust from 
people and to promote a public feeling of confidence in 
the administration of justice. 11 Nothing is to be done 
which creates even a suspicion that there has been an 
improper interference with the course of ,justicen. (37) The 
r.ule varies according to the facts and circumstances of 
each case. If a Social worker involved in an adoption 
proceeding retires with the justices, their determination 
will be quashed - because justice was· not seen to be done. (38) 
But the strict procedure applicable to a court does not 
apply so rigidly in other cases, for example, in the case of 
an educational institution taking disciplinary action. 
35. Gaiman v. National Association for Mental Health ~1971~ 
Ch. 317, 333. The above comment was made by Megarry~ 
~,with regard to both principles of natural justice. 
The expression is subject to certain exce~tions -
Csee chapter on "Exclusion of the Rule"..::7. It also does 
not apply to legislative acts. Megarry,J.~himself held 
in a recent case that the rules of natural justice did 
not apply to legislative acts: Bates v. Lord Hailsham 
£'1972.:7 1 W .L .R. 1373 (Ch.D.) 
36. American law discussed in the next section. 
37. ~· Sussex JJ., Ex parte McCarthy ~192lt-_7 I K.B. 256, 
259. 
38. Re B. (a minor) £1975J 2 ALL E.R. 449. Professor Paul 
Jackson suggests that it was not necessary even if it 
were possible, to establish whether the social \vorker 
gave further evidence in the absence of the parties or 
participated with the justices in deciding the case, or 
both: 1976 Public Law I, at p.4. 
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What is important is that the body which takes such a step 
should be fair and unbiased.C39) The rule is not 
stereotyped; it is flexible and must be adjusted to the 
particular case, so it is impossible to lay down any rigid 
rule as to when the principle would apply or as to its 
extent. ..Everything depends on the subjectmatter of the 
case". (4o) 
39. Ward v. Bradford Corporation (1971) 70 L.G.R. 27. 
It may be noted that participation of an assistant 
director of education in the committee r·s deliberation 
did not invalidate the decision, (discussed later}. 
4o. R.v. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim and Khaida ~1970;7 
2 Q.B. 417 at 430. (The above comment was made by 
L.ord Denning N.R, with regard to the scope, and 
application of the rules of natural justice. In the 
recent case R.v. Home Secretary Ex parte Hosenball 
~1977~ 1 W.L.R. 766 the Court of Appeal held that in 
a case where national security was involved, the 
ordinary rules of natural justice were modified for 
the protection of the realm. 
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MODERN APPLICATION OF THE RULE : UNITED STATES. 
Under American Law, the rule against bias and interest 
enjoys constitutional (4l) and statutory safeguards. Unlike 
English law, the disqualification of judges in the 
United States is now governed by statute at both federal 
and state level. For example federal statute such as 
(4la) 28 U.s.c. Section 455 provides for judicial 
disqualification for interest , bias and other specific 
(42) 
grounds. Again 28 u.s.c. Section 144 empowers 
litigants to disqualify federal district judges for 
personal bias or prejudice. Similarly in the States, 
for example in California, disqualification of judges for 
interest, bias and other specific grounds is provided by 
t t t 
(42a) 
s a u e. 
Again federal statutes such as Administrativ~ Procedure 
Act has provided for disqualification of administrative 
adjudicators for bias and interest. ' 43 ) The Act has also 
. (44) 
made provision for judicial review. In many States 
review of administrative decision on grounds of procedural 
41. "In the United States, the rules of fair administrative 
procedure are embedded in the Constitution; the 
legislature itself consequently does not possess the 
authority to relieve the administration from· their 
demands" - B. Schwartzl An Introduction to American 
Administrative Law, (1~62) p. 106. 
4la. 28 u.s.c. §.455 (as amended) Dec.5, 1974, Pub 4. 
93-512 1, 88 stat. 1609. 
42. 28 u.s.c. s 144 (1970). 
42a.. California Civil Procedure Code (West Supp) S .170 (as 
amended by Stats. 1969,c.446, P.995 1; Stats 1971, 
c.8o7., P.l563 1; stats 1975, c.l24o P- , § 2. 
43.. Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c. §.556(b). 
44. Ibid, § 706. 
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unfaiTness is provided by statute.<45) Besides the due 
process clause in the u.s. Constitution itself imposes 
an obligation to be impartial on those who decide 
anything. In a leading case the United States Supreme 
Court emphasized that "when the constitution requires a 
hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal 
which meets at least currently prevailing standards of 
impartiality". <46 ) The Court observed that the 
Administrative Procedure Act requirements of a hearing by 
an impartial tribunal were also applicable to deportation 
proceedings where a full hearing was required by due process 
even though not by the deportation statute.< 47) The right 
to an impartial tribunal has become a constitutional as 
well as statutory right of a litigant. Impartiality is to 
be observed by a trier of a fact when the decision is made 
by an administrative authority just as when it is made by a 
judge in a court. <48 ) It was held in Tumey v. Ohio that 
ttevery procedure which would offer a possible temptation 
to the average man as a judge ••••••••• not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true between the state and the 
accused, denies the latter due process of law". (~9, 
45. E.g., Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 
g.l5. See Chapter VI "Remedies". 
46. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) (an 
alien held for deportation on a charge of being 
unlawfully in the United States). At the time when the 
case was decided, there was no requirement of a hearing 
in the deportation statute. 
47. Ibid, at 49,50. 
48. N.L.R.B. v. Phelbs, 136 F.2d. 562, U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, (1943). 
49. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 u.s. 510, 532 (1927). 
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A State is free to regulate its court procedure, 
nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court will 
interfere if it fails to provide an impartial tribunal 
which is an essential requirement of of due process of law. 
A procedure which violates the due process clause is held 
to be unconstitutional. (50) Administrative authorities, 
agencies, and statutory bodies, as well as bodies 
exercising disciplinary functions, are all under an 
obligation to observe impartiality. Impartiality is an 
essential requirement of due process.C51) It was 
formerly held that due process protects only property 
rights and was not applicable when the administrative 
action affected only a "privilege". Government and 
welfare benefits were all considered mere privileges. 
But the courts have fully and finally rejected the 
distinction between "rights" and rtprivileges" as the 
relevant criterion governing the applicability or otherwise 
of procedural due process rights. As Mr. Justice 
Blackmun has declared in a recent case that "this court 
now rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn 
upon whether a governmental benefit is characterised· as a 
"right" or as a privilege". (52 ) Even more sienificant is 
the opinion of circuit judge Berger in Gonzalez v. 
Freeman.C53) It has been long held that a person may be 
50. Tumey v. Ohio, o~.cit. 
51. Hortonville Education Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School 
District No.I. Wis ~1975~ 225 N.W. 2d 658. (reversed 
on other grounds - 49 Led ·2di, (Sup.et.l976). 
52. Graham v. Richardson 403, u.s. 365, 374, (1971). Denial 
of Welfare benefits to resident aliens held 
unconstitutional under the Equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
53. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. cir. 1964). 
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debarred from-eligibility for government contracts without 
compliance with the procedual requirements. In this case 
the plaintiff who had a contractual relation with a 
Commodity Credit Corporation (a federal government 
corporation) for many years was debarred from doing 
business pending an investigation into possible misconduct 
on his part, and, after investigation, the business was 
suspended for five years vli thout giving any reason. The 
circuit court observed that no one has a legal right to do 
business with the government, "but use of such terms as 
"right" or "'privilege" tended to confuse the issues 
presented by th~ debarment action. (54) Even if there was 
no right to government contracts that did not mean that the 
government "'can act arbitrarily, either substantively or 
procedurally, against a person or that such person is not 
entitled to challenge the processes and the evidence before 
he is officially declared inelligible for government 
contracts•t.C55) In another case involving the liberty of 
parolees, it was observed that whether this was a "right" 
or a •tpri vilegen, by whatever name it was called, the 
liberty was valuable, so that its termination called for 
some orderly and impartial process.C56) The Fourteenth 
54. Ibid, 574. 
55. Ibid, 574. 
56. Morrissey v. Brewer, 4o8 U.S. 471 (1972), (determination 
that reasonable grounds exist for revocation of parole 
be made by someone not directly involved in the case). 
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Amendments' procedural safeguard in protection of property 
is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person 
has already acquired in receiving specific benefits. A 
person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and 
administrative standards defining eligibility for them 
has an interest in the continued receipt of those benefits 
that is safeguarded by procedural due process. Although 
the pretermination hearing need not take the form of a 
judicial or quasi-judicial trial, it has to meet the 
minimum procedural safeguards demanded by rudimentary 
due process which included inter alia, the right to an 
impartial decision maker.<57) Likewise,college 
professors or school teachers dismissed during the terms of 
their contracts have interests in continued employment 
during such a period so that their termination must be 
made by an impartial authority.(58)' Whether or not due 
process requirement of impartiality applies depends, then, 
on whether the nature of the interest is one within the 
contemplation of the nright", "liberty" or "property" 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been held in 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth(59) that to have 
a nproperty interest"· in an employment, a person must have 
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have 
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Procedural due 
process applies only when such an interest exists. However 
57. Goldberg v. Kelly 397, u.s. 254, (1970). 271. 
58. E.g., Hortonville Education Association v. Hortonville 
Joint School District No.I, Wis 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975) 
reversed on other ground 49 Led 2d I, u.s.Sup.Ct. (1976). 
59. 4o8 u.s. 564 (1972). 
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there is some authority to suggest that procedural due 
process does not require that grounds for removal from 
government employment be initially considered by an 
impart-ial agency official. In a recent case, (60) brought 
by a discharged non-probationary federal employee, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the removal 
procedures established by the Lloyd La Follette Act 
{5 u.s.c. § 1501} did not violate due process of law in 
failing to provide a trial-type hearing before an impartial 
body i.e. other than the one making the charges against the 
employee even where, as in that case, the charges involved 
stat-ements of the employee accusing the official of 
misconduct, since the Act afforded a post-removal trial 
type of hearing on administrative appeal. (6l) 
As under English law, the rule against bias is subject 
to certain exceptions. For example it is held to be 
inapplicable to ministers and administrative authorities who 
may be predisposed in favour of some policy.< 62 ) Similarly, 
it also does not apply to legislative acts. Courts have 
refused to disqualify administrative officials called on to 
act in a legislative capacity, reasoning that the courts 
should not inquire into the motives of the legislators.<63) 
60. Arnett v. Kennedx 416 u.s. 134 (1974). 
61. Ibid. 
62. Both English and American cases on this point are 
discussed in the later chapter on "Exclusion of the Rule". 
63. E.g., City of Hiami Beach v. Schauer 104 So.2d 129, 132 
(Fla. 1958). 
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Final~y it may be observed that procedural due process 
has been made synonymous with the term "fA.irness" as with 
natural justice in England. <64 ) The due process requirement 
of a fair trial in a fair tribunal applies to both 
administrative agencies which adjudicate as well to 
courts.<65) Again, like natural justice due process is a 
flexible procedure and calls for such procedural protection 
as the particular situation demands. Due process is a 
term that ttnegates any concept of inflexible procedures 
universally applicable to every imaginable situation".(66) 
It would be wrong to suppose that situations which call for 
procedural safeguards necessarily call for the same kind of 
procedure. In determining whether a process fulfils the 
due process requirement of impartiality in a particular 
case, the court takes into account the individuals' stake 
in the decision at issue as well as the states' interest in 
a particular procedure for making it.<67) Due process 11is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances".(68) 
64. See In re Murchison (discussed earlier).Fairness 
requires absence of bias and interest. 
65. Withrow v. Larkin, 43 Led 2d 712, 723. u.s. Sup.et.(l975). 
66. 
67. 
68. 
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961). A Short-Order cook in a cafeteria who 
operated on the premises of a Navy Ordance installation 
was refused permission to enter without hearing. 
Hortonville District v. Hortonville Education 
Association 49 Led 2d I 110 7ll. U.S. Sup.Ct. (1976). 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 u.s. 
123, 162-63 (1951); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers 
Union v. McElroy - supra. 
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CHAPTER III 
PECUNIARY. INTEREST: ENGLAND: A)COURTS 
It is an unquestioned point of law both in England 
and the United States that a man has the right to trial 
before a disinterested judge. A direct pecuniary or 
proprietary interest, however small, would disqualify a 
judge or a magistrate under English law. No matter if 
the pecuniary interest is "less than fd. but it is still 
an interest"' which is enough to vitiate the decision of a 
judge in a given case. (l) 
If a judge is a shareholder in a corporation litigant, 
he is financially interested and is therefore disqualified 
for that reason. The most remarkable case in this 
connection is the Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co. (2 ) 
The facts of the case were that a public company which was 
incorporated filed a bill in equity against a land owner. 
The Lord Chancellor (Cottenham)' was a shareholder in that 
company. This fact was at first unknown to the defendant 
in the suit. The case was heard before the Vice 
Chancellor and the company was granted relief. The Lord 
Chancellor on appeal,affirmed the order of the Vice 
Chancellor. Lord Chancellor 1 s decree was set aside by the 
House of Lords. It was held that the Lord Chancellor was 
1. R.v. Hammond (1863) 9 L.T.(N.S.) 423 per Blackburn J. 
2. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co. (1852) 3 H.L •. C. 759. 
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disqualified, on the ground of interest, from sitting as 
judge in the cause, and that his decree passed in the case 
was therefore voidable and consequently must be reversed. 
·It was also held that the Vice Chancellor as he was not 
dependant but a judge subordinate to the Lord Chancellor, 
the disqualification of the Lord Chancellor did not affect 
him but his decree might be made subject to appeal to the 
House·of Lords. Lord Campell said in this case (at p. 
793): 
"I take exactly the same view of this case as do my 
noble and learned friends ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be in the 
remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had 
in this concern; but my Lords, it is of the last importance 
that the maxim that no man is to be judge in his own cause 
should be held sacred. And that is not he confined to a 
cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause in 
which he has an interest •••••••••••••••• And it will have 
a most salutary influence on these tribunals when it is 
known that this high court of last resort, ••••••••••• 
considered that his decree was on that account a decree not 
according to law, and was set aside ... When the 
disqualifying interest is direct pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, the disqualification is automatic and in "such 
case the law assumes bias•t. (3) The dictum of Blackburn J. 
in R.v. Rand on the law of bias is still considered to be 
3. R.v. Camborne JJ ~. Pearce Cl955.J. 1. Q.B.,;41 
~er Slade, ~. at-~?). 
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authoritative on the point. (4) The facts of the case in 
short were that the Corporation of Bradford were the 
owners of the waterworks and were empowered by Statute to 
take the water of certain streams without any permission of 
the mill owners, on obtaining a certificate from the 
Justices that a certain reservoir was completed of a given 
capacity and completed with water. An application was 
made by the Corporation which was opposed by the mill-
owners. After due inquiry, the certificate was granted 
to them. Now two of the justices were trustees of a 
friendly society and a hospital respectively, each of 
which had lent money to the corporation charging the 
Corporate fund. Neither of the justices could by any 
possibility have any pecuniary interest in these bonds, 
other than that the security of the "cestuiqui" trusts 
would be improved by anything improving the borough fund 
and the granting of the certificate would indirectly 
produce that effect as increasing the value of the 
waterworks. A rule nisi was obtained for certiorari to 
quash the certificate on the ground that the justices who 
granted it were interested in the subject matter. The 
opinion of Blackburn J. was expressed in the following way: 
"There is no doubt that any direct pecuniary interest, 
however small 1 in the subject of inquiry, does disqualify a 
person from acting as a judge in the matter; and if by any 
possibility these gentlemen, though mere trustees, could 
have been liable to costs, or to other pecuniary loss or 
gain, in consequence of their being so, we should think the 
4. R.v. Rand (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230. 
0 
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question different f'rom ,.,hat it is; for that might be held 
an interest. But the only way in which the facts could 
affect their impartiality, would be that they might have a 
tendency to favour for those for whom they were trustees; 
and it is an objection not in the nature of interest, but 
a challenge to the favour".(5) This case also lays down 
the principle that a mere trusteeship is not such a 
pecuniary interest as to disqualify a judge. The pecuniary 
interest, in order to be a disqualification, must be 
directly connected with the issue in question and must not 
be remote or indirect. 
The principle enunciated in R.v. Rand was approved 
in later cases.(6) The rule has been held to be so 
important that a century later Ormond L.J. in R.v. 
Barnsley Licensing JJ., where the particular pecuniary 
disqualification was invalidated by the provision in the 
statute, said: 
"Of course, if the justices had some direct pecuniary 
interest in the premises, other than an interest in the 
profits of the premises, than the principle in R.v. Rand 
would still apply and the act would be invalidated in spite 
5. Ibid,at f~ 232. 
interest is not 
is possible not 
or not there is 
233. (discussed 
This case suggested that when the 
a direct pecuniary interest, challenge 
for interest but for bias i.e. whether 
a real likelihood of bias - ibid, f. 
later). 
6. E.g. R.v. Meyer (1875) 1 Q.B. 173 at p. 177; Frome 
United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586 
at P. 591 (discussed in the later section on 
"Prosecutor-Judge cases"). 
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of the prov1s1ons of section 48(5) of the Licensing Act of 
1953". (7) 
In R.v. McKenzie, (8) in a prosecution under section 7 
of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, 
against a union leader, the prosecutor was the local agent 
of a shipping federation. The justices were shareholders 
in the shipping companies whose ships were insured in 
Societies which were members of the Federation. It was 
held by the Court that the justices' pecuniary interest was 
too remote to justify disqualification. The matter of 
remoteness of interest plays a decisive part in 
disqualifying for pecuniary interest. Another example 
where pecuniary interest was held to be too remote to 
disqualify is R.v. Middlesex JJ.C9) In it a company 
appealed against a poor rate to Middlesex Quarter Session. 
Some of the justices who were members of the Court of 
Quarter Sessions were also members of the County Council who 
were the owners of the tramways and had leased them to the 
tramway company on the terms that the council were to 
receive (inter alia) 45% of the net revenue of the tramway 
company. It was held that there was no pecuniary interest 
on the part of the justices. They were only trustees for 
the ratepayers of the money received from the tramways 
company. "[The Justices'] interest, if any, is only the 
7. R.v. Barnsley Licensing JJ.[i96o] 2 Q.B. 167 at ?a 182. 
8. R.v. McKenzie [1892] 2 Q.B. 519. 
9. ~· Middlesex JJ. (1908) 72 J.P. 251 (K.B.D.) 
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interest of tru~tees, they are not precluded from sitting 
on the hearing of the appealsn.ClO) Courts have adopted 
the principle that when pecuniary interest exists in any 
member of the adjudicating body, and even where it is 
shown that such members took no part in the decision, 
nevertheless the body is held to be inproperly constituted. 
Williams J. said in R.v. Cheltenham Commissioners: 
11 I am strongly disposed to think that a Court is 
badly constituted of which an interested person is a part, 
whatever may be the number of disinterested members. 
(We) cannot go into a poll of the Bench.u(ll)' 
• • • • • • • 
In R.v. Hertfordshire Justices, a magistrate who sat 
at Quarter Sessions to hear an appeal from his own 
decision was held to be interested because of his contingent 
liability for costs if the appeal was allowed. It was held 
that the Bench was improperly constituted by reason of his 
participation and the whole decision was vitiated. In 
such cases it was held to be no answer that there was a 
majority of the justices presiding in favour of the decision 
arrived at without counting the vote of the interested 
Justice, nor was it of any effect that he withdrew himself 
before the decision was arrived at, 11 for it is quite 
consistent with this that he may have joined in the 
10. Ibid, at '"P. 2 52. 
11. R.v. Cheltenham Commiss.ioners (1841) 1 Q.B. Rep. 467, 
478-480. The same view was taken in R.v. Hertfordshire 
JJ. (18!+$.), 6 Q.B. 753. 
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discussion, so far as to affect the result". (l2 ) According 
to Patteson J: ,,The real question is, has an interested 
person taken any part at all?"(l2a) 
The rule is that even if the pecuniary interest of the 
deciding authority is invalidated by provisions in a 
statute, then the invalidating effect will be only as 
regards the particular provision and the courts are ready 
to disqualify for another interest not covered by the 
statute. (l2b) An important case on this point is R.v. 
Barnsley L.icensing JJ. Ex parte Barnsley and District 
Licensed Victuallers Association (l3)'in which the facts 
arose in the following way: 
An application for a spirits off-licence at a drug 
department was granted to a Co-operative Society by seven 
licensing justices, six of whom were members of the Co-
operative Society. An appeal against an order rejecting 
an application by the Licensed Victuallers' Association 
for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the 
12. (1845) 6 Q.B. 753, 756-757 Per Lord Denman C.J. But a judge was not disqualified merely because he was 
sitting on appeal from his own decisions. Discussed 
in a later section, "Participation in Appeal against own 
decision". 
l2a, Ibid, f. 757. 
l2b. Disqualification will lie, apart from pecuniary interest, 
if the circumstances give rise to a real or reasonable 
likelihood of bias - Discussed in Chapter IV- "Bias". 
13. [1960) 2 Q.B. 167. (C.A.). 
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Licensing Justices was made before the Court of Appeal on 
the ground that the justices had a pecuniary interest in the 
matter and therefore were disqualified under Section 48 
of the Licensing Act of 1953. The Court of Appeal held, 
dismissing the appeal, that the dividend received by the 
members of the Society in respect of their purchases did 
not amount to a discount, but they were interested in the 
"profits of the premises 11 for which a licence was sought 
within sub-section 4 of section 48 of the Licensing Act 
1953. Lord Evershed M.R. said: 
"·It therefore follows that if the disqualification is 
limited to the fact that the person concerned had an 
interest in the profits in the kind stated in subsection (4), 
then that alone does not render the decision invalid • • • • • • 
to that extent the subsection ousts the rule of law 
enunciated in Reg. v. Rand. That conclusion does 
not mean, however, that the general rule of law is 
altogether superseded. All it means is that in a case 
which falls within the rule in Reg. v. Rand but also within 
the scope or limit or sub-section (4), the pecuniary 
interest will of itself, not withstanding the common law 
rule, not render invalid the justices' determination by 
reason of the words of sub-section(5) ••••••••••••••• I 
think that the construction put upon sub-section (3) of 
section 60 of the Act of l872Cl4 ) is authority for the view 
14. Section 60 of the Licensing Act 1872 created 
disqualification whereas sub-section 3 of section 60 
provided ••No act done by any justice disqualified by 
this Section shall by reason only of such 
disqualification be invalid" -(a similar provision 
was provided in sub-section 5 of the section 48 of 
1953 AC'R.) 
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which I take of th~ meaning and effect here of sub-section 
( 5) of section 48 of the Act of 1953": (l5} 
But such an approach might well lead to anomalies 
and Devlin L.J. commented:(l6) 
"On this view, a rather arbitrary situation may arise 
if a man is pecuniarily interested in the result of the 
application but not interested in the profits of the 
premises. In that case the underlying rule in Reg v. 
:!land applies, 't-lhereas if his interest is of a character 
which comes within the sub-section, then it will not apply. 
I cannot regard that as a satisfactory distinction, but I 
think it inevitably follows from the construction which we 
have put upon the section". 
Now the Licensing Act 1964, section 193, provides for the 
statutory disqualification of Licensing Justices for 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. (l7) There is some 
authority to suggest that a pecuniary or proprietary 
interest of a judge •·s spouse in a party before him would 
15. Lord Evershed M.R., supra,- at PP. 179, 180. 
16. Devlin L.J., Supra at P. 185. 
17. T.he invalidating effect of such interest has been 
removed by section 193 (6) (discussed in a later section 
on "Waiver.") but provision for penalty up to one 
hundred pounds has been made under sub-section (7). 
And again, even though the invalidating effect 
is removed by statute, disqualification is possible 
on the ground of bias~- E~g., R.v. Barnsle~ 
L.icensing Justices (o.p.cit.,) discussed~· · 
further · in Chapter IV. 
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not disqualify a. judge.<lB) In an Australian case, 
R..v. Industrial Court(l9J a dispute arose concerning the 
reemployment of miners of Mount Isa Mines Lt~ and the 
company being dissatisfied with the order of the 
Industrial Commission appealed to the Industrial Court. 
The President of the Industrial Court, Hanger,J.,allowed 
the appeal and set aside the order. The wife of the 
President held shares in the Mount Isa Mines Ltd, though 
the President did not own and had never owned any stock 
in the company and had no pecuniary interests in the units 
held by his wife. It was held by the Full Court that a 
judicial officer whose wife held shares in a company which 
was party to the proceedings before him did not on that 
account himself had a disqualifying interest, the question 
being whether in all the circumstances of the case it had 
been shown that there was a real likelihood of bias. 
It may, therefore, be stated that unless there is 
statutory exemption, a direct pecuniary interest however 
small or insignificant always disqualifies a judge or 
justice under English law. The Courts always consider it 
as a "serious dereliction"' of duty for a justice to 
adjudicate on a matter in which he or she has got a 
pecuniary or proprietary interest.<20) 
18. Further discussion on this point has been made in a 
later section - Pecuniary Interest: u:.s .A.: Courts. 
19. R.v. Industrial Court [1966) Qd. R. 245. It vras held 
further, that as there was no real likelihood of bias, 
the president was not disqualified from determining 
the appeal. 
20. Per Lord Widgery C.J. in R.v. Altrincham JJ. Ex 'P. 
Pennington 1 Q .B. [ 1975] 549 at "P. 552 (D.c.). 
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PECUNIARY INTEREST (B)BODIES OTHER THAN COURTS : ENGLAND 
The rule applicable to courts applies, with appropriate 
modifications, to other non-judicial bodies acting 
judicially and to administrative tribunals whose functions 
are analogous to those of courts. As has been observed, 
a direct pecuniary interest always disqualifies a judge 
under common law and there is no difficulty in applying 
the rule to bodies when their proceedings are in the nature 
of a judicial type of proceedings. In such cases although 
the statute was silent on the principles of natural justice, 
nevertheless the court was ready to infer that in 
providing for a judicial type of proceeding, the statute 
certainly imported that the substantial elements of natural 
justice must be observed by the deciding authority. As 
Bowen L.J. observed in Leeson v. General Council of Medical 
Education: (21) 
"These proceedings vrere in the nature of judicial 
proceedings, although the forum is a domestic one •••••••••• 
The jurisdiction is defined by the statute. There must be 
an allegation before the General Medical Council of imfamous 
conduct ••••••••• and adjudication must be arrived at after 
inquiry. The statute says nothing more, but in saying so 
it certainly imports that the substantial elements of natural 
justice must be found to have been present at the inquiryn·. 
The learned judge continued: 
"[Nothing] can be clearer than the principle of law 
21. L,eeson v. General Council of Ivledical Education (1889) 
43 Ch.D (C.A.) 366 at P. 383. 
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that a person whp has a judicial duty to perform 
disqualifies himself from performing it if he has a 
pecuniary interest in the decision which he is about to 
give or a bias which renders him otherwise than an 
impartial judge". (22 ) 
Existence of pecuniary interest makes disqualification 
automatic. In such a case the law will not enquire 
'~whether or not the mind was actually biased by the 
pecuniary interest 11 • (22) 
In this century,.of course, many kinds of tribunals have 
been set up by Acts of Parliament to decide disputes which 
would otherwise have gone to courts of law.< 22a) These 
have their own procedure for the determination of the 
disputes with which they are appointed to deal. 
In many cases, the chairman of the tribunal must be 
legally qualified. The members of these tribunals are 
required to act impartially i.e. without any interest and 
bias. As Professor Wade remarked: 
"Here we meet the highest possible degree of 
judicialisation of administration:<23Y The rule against 
pecuniary interest is applied to members of administrative 
tribunals in the same way as it applies to judges. Direct 
22. Supra at P. 384. 
2~ See for general surveys of this growth, Harry Street, 
Justice in the Welfare State; H.W.R. Wade, Towards 
Administrative Justice; N.D. Vandyk, Tribunals and 
Inquiries. 
23. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, (3rd ed.)' P. 5. 
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pecuniary interest disqualifies a member of the tribunal 
just as it disqualifies a judge. In the same way 
disqualification will not lie when pecuniary interest is 
indirect, too remote or uncertain. In a leading case, 
Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon, Lord 
Denning M.R. said< 24 ) that there was no evidence that the 
Chairman of the Rent Assessment Committee had any direct 
pecuniary interest in the suit since he had no interest in 
the appellant landlord's flats in Oakwood Court (whose 
rents were in dispute). The only possible interest was 
his father's pecuniary interest in having the rent of his 
flat reduced which was also too remote. If the assessment 
committee reduced the rent of the Oakwood flats those rents 
might be used as ncomparable" for the rent of his father •·s 
flat at Regency Lodge which belonged to the same group of 
companies as the appellants. "Even if we identify the 
son •·s interest with the father 1 s, I think this is too 
remote. It is neither direct nor certain. 
indirect and uncertain"'· <25} 
It is 
However, difficulty arises with regard to the application 
of the rule to domestic tribunals, which are purely 
voluntary organisations, such as clubs and trade unions 
formed by contract. Maughan J. in Maclean v. The Workers 
Union refused to accept that the principles of natural 
justice had any application to a domestic tribunal which 
24. [1969] 1 Q.B. 577, at P. 598. 
25. Ibid. However the Chairman was held disqualified for 
bias. 
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according to him is in general a tribunal composed of 
•'lay men". (26) The facts of the case in short were that 
the plaintiff, Neil Maclean, was a member of the defendant 
union, the rules of which provided, inter alia, that 
members who issued addresses or circulars not approved 
by the executive committee or by the general secretary 
should be fined and were subject to certain disqualifications. 
T_he plaintiff broke union rules more than once and the 
committee resolved that he be excluded from membership 
of the union. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the 
resolution was ultra vires and void and an injunction to 
restrain the defendant union from enforcing it, the grounds 
for his claim being that the executive committee could not 
be an impartial body. 
The learned judge after discussing the principles 
formulated in earlier decisions such as K.v. Rand( 27) said:~B) 
11 In my opinion, however, these cases have no real 
application to the case of a domestic tribunal established 
by private contracts and acting ••••••••••••• on a system 
and by methods so entirely different from those of courts 
of justice. If we consider first the case of pecuniary 
interest it is impossible in general to imply from the terms 
of the rules such a disqualification as regards the members 
26. Maclean v. The vlorkers I Uhion [1929] 1 Ch.602, 625. 
27. (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B 230 (discussed before). 
28. Per Maugham J. Supra, at pp. 625, 626. 
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of a domestic fqrum •••••• when members of a club expel 
another member under their rules, generally speaking, 
they all have a small pecuniary interest in the mattern. 
The consensus of judicial opinion is to hold that a trade 
union is bound by the rules of natural justice and to 
refuse to accept that the rules of trade unions can oust 
these principles.< 29) Now the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act 1974 provides a statutory embodiment of the 
rules of natural justice which must be observed by trade 
unions before expelling a member from the union. The Act 
says: nrn making provision for any hearing or a 
determination of any question, whether in relation to an 
alleged offence, an appeal or a dispute the rules [of every 
trade union] shall be so framed, as not to depart from, or 
permit any departure from, the rules of natural justicen.(30) 
The rule against interest is difficult to apply to the 
decisions of arbitrators on the ground that parties 
themselves choose their own judge, and so there is nothing 
for the court to do. As Lord Cranworth observed in 
29. E.g., Edwards v. S.O.G.A.T. 1970 3 Al1 E.R. 625. 
Lord Denning refused to accept that the rules of 
trade unions could oust the principles of natural justice and could give the union •tan unfettered 
discretion to expel a man or withdraw his membership". 
30. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 s.6 (13) It 
is difficult to say whether the rule against interest 
can be applied with the rigidity of a court of la"r in 
case of a trade union when it fines or expels its 
members. As it will be seen later, the rule against 
bias cannot be applied with the rigour of a court of 
law in trade union expulsion cases. (Discussed in a 
later section "Bias"·, see also de Smith, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action, (3rd ed.) F. 232. 
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(31) Ranger v. Great Western Ry.: 
"I think the principle (Dimes case)' has no application 
here; a judge ought to be and is supposed to be indifferent 
between the parties •••••• when it is stipulated that 
certain questions shall be decided by the engineer 
appointed by the company •••••••• the principle on which 
the doctrine as to a judge rests, wholly fails in its 
application to this case". (32 )' In the instant case, 
a contract was made between a contractor and a railway 
company. The termsof the contract provided that the 
payment to the contractor would be made from time to time 
by the company on certificates granted by the "Principal 
Engineer of the Company or his Assistant Resident Engineer". 
In case of any dispute pending the progress of the contract, 
the decision of the Principal Engineer would be final. At 
the completion of the work, if the contractor and the 
Principal Engineer differed in their opinion, that would be 
settled by arbitration. A difference arose between the 
contractor and the company and the contractor discovered 
that the Engineer was a share holder in the company. But 
the court held that the fact that the engineer was a share-
holder formed no ground for relief as the company's engineer 
was not intended to be an impartial person but an organ of 
the company. When the parties select their own tribunal 
the case is very different, and such a position though 
31. Ranger v. Great Western Ry. (1854) 5 H.L.C. 72. 
32. Ibid, at P. 89. 
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"prima facie raises some surprise in a judicial mind; but 
that is the· contract of the parties". (33) If the parties 
to a contract agree that a person, who may be suspected 
of bias or deciding in his own c~~e yet shall be the 
judge in a dispute between the parties, the Courts will not 
interfere. (34 ) However, the Courts did not hesitate to 
intervene in a case where the circumstances relating to 
bias or interest of the arbitrator was completely unknown 
to either of the parties.<35) 
At present a party is entitled under the Arbitration 
Act 1950, Section 24 (1), notwithstanding the agreement 
between the parties, before an arbitrator proceeds to 
arbitration, to apply to the High Court for leave to revoke 
the authority of the arbitrator or for an injunction to 
restrain any other party or the arbitrator from proceeding 
with the arbitration, and it shall not be a ground for 
refusing the application that such party at the time when 
he made the agreement knew or ought to have known that the 
arbitrator might not be impartial.C36) Moreover by section 
23(2) a party is entitled to challenge an award before the 
court on the ground of bias or interest and to get it set 
aside. 
33. 
34. 
Eckersley v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Li894~ 2 
Q.B.667 (C.A.) at P. 673 (Per Davey L.J.). 
Jackson v. Barry Railway Co. ~1893-7 1 Ch. 238, 
discussed later in Chapter IV. 
35. Kemp v. Rose (1858)1 Giff 258 (discussed further in a 
later seCtiOn "Waiver"). 
36. Arbitration Act 1950 24(1) Statutory arbitrators are 
excluded from the operation of this section, .by S.31 of the 
same Act. 
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The rule applies to the decisions of local authorities 
acting judicially i.e. hearing disputes or determining 
questions affecting the rights of the subjects. In R.v. 
Hendon Rural District Council,<37) the decision of a rural 
district council to permit development under section 4 of 
the Town Planning Act 1925, pending the approval of its 
town planning scheme by the Minister of Health, which 
permission would safeguard a third party's right to 
compensation under section 10 in the event of his property 
being affected by the scheme, was held to be sufficiently 
near a judicial decision. In that case a local authority 
unanimously decided to permit development of certain 
premises pending the final approval of a scheme by the 
Minister of Health. One of the Councillors voting in 
favour of the resolution to grant permission to develop, was 
acting as an agent for the existing landowner for sale to 
the proposed developer. It was held that he had such an 
interest in the matter as to disqualify him from taking 
part or voting, on account of bias, and an order nisi for a 
writ of centiorari to quash the decision of the Council was 
made absolute. In this case the dicta of Atkin L.J. in 
R.v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity 
Joint Committee were applied. Lord Hewart C.J. said:(3B) 
37. R.v. Hendon Rural District Council, Ex parte Chorley. 
Cl933J 2 K.B. 696. 
38. Per L.ord Hewart C. J. supra at 1'. 702. 
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•••• I will refer only to the following words of 
Atkin L.J.(as he then was) in Rex. v. Electricity 
. (39)' CommissJ.oners •••••••••• 1'/herever any ••••••••••••••• of 
persons having legal authority to determine questions 
affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to 
act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority 
they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the 
Kings Bench Division exercised in these writs". 
Presence of pecuniary interest even in one single 
administrative adjudicator was held sufficient to vitiate 
the decision of the whole body. It was said that if any 
of the member of a county council had a pecuniary interest 
in the subjectmatter, such adjudication could not stand. <40) 
The rule against interest applies equally to statutory bodies. 
But the rule, being common law principle for the 
interpretation of statutes may be excluded by statute. The 
legiruaturecan depart from the general rule and make a 
person judge in his own cause. In Jeffs v. New Zealand 
Dairy Production and r.1arketing Board, <41 ) the respondent 
Board was established by the Dairy Production and Marketing 
39 • .Cl924.7 1 K.B. 171 at P. 205. This dictum of Lord 
Atkin L.J. was criticised by Lord Reid in Ridge v. 
Baldwin ~1964~ A.c.4o at P. 79. According to Lord 
Reid when there is a legal authority to determine 
questions affecting the rights of subjects, there is 
also a corresponding duty to act judicially and there 
need not be any additional duty to act judicially for 
the application of the rules of natural justice 
(discussed in Chapter II, Modern Application of the Rule). 
4o. R.v. London County Council Ex P, Akkersdyk L'"l892 :7 1 Q.B. 
190, 195. (discussed in a later section "Prosecutor 
Judge"·). 
41. Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing 
Board Cl967~ 1 A.C. 551, 565 (P.C.). 
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Board Act 1961; and was concerned with the production and 
marketing of dairy products. One of its powers was to 
define areas from which particular factories could get 
cream and milk. The board inherited a right to the 
repayment of a loan made by the predecessor to the R.Co. 
and held a debenture securing a further loan made to that 
company. Notwithstanding their financial interests, the 
board made a zoning order covering, inter alia, the R. Co. 
In 1963, a committee set up by the board to investigate 
questions of supply, and consisting of three if its members, 
held a public inquiry at which the appellants, all farmers 
in the district, gave evidence. The Committee made a 
written report to the board, recommending certain zonings 
conditional upon compensation being paid to the R.Co. for 
the loss of supply it would suffer. The board accepted 
the committee•s recommendations without alteration and made 
the orders. The appellant farmers sought a writ of 
certiorari to quash the zoning orders contending inter alia 
that in view of the Board 1 s pecuniary interest it should not 
have adjudicated upon the zoning applications and that it had 
acted as a judge in its own cause contrary to the principles 
of natural justice. The Supreme Court of New Zealand first 
gave judgment for the board. The Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand dismissed the farmers• appeal. On further appeal to 
the Privy Council, it was held that in the Act of 1961 the 
legislature had shown a clear intention to make an exception 
to the general rule that a person should not be a judge in 
his own cause and that the Board was required to decide 
zoning questions even though its pecuniary interests might 
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be affected •. <42 ) Since, however, it is contrary to the 
general rule of law to make a person judge in a case in 
which he is interested, such a legislative intention must 
be clearly expressed in the statute.<43Y Sometimes on the 
other hand, disqualification for pecuniary interest is 
specifically provided by the legislature in a statute. For 
example, the Local Government Act 1972, Section 94 (subject 
to Section 97) states that "if a member of a local authority 
has any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in any 
contract, proposed contract or other matter and is present 
at a meeting of the local authority at which the contract 
or other matter is the subject of consideration he shall 
at the meeting and as soon as practicable after its 
commencement disclose the fact and shall not take part in 
the consideration or discussion of the contract or other 
matter or vote on any question with respect to it". If 
any member fails to comply with the above provision, he shall 
be liable for a criminal offence. Section 95 provides a 
detailed explanation of "indirect pecuniary interest"' as 
stated under section 94. In the case of married persons 
living together the interest of one person shall, if known 
to the other, be deemed for the purpose of section 94 to be 
also an interest of the other. 
42·. Supra. Appeal allowed on other grounds. 
43. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs (1866) L.R. I H.L. 93, 
110. 
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PECUNIARY INTEREST(A)COURTS :UNITED STATES 
At present every State in the United States has some 
statutory provision for the disqualification of judges for 
pecuniary interest.(l) Direct pecuniary interest in a 
party or in the subjectmatter of controversy have been 
regarded as a disqualifying factor by the justices and 
judges from an early period. Supreme Court justices 
beginning with Justice Livingston( 2 ) and Chief Justice 
Marshall(3) have consistently disqualified themselves in 
such circumstances.(4) Earlier decisions such as Tumey v. 
Ohio(5) shows that a direct and substantial personal 
pecuniary interest of a court in its decision constituted 
that court an unfair and partial tribunal within the 
prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Tumey v. Ohio 
the question arose whether certain statutes of Ohio in 
providing for the trial of one Tumey who was convicted and 
committed to jail by the Mayor for unlawfully possessing 
1. E.g., Cal. Civil Proce. Code (West Supp) § 170; Utah 
Code Ann. (1953)§78-7-I. N.Y. Judiciary Law§ 14 and 
see 42 N.Y. University Law Review (1967) P. 484. 
2. Livingstone& Gilchrist v. Maryland Insurance Co. 11 U.S. 
( 7 Cranch} 506 (1813). 
3. Fair Fax Devisee v. Hunter's L.essee 11 u.s. (7 Cranch) 
603 (1813). 
4. Frank "Disqualification of Judges", 56 Yale Law Journal 
605' 615. 
5. 273 u.s. 510 (1927). 
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intoxicating -liquor in violation of the Ohio Prohibition 
Act, deprived the accused of due process of law and 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
because of the pecuniary and other interest with which the 
statutes provided the Mayor in the result of the trial. 
Under Ohio law, the Mayor received his fees and costs for 
his service as a judge in addition to his salary only when 
he convicted the defendant but not otherwise. l!lhen the 
case came before the Supreme Court of the United States, it 
discussed many authorities(6 ) and concluded that there had 
been no usage at common law by which an inferior judge was 
paid for his services only when he convicted, and nor 
could such a system be regarded as within due process of law 
unless the costs usually imposed were so small that they 
might "be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis 
UQQ cur at lex". ( 7) In that case the Mayor received for his 
fees and costs $ 12 which he would not have received if the 
defendant had been acquitted. "We cannot regard the 
prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each 
case as a minute, remote, trifling or insignificant interest. 
It is certainly not fair to each defendant, brought before 
the Mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his 
guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a loss by the 
Mayor should weigh against his acquittal".(8) The Supreme 
6. E.g. Dr. Bonham's case (1610) 8 Co.Rep., 107a ll8a; 
City of London v. Wood (1701) 12 Mod. 669, 687 
Day v. Savadge (1614) Hobart 85, 87; R.v. Rand (1866) 
L.R. 1 Q.B. 230, and so on. 
7. Ibid, 531. 
8. Ibid, 532. 
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Court held that to subject the accused to trial before a 
judge who had a direct, personal and substantial pecuniary 
interest in reaching a particular conclusion amounted to a 
denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The principle enunciated in Tumey v. Ohio was extended 
further in Ward v. Village of Monroeville(9) disqualifying 
a mayor though he did not gain personally from imposing 
fines. 
In that case the Mayor before whom the petitioner was 
compelled to stand trial for traffic offences was 
responsible for village finances, and the mayor's court 
through fines, forfeitures, costs and fees, provided a 
substantial portion of village funds. Thus the petitioner 
was denied a trial before a disinterested and impartial 
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the u.s. Constitution. The court feared that 
the Mayor might be tempted to be unfair because he had 
large official responsibilities related to the financial 
affairs of the village. 
The question whether the court has any direct and 
personal pecuniary interest in the case has been perceived 
to be a due process question. In another case it was held 
that a justice of the peace who got an additional fee in a 
civil case of $ 5 to be paid by the plaintiff and who was 
entitled, if he found infavour of the plaintiff to an 
additional fee of$ 2.50 for issuing execution of judgment 
9. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, Ohio 1972, 
4o9 u.s. 57, (1972). 
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in order to ~atisfy judgment for the plaintiff had a 
financial interest in finding judgment for the plaintiff, 
which was violative of the due process clauses of the 
Federal and State Constitutions~lO) 
It may be noted that under English law there is the 
greatest sensitivity over the existence of any direct, 
pecuniary interest however small or insignificant.(ll) 
In Parishes= : .-.: of Great Charte of Kennington< 12 Y where 
a pauper removal order was made by two justices, one of 
111hom was an inhabitant of the parish from which the pauper 
was removed, the order was quashed on the ground that the 
justice who was an inhabitant was interested as being liable 
for the poor rate, because the fundamental rule was that a 
party interested could not be a judge. Earlier cases show 
that the American courts similarly adopted the strict 
principle of common law; citizens and tax payers have been 
held to be disqualified from hearing cases aeainst the 
municipal corporation of which they were residents.<l3) 
But in time, the strict common law doctrine seemed to be 
impracticable, inconvenient and unnecessary with other 
courts and with legislature. The courts took the view that 
such remote or minute interest in the litigation might be 
declared by the legislature not to be a ground for 
10. State ex rel. Reece v. Gies(w.va.l973)'.198 S.E. 2d 211. 
11. R.v. Rand (1866) L.R. lQ.B. 230; R.v. Barnsley Licensing 
JJ rl96o.7 2 Q.B. 167. 
12. (1742) 2 Strang~ 1173 Burr. S.C. 194. To remedy such a 
situation, the Justices Jurisdiction Act 1742 was 
passed removing disqualification. 
13. For example, Diveny v. ElmiT.a, 51 N.Y. 506. 
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disqualification of a sheriff, juror, or judge.<l4) 
Federal statute 28 u.s.c. Section 455 (unamended) 
required any judge or justice to disqualify himself in. _any 
case in 'o~hich he has a rtsubstantial interest•t. 
Substantial interest normally contemplated pecuniary or 
beneficial interest and the section was not applicable in 
the absence of it being shown that the judge had such an 
interest in the case,Cl5) Again when direct pecuniary 
interest l.oTas de minimis, it did not disqualify a judge and 
until late 1974, this was the standard followed by the 
courts. The rule was that is a judge ovmed stock in a 
party, he was not disqualified when his holdings were an 
rtinfinitesimal portion of the shareS"outstanding". (16) 
However, the A.B.A. code, by contrast, prescribed a strict 
per se disqualification rule for judges even in the case of 
a very small and insignificant pecuniary interest, but the 
code did not have legal force.<l7) 
14. E.g., City Council v. Pepper, I Richardson (S.C.) 364 
(:see also Tumey v. Ohio Supra, 529, 530) Statutes 
permitting judges to sit in such situations have been 
considered necessary in several jurisdictions e.g. Peck 
v. Freeholders of Essex, 21 N.J.L. 656 (1847) 
disqualifying a judge for residence and the reverseing 
statute N.J. Rev, Stat. (1937) § 2 : 26 - I93. 
15. u.s. v. Bell, 351 F,2d 868 Cert. denied 383 u.s. 947. 
16. Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 4o3 
F.2d. 4371r5th cir. 1968) (100 of 36 million shares) 
17. A.B.A.Code of Judicial Conduct (1972) canon 3C{l) (c); 
Harv. L.R. Vol.86 (1973) 736, 742 et seq, 
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A significant departure from the past has been made by 
the recent amendment of section 455 of the federal 
judicial procedure. Previously pecuniary interest used to 
disqualify when it was substantial but under the present 
amendment any justice, judge, magistrate or referee in 
bankrupty shall disqualify when "£heJ knows that he 
individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child 
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the 
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceedingn.(l8) It is 
submitted that the new amendment to Section 455 has provided 
a most comprehensive guideline for judicial disqualification 
on a very wide range of matters for some of which a 
counterpart is lamentably lacking under English law. Sub-
Section (d) (4} explains "financial interest", which means 
ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, 
or relationship as director, adviser or other active 
participant in the affairs of a party, with the following 
exceptions: 
11 (i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment 
fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" 
in such securities unless the judge participates in the 
management of the fund; 
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, 
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a 
•tfinancial interest 11 in securities held by the 
organisation. 
18. 28 u.s.c. £ 455 (b) (4} as amended Dec. 5, 1974, 
Pub.L. 93 - 512 ~ 1, 88 Stat. 1609. 
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(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in 
a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual 
savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, 
is a nfinancial interestn in the organisation only if 
the outcome of the proceeding could substantially 
affect the value of the interest; 
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial 
interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the 
proceeding could substantially affect the value of the 
securities :• 
The statute also provides for disqualification when 
such a judge has in his fiduciary relationship as 
executor, administrator, trustee or guardian has a 
"financial interestn as defined under Sub-Section (d) (4-) 
in a party or in the subject matter in controversy. The 
statute covers a very wide range of circumstances. The 
standard of disqualification has been drawn from 
"substantial interest" to one of •tde minimis" financial 
interest. Disqualification will lie for financial interest, 
however small. The standard adopted for disqualification 
for pecuniary interest now appears to be the same as that 
which nmv exists under English law. 
Nevertheless, there are differences. Uhder English law 
pecuniary interest disqualifies when the interest is direct 
as well as personal. It is not clear whether the interest 
of a minor son as under American law would also disqualify 
a judge under English law. However the pecuniary interest 
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of a spouse does not disqualify a judge.(l9) So there is 
even less chance of disqualification for interest of a 
minor son. Therefore, the most accurate description of 
English law would be that pecuniary interest disqualifies 
when such an interest is not only direct, but also 
personal,(20) though a recent decision suggests that a 
judge 1 s interest may be identified with his father 1's 
pecuniary interest, but only when such interest is direct 
(21)' 
and certain. 
Most difficult is the situation where the litigation 
may affect an indirect but substantial financial iQterest 
of the judge. English law has made no provision so far 
' 
for the disqualification of judges for indirect financial 
interest, however substantial. On the other hand, 
28 u.s.c. Section 455(b} (4)' makes it explicit that 
disqualification will lie for indirect pecuniary 
interests. The first clause of Sub-Section (b) (4) 
19. E.g., R.v. The Industrial Court and Others ~1966~ 
Qd.R. 245 (Full Court) a judicial officer whose wife 
holds shares in a company which a party to the 
proceedings before him does not on that account himself 
have a disqualifying interest. Statute may provide for 
disqualification - see Local Government Act 1972 ss. 94, 
95(3)~ providing disqualification of a member for his 
own as well as his Spouse's pecuniary interest. 
20;. However "personal•• 
interests as well. 
Canal Co. (1852) 3 
is used to include certain shared 
See Dimes v. Grand Junction 
H.L.C. 759 - (discussed earlier in 
Chap. III: Pecun1.a!ry Interest) 
21. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon 
C 1969 .7 1 Q .B. 577 at :P. 598 (discussed in the 
earlier section. in Chap. III:"Pecuniary Interest". 
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prescribes disqualification for any "Finane ial" int·erest 
in a party or the subject matter, while the second clause 
refers to "any other interest" \vhich could be substantially 
effected by the outcome. It is not easy to ascertain 
what is meant by the term "any other interest",C22) 
because unlike "financial interest" this term is not 
defined in terms of ownership or in any manner at all. 
An application of it has been made in a recent case: 
In · .· Virginia Electric and Power Co. (VEPCO) v. Sun 
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.<23) In that case a motion 
was made for the disqualification of the presiding Judge 
in litigation involving The Electric Company which serviced 
the area in which the judge resided. The District Judge 
Warriner held, inter alia, that although under other 
grounds the judge was not required to disqualify himself 
because of the fact that if the electric utility were 
successful in action there might be a general electric rate 
reduction which could personally benefit him to the extent 
of approximateiy ~ 100, nevertheless under the test of "any 
other interest" in Section 455(b) (4) the District Judge 
felt c~mpelled to disqualify himself.(24) When the case 
22. ·. Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding 
and Dry Dock Co. 539 F.2d 357,367. (u.s. Ct. of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit, 1976). 
23. Supra. 
24. 4o7 F.Supp. 324 (D.C. Va.l976). 
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went to the-Court of Appeal, the Court held, inter alia, 
that the only interest the judge had was the remote 
contingent possibility that he might in future share in 
any refund that might be ordered for VEPCO customers in 
general. "Such a contingent interest does not presently 
exist •••••••• Neither Judge Warriner nor any other 
customer of VEPCO will have a claim for refund until, if 
ever, there occurs an intervening and independent decision 
of a state agency, the Virginia State Corporation 
Commission, which regulates public utilities".<25} The 
interest of Judge Warriner in that refund was speculative 
and the Judge lacked the ownership of a legal or equitable 
interest, however small, in the subjectmatter of litigation, 
so he had no ""financial interest"· in the subj ectmatter in 
controversy within the meaning of the Code Section 
warranting disqualification. The Court contended, though 
finding it difficult to ascertain the meaning of the term 
"any other interestn, that"it must have been the 
congressional intent to make an interest of lesser degree 
than ownership disqualify •••••• otherwise there would be no 
purpose in defining financial interest in terms of ownership 
and failing to apply such a limitation on "any other 
interest".(26) The words nhowever small"' referred, it was 
thought, only to a financial interest i.e. when a judge has 
an ownership interest in a party or in the subjectmatter. 
25. 539 F.2d 357, 366-e 
26. Ibid, p. 367. 
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The test "however smalln would be applicable in the case of 
a rtfinancial interest" only but that test would not apply 
to "any other interest". n,r- A.:/ judge who is a customer 
of a company must necessarily consider the remoteness of 
the interest and its extent or degree". (27) Though $- 70 
to $ 100 cash in hand was not necessarily "de minimis", 
when the possibility of recovering that amount was spread 
over the next forty years and was depe~dent upon factors 
which included the Electric Company winning the law suit, 
and the Virginia State Corporation Commission requiring the 
company to return the increased fuel costs to its customers, 
then the district judges' interest in such speculative 
recovery was de minimis, and his finding to the contrary on 
'l.vhich he recused himself was clearly erroneous. (28) The 
recusal order was therefore vacated and remanded with 
appropriate instructions. 
27. The Court referred to a Commentary ~See Disqualification 
of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv. 
L. Rev. 736, 753 (1973} with regard to a simllar 
provision in the ABA.Code of Judicial conduct Canon 3C 
{1) (C)• Ibid pp. 743, 744, 753-7 that "any other interest" 
to be a disqualifying factor would depend on the 
interaction of two variables - "the remoteness of the 
interest and its extent or> degree 11 • If the interest 
strongly resembles a direct interest, say, stock held in 
a subsidiary (or parent) company of the corporate party, 
then any amount would disqualify; when the interest is 
less direct then •~only if the extent of the interest is 
itself substantial can the judges' impartiality 
reasonably be questioned 11 - Ibid, p. 368. 
28. The Court of Appeal also pointed out that the amended 
Section 455 was not applicable in that case since it 
had been filed before the amendment became effective. 
- 75 -
PECUNIARY INTEREST $)BODIES OTHER THAN COURTS : UNITED STATES 
Similarly under American law as ,.ri th English law •ri t is 
the general rule, even apart from statute, that officers 
acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are 
disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be 
decided". (29) In City of Naperville v. Wherle, (30) the 
City of Naperville filed its petition in the county court 
of Du Page county to levy a special assessment for a local 
improvement and to acquire by condemnation certain land 
and easements. The Court in pursance of a statutory 
provision(3l) appointed two commissioners to act with the 
President of the Board of Local Improvements to investigate 
and report to the Court what would be just compensation 
for the respective ovmers of the private property to be 
taken or damaged for the said improvement, together with 
real estate benefitted and the amount of such benefits to 
each parcel. One statute also provided that such persons 
"shall be disinterested persons".(32) One of the persons 
who acted as a commissioner was a Secretary of the 
Naperville Board of Education, receiving financial 
compensation for his services in such capacity. It was 
29. City of Naperville v. Wherle 173 N.E. 165, 166. 
30. Supra. 
31. Cahills' Rev. St. 1929, e.24, Par.l36. 
32. Ibid. 
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held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that the 
Commissioner was neither "·competent" nor "disinterested", 
and that his participation infected the action of the 
whole body.<33) A direct pecuniary interest if 
substantial is ordinarily held to disqualify an 
administrative decision maker. Thus, a member of a 
Zoning Board who voted for a variance \vhich vmuld benefit 
his property \vas held to be disqualified. The court set 
aside the decision of the Board even though his vote was not 
necessary for the decision, on the ground that the decision 
might have been influenced by him.<34 ) 
Similarly in Daly v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of the 
Town of Fairfield,<35) an action of the Zoning Commission 
in approving a zoning amendment permitting the erection 
of a radio broadcasting antenna on land was held to be 
invalid by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. One 
of the members of the commission who participated in the 
hearing was an officer of a cemetery association which had 
contracted to sell land to the radio broadcasting company 
if variance in zoning regulations could be obtained to 
permit the erection of the broadcasting antenna. The 
member had earlier unsuccessfully argued before the Zoning 
Board of Appeals in support of the company's application 
for variance in zoning regulation to permit the erection of 
broadcasting antenna. Such an act on the part of the 
member violated the statutory provision prohibiting a 
member of any zoning commission board or board of appeals 
33. City of Naperville v. Wherle, Supra, at p. 166. 
34. Piggot v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 
A.2d. 667 (1952). 
35. 191 A.2d (1963) 250. 
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from participating in the hearing or decision upou Qny 
matter in which he was directly or indirectly interested 
in a personal or financial sense. (36 ) In Wilson v. Iowa 
City,<37) a city council's action with regard to an urban 
renewal project was considered as void under a statute 
because of the interest of some of its members in the 
property under the project. The court held that a vote 
cast by a member of the city council on any resolution 
relating to the urban renewal project, if in violation of 
conflict of interest provision of urban renewal law, was 
void and the result reached by the council in such a 
matter was also void, whether such votes actually 
determined the issue before the council or not. Though 
there had been no evidence of any improper motives or 
actions on the part of any councilmen, "'Chowever .::/, 
actual dishonesty is not decisive. The fact that there is 
opportunity for dishonesty is what may disqualify. 
the potential for conflict of interest that becomes 
vi tal n. (38) 
It is 
A mere combination of prosecuting and adjudicating 
. (38a) function does not const1tute a violation of due process. 
36. C.G.s.A.g 8-11, (supra at p. 252). 
37. 165 N.W. 2d 813, (1969), Sup.Ct. of Iowa. 
38. Ibid, at p. 824. 
38a. See discussion in Chapter IV, Bias. 
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Nevertheless where the administrative adjudicator has a 
pecuniary interest in the outcome, disqualification will lie. 
In a recent case, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the 
question of whether an Alabama State Board of Optometry 
was biased when, having lodged charges of 11 unprofessional 
conduct" against some licensed optometrists, it then 
passed on the validity of the charges which the Board had 
framed itself. But the courtdid decide that because in 
this case the Boards 1 members might personally benefit from 
action adverse to the respondents in the license 
revocation proceeding, so they were barred from being the 
adjudicators - "those with substantial pecuniary interest 
in legal proceedings should not adjudicate those 
disputes".(38b) The Court 1 s decision hinged on possible 
"pecuniary interest", not on "bias" resulting from prejudgment. 
Thus the due process requirement of a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal applies to administrative-agencies which 
adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased 
decision maker constitutionally unacceptable but even any 
probability of unfairness should be prevented. Where an 
administrative decision maker has a pecuniary interest in 
the outcome, the probability of the actual bias on the part 
of such a decision maker is too high to be constitutionally 
tolerable under due process of law.<39) Apart from 
constitutional provision, statutes such as Administrative 
procedu~e Act provides for disqualification of administrative 
adjudicators for pecuniary interest. The Administrative 
38b. Gibson v. Berryhill 411 U.s. 564 at 579, (1973). 
39. Withrow v. Larkin, 43 Led 2d 712, 723, (1975) U.S. 
Sup.et. (discussed later). 
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Procedure Act 5 u.s.c •. s.556(b) states in part that any 
officer who presides over a hearing (or who formulates an 
initial or recommended decision)' "may at any time 
withdraw if he deems himself disqualified". The statute 
contemplates that hearing officer will withdraw on his 
own if he deems himself disqualified,for example~if he 
were a shareholder in a company which is a party in the 
proceedings.<4o) If the officer decides that there is 
no sufficient ground for his disqualification, his 
conclusion in that regard will be deemed as one of the 
issues before the agency when the case is finally decided. 
The agency's final decision is subject to judicial 
review. <41 ) 
4o. Gellhorn and Byse1 Administrative Law : Comments (6th ed .,J 1974, p. 964. Cases and 
41. Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c. §.706. 
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CHAPTER IV : BIAS 
(A) TEST OF BIAS -
The principle that no man should be a judge in his own 
cause in its simplest form means that a man shall not be a 
judge where he has a direct pecuniary or proprietary 
interest or he himself is a party. But the rule has been 
extended to include cases where the judge has some interest 
in the parties or in the subjectmatter of the dispute 
thereby making it difficult or impossible for him to give 
an impartial judgment on the matter.(l) There may be 
circumstances such as friendship towards a party or enmity 
towards the other, or prior contact with a case as counsel 
which may cause "bias" or n·prejudicen in the literal sense 
of the word, that is, prejudgment of the merit of a case. 
Of course, in one sense no judge will be altogether free of 
bias or prejudice unless he has no prior knowledge or 
workings of the world. As judge Frank observed: 
"If however "bias" of ttpartiality" be defined to mean 
the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the 
judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one 
ever will •••• we are born with predispositions; and the 
process of education, formal and informal, creates 
attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations, 
attitudes w~ich precede reasoning in particular instances 
and which, therefore, by definition are prejudices".(2) 
" So it is necessary to consider how much bias or prejudice 
infact does disqualify under English and American law. 
1. 
2. 
R.v. Altrincham JJ., Ex Farte Pennington, [i975) 1 Q.B. 
549 ' 5 52 (0 .c • ) . 
In re L.inahan, Inc., 138 F.2d. 650, 651 (2d Cir., 1943). 
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TEST OF BIAS : ENGLAND 
English courts have differed considerably in their opinion 
as to the criterion which will be followed to disqualify 
for non-pecuniary bias. Some courts have given more 
stress to public policy rather than actual bias while some 
courts have followed a real likelihood test of bias. In 
1866, a frequently cited dictum of Blackburn J. laid down 
the principle that though direct pecuniary interest, 
however small, disqualifies a person from judging the matter 
yet the mere possibility of bias did not ipso facto avoid 
the justice's decision but "wherever there is a real 
likelihood that the judge would, from kindred or any other 
cause, have a bias in favour of one of the parties, it 
would be very wrong in him to act; and we are not to be 
understood to say, that where there is a real bias of this 
sort this court would not interfere".(3) 
On the other hand the contention that mere suspicion 
of bias would suffic.e to disqualify a judge perhaps found its 
strongest support from the statement of Lord Esher M.R. in 
Eckersley v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board( 3a) According 
to him the doctrine of 'nemo judex in re sua• requires that 
the judges "not only •••••••• be not biased, they ought not to 
act as judges in a matter where the circumstances are such 
that people not necessarily reasonable people, but many 
people would suspect them of being biased".<4 Y The 
reason is plain. Impartiality on the part of adjudicators 
3. Blackburn J. in R.v. ~ (1866) L.R. I Q.B. 230, 232, 
233. 
3a. Eckersley v. Mersey Docks 2.!!£ Harbour Board Cl894..7 
2 Q.B. 667, (C.A.Y. 
4. Ibid at 671. 
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has been thought to be essential to bring about the public 
confidence in the administration of justice which is 
essential to social order and security. 
The test of Lord Esher M.R. was not followed in R.v. 
Sunderland Justices. (5) According to Stirling L.J., the 
test should be the one that applied in R.v. Rand (supra}. (5a) 
The mere possibility of bias would not disqualify a judge 
but if there was a real likelihood of bias nthen it is 
clearly in accordance with natural justice and common sense 
that the justices likely to be so biased should be 
incapacitated from sitting''.<6 Y Similarly O'Brien C.J. in 
R.v. Justices of County Cork(7)considered the view of Lord 
Esher M.R. as going too far because it "ma}res the mere 
suspicions of unreasonable persons a test of biasn. The 
same judge held in an earlier case that '~he mere vague 
suspicions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people 
••••••• mere flimsy, elusive, morbid suspicions should not 
be permitted to form a ground of decision"'• (B) 
However a mere suspicion test has also been followed in 
many cases. Lord Hewart C~J. in R.v. Sussex JJ., Ex parte 
McCarthy made the famous statement that is ••or 
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, 
but. should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done"' 
and that judges are not allowed to do anything "which 
5. ~Sunderland JJ £"1901..7 2 K.B. 357 (C.A.,). 
~ Ibid, at p. 373. 
6. Ibid, per A.L., Smith M.R. at p. 364. 
7.JL(Donoghue)'~-v. Cork County J"ustices Cl910..:7 2 I.R. 271, 
275~ 
B. R (De Vesci) v. Justices of Queens County ~19o8:r 2 I.R. 
285-;294. 
- a.s -
creates even.a suspicion that there has been an improper 
interference with the course of justice".(9) However, 
Slade J. thought it necessary to draw a line of 
distinction between the genuine cases and cases on the 
· 'tflimsiest pretext of biasn, because continuous application 
of this principle to all cases irrespectively might create 
the wrong impression that "it is more important that 
justice should appear to be done then it is in fact be 
done" • (10) 
Therefore for the int.erest of justice, such cases should 
be dismisssd by the court. There seems to be another 
test. In Frome United Breweries, while Lord Cave(ll) 
spoke of the real likelihood test, Lor.d Sumner(ll)' and 
Lord Carson(llY thought of a simple test i.e. whether there 
was such a likelihood of bias as would cause the court to 
interfere. 
The real likelihood test has been applied in many 
later cases.(l2) Real likelihood does not necessarily 
require that an actual bias should be proved but it 11depends 
on the impression which the court gets from the circumstances 
in which the justices were sitting".(l3) In a recent 
9. R. v. Sussex JJ.,Ex. parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259. 
10. ]£y. Camborne JJ,and Another Ex,parte Pearce [1955]1 
Q.B. 41, 52. 
11. Frome United Breweries ~· Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586. 
Lord Cave at p. 591, Lord Sumner at p. 615 and Lord 
Carson at p. 618. 
12. For example, R.v. Meyer (1875) 1 Q.E.D. 173 Blackburn 
J. at p. 177; 
R.v. Grimsby Borough Quarters Sessions [1956]1 Q.B. 36. 
13. R.v. Barnsley Lricensing JJ. [1960] 2 Q.B. 167, 187, 
(Per Lord Devlin). 
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Commonwealth case, Sallah v. Attorney General, the majority 
of the Court of Appeal concluded that the proper test to 
be adopted was whether or not a "real likelihood of bias" 
existed. A mere allegation against a judge was not 
enough to disqualify him and the maxim rt justice must not 
only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done" should 
not mean that every step is to be taken to satisfy the 
views of unreasonable people. In that case frivolous 
objections would render it impossible to do justice at all~14) 
The Dictum of Lord Hewart C.J. in R.v. Sussex 
Justices (l 5) was applied ·in Metropolitan Properties Co. 
(F.G.C.) Ji.,td. v. Lannon. In that case the Master of the 
Rolls said that even if a judge, chairman of the tribunal 
or anyone who sat in a judicial capacity was as impartial 
as could be, yet nif right minded persons tofould think that, 
in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias 
on his part, then he should not sit ••••••••••••••••• There 
must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would 
think it likely or probable that the justice or chairman, 
as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side 
unfairly at the expense of the other •••••••• Justice must 
14. Sallah v. Attorney General S.C. April 17, 20, 1970; (1970) c.c. 54. 55. University of Ghana Law Journal (1970)'P. 142, 144. Themajority of the judges 
rejected the dicta in certain cases which suggested 
that suspicion of the unreasonable pers·on would 
suffice for disqualification (e.g. per Lord Esher 
M.R. in Eckersley v. Merse Docks and Harbour Board [1894] 2 Q.B. 667, 671 C.A.. ----
15. Supra. 
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I 
be rooted in confidence".(l6) It is thought there is really 
very little difference between the two tests. If a 
reasonable person thinks "that there might well be bias 
then in his opinion a real likelihood of bias" exists, the 
question is not whether or not a tribunal is actually 
biased but whether a reasonable man who has no inside 
knowledge might well think that it might be biased.(l7J 
·This reasonable suspicion test was followed in mariy 
later cases • .<l8 ) Disqualification will lie only when 
reasonable suspicion and not fanciful bias exists.(l9) 
The real likelihood and reasonable suspicion tests very 
often overlap, of course. The former test may be 
appropriate in one situation and in another situation the 
latter test becomes more appropriate.< 20 ) It may be that 
in many or most of the cases the result would be the same 
whichever test is followed. When a licensing authority 
had already reached a conclusion on the basis of a public 
inquiry and before the subsequent prejudicial evidence 
was heard, then whichever test is adopted, uthe answer is 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Per Lord D-enning M.R. [i969] 1 Q.B. 577 at 599 (C.A.). 
"This dictum runs together two tests ••••••• in a way 
which supports the suggestion made here that there is 
in fact only one test" Paul Jackson, "Natural Justice" 
p. 31. 
Hannam v. Bradford Corporation (C.A.) [l97Ql I W.L.R. 
937, Per Cross L.J. at 949 (C.A.) 
E.g., R•jf• Eastern Authority, Ex parte Wyatt li97lfl 
R.T.R., 8o·, R.v. Peacock, Ex·,Parte Whelan (1971) 
Qd.R. 471, 477. 
19. R.v. Peacock, ~ parte Whelan, supra. 
20. R.v. Eastern Authority, Ex·p. Wyatt, supra. 
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that it is p9sitively proved that there could be no 
prejudice, and that to my mind is an end of the mattern.(2l) 
21. R.V. Eastern Authorit*,_ Ex.P. Wyatt, Supra, Per Lord 
Widgery C.J. at 486, ~7 followed in R.V. Altrincham 
#-· Ex parte Pennington (D.C.) l Q.B."7YJ72/ 549, 553. 
. ~ 
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TEST OF BIAS. : UNITED STATES 
Federal courts have adopted statutory procedures 
for disqualification of judges. Congress passed the first 
statute for disqualification of federal judges for interest 
in 1792. (22 ) The statute was re-enacted in 1911 (23 ) and 
codified in section 455 of the Federal Judicial Code. (24)' 
Section 455, prior to amendment, failed to provide a 
sufficiently detailed and well defined standard for 
disqualification which could help a judge to decide whether 
to disqualify himself in cases which are not covered by the 
first portion (i.e. first three mandatory grounds) of the 
section. (24) 
The final clause of the statute was by its terms 
discretionary. The statute did not define what is 
"'improper", so that excessive discretion was left in the 
trial judge. The statute required the judge to disqualify 
only when it was improper "in his opinion". The American 
Bar Association in their canons of judicial ethics implored 
all judges to keep their conduct "free from impropriety 
and the appearance of impropriety"' but the canons were not 
22. Act of May 8, 1792. ch. 36 Sll, 1 stat. 278. 
23. (1911) ch. 231§ 20, 36 stat, 1090 (1911) 
24. 28 u.s.c. §, 455 (1970) which provided that 
"Any justice or judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a 
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has 
been a material witness, or is so related to or 
connected with any party or his attorney as to render 
it improper in his opinion for him to sit on the trial 
appeal or other proceeding therein". 
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officially-adopted in the federal courts.<25) In 1972, 
the American Bar Association replaced the old canons by a 
new code of judicial conduct. Certain standards of 
disqualification have also been prescribed, such as, na 
judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned".<26) In 
1974, Congress amended section 455 on the pattern of the 
ABA code, and adopted a similar standard for 
disqualification. Under the amended section b~sides 
disqualifying on certain specified grounds, a judge, 
justice, magistrate or referee in bankruptcy must 
disqualify himself whenever "his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned'". (27) Therefore in contrast to 
the previous section 455, an-underlying standard is 
articulated to guide the judge when the circumstances do 
not fall within one of the mandatory grounds for 
disqualification. The standard of the general 
disqualification provision of the new federal statute on 
disqualification of judges is one of reasonableness, and 
should not be intepreted to include a spurious or loosely 
based charge of partiality.<28) A judge is required to 
disqualify himself only when his impartiality "might 
25. ABA canons of Judicial Ethics No. 4. See 86 Harvard 
Law Review (1973) PP. 741 - 742. ,:. _ .: . 
26. American Bar Association, Code of Judicial Conduct 
(1972) canon 3C. 
27. 28 U.s .c •. · S, 455 (a) as amended Dec 5, 1974. 
Pub.L. 93-51~ §1, 88 stat. 1609. 
28. Mavis v. Commercial Carriers. Inc.,4o8 F. Supp. 
55 (1975). 
- 89 -
reasonably be questioned1~.< 29 l On the other hand 28 u.s. 
C.~·. §· 144 permits a litigant to disqualify a district 
court judge for personal bias or prejudice. This section 
which was originally enacted as section 21 to the judicial 
code of 1911,(30) is still considered as the most 
significant statute for disqualification of federal district 
judges ·for personal bias and prejudice. Uhder it, the 
litigant has to submit a timely and sufficient affidavit 
alleging bias of the trial judge before whom the matter 
is pending. The Supreme court of the United States held 
in Berger v. United State~ that the trial judge cannot go 
into the truth or falsity of the allegations. But the 
facts alleged must be legally n·sufficient't i.e. nmust 
give a fair support to the charge" of bias or prejudice.<3l) 
The principle that a judge cannot make any inquiry 
into the truth of the allegations in the affidavit for 
disqualification has been followed in later cases.<32) But 
the courts differ as to the requirement of a "sufficient 
affidavit" in order to disqualify for personal bias under 
Section 144. Some of the courts have adopted a strict 
standard (that is, a real prejudice rule)' and laid down 
that actual bias must be shown. In deciding the question 
of how strong the inference of bias must be, the courts have 
29. 
30. 
Turner v. American Bar Association 4o7 F. Supp. (1975); 
28 u.s.c •. g 455, 4n(a)'. 
Act of March 3, 1911, ch 231. f· 211 36 stat. 1090. 
28 u.s.c. §.21 (1911). 
31. Berger v. United States 255 u.s. 2·2 (1921) at 34 .. >. 
32. U~S. v. Sciuto(C.A. ILll976),531 F.2d 842. 
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very often analogized the allegations in the affidavit 
to evidence and assumed that the facts, taken as true, 
must prove that the judge is actually biased.(33) This 
approach has similarity with the "real likelihood" of 
bias test adopted in R.v. Rand.<34 ) An affidavit for 
disqualification of a judge, though accepted as true, 
must clearly delineate circumstances showing personal 
bias in order to be "legally sufficient"· under the 
Section.<35) This actual showing of bias standard has 
also been adopted in many states.<36) 
On the other hand some of the courts have interpreted 
liberally the meaning of "'sufficient affidavittt. 
Focussing on the ttfair support" language used in Berger 
~, these courts adopted a less strict standard, i.e. 
the 11appearance of bias"' test, to disqualify a judge even 
though there was not actual bias on the part of the 
judge.<37Y 
In Whitaker v. McLean, a Federal Court of Appeal in 
reversing the district judge's refusal to disqualify for 
bias, stated that the policy in implementing section 144 
is that the courts of the United States "shall not only be 
33. United States v. Gilboy, 162 F.Supp.384, 393, (M.D.Pa 
l958),":A prima facie case will not suffice". 
34. R •. v. Rand. (1866) L .• R. l Q.B. 230 (discussed earlier)· 
35. Hirschkop_v. Virginia state Bar Ass•n, D.C, 
Va.l975, 4o6 F.Supp. 721. 
36. Norman v. State 236 Ark.476, cert. denied 375 u.s. 933 
(1963). 
37. Whitak~r v McL,ean, 118. F.2d.596 (D.C •. CJJ:) l94lo 
- . 
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impartial in the controversies submitted to them, but 
shall give assurance that they are impartial".<37) This 
assertion is very similar to Lord Hewart C.J.'s statement 
in R.v. Sussex JJ.(38) under the appearance of bias" test 
disqualification would be made where there is evidence 
from which the court could find that the litigant's 
allegations appear to be reasonable although insufficient 
to prove the existence of bias.<39) The public and the 
litigant must have faith in the administration of justice 
which is essential for the social order and stability of a 
democratic government. The Supreme Court has stated that 
while the absence of actual bias is essential to a fair 
trial, nevertheless, 
"bur system of law has always endeavoured to prevent 
the probability of unfairness ••• such a stringent rule 
may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias 
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of 
justice equally between contending parties. But to 
perform its high function in the best way "'justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice".(4o) 
Many of the state courts have preferred the reasonable 
inference test to disqualify judges. One court applying 
37. Whitaker v McLean, 118. F.2d.596 (D.C. ·cir.) 1941 
same view held in Berger v. United States -- 255 U .S.22 
at 36. (1921). 
38. [192~ 1 K.B. 256, 259, supra. 
39. Minnesota Law Review- vol 57, 749, 759 at seq (1973). 
4o. In re Murchison, 349 u.s. 133, 136 (1955); same view 
held in Offutt V. United States, 348 u.s. 11. 14 (1954). 
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this test stated that "when circumstances and conditions 
surrounding litigation are of such a nature {that) they 
might cast doubt and question as to the fairness or 
impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, 
such judge, even though he is not conscious of any bias 
or prejudicen(41) should be disqualified. 
It has been held in a recent case that in order that 
the affidavit for the disqualification of a judge to be 
legally sufficient under Section 144, the facts and reasons 
set out in the affidavit must give fair support to the 
allegation of bias. '1'he legal question of the sufficiency 
of the affidavit for disqualification of a judge is 
determined by applying a reasonable man standard to the 
facts and reasons stated in affidavit. The facts must be 
such, their truth being assumed, as would convince a 
reasonable man that a bias exists.(42) 
A litigant has a constitutional right to an impartial 
trial. 'llhe 11 bias in fact•• or actual bias test reduces the 
number of successful disqualification motions by putting a 
high burden of proof of bias on the litigant·· and so may 
fail to secure the same public confidence which is the 
intention of Section 144. In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 
following some incidents of alleged bias during pretrial 
proceeding, the petitioners filed an affidavit to disqualify 
the judge under Section 144. The court found that the 
judge's adverse comments regarding the petitioners' witness 
41. In re Estate of Hupp, 178 Kan. 672. 676; 291, P 2d 
428, 432 (1955). 
42. Pa.rr.isb v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State 
Bar - 524 F. 2d. 98 (1975) at p. 100. 
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as '~inappropriate, perhaps even unfair to the witness", 
yet these remarks failed to show "any personal bias or 
prejudice" against the petitioners".(43) Relying on the 
actual bias test, the court denied the application for 
disqualification. 
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C •.. § 556 (b) 
provides for the voluntary disqualification of a presiding 
or participating employee. He may at any time disqualify 
himself. ••on the filing in good faith of a timely and 
sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other 
disqualification of a presiding or participating employee, 
the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the 
record and decision in the case".(44) It has been said 
that, unlike federal district judges, examiners and other 
officers participating in decisions are not forced to 
withdraw upon the mere filing of a sufficient affidavit, 
but "the truth and sufficiency of the charges must be 
established before the agency to force a disqualification 
of an administrative officer".(45) If the adjudicator 
refuses to disqualify himself, his refusal will be 
considered as one of the issues before the agency when the 
43. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord 456 F.2d. 532, 539 544 (8th cir.) 
cert. denied, 4o6 u.s. 976 (1972). 
44. Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c., .. , §.556(b). 
·Parallel Section of Administrative Procedure Act 1946. 
s. 7(a). 
45. K.C. Davis ;; Administrative Law Treatise §.12.05 
p. 167. (Vol.2). 
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case is finally decided. The agency's final decision, if 
adverse to the affiant,·. \otill be subject to judicial 
.review. 'll:he court will set aside an agency decision, 
findings or conclusion if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence. In the case of administrative 
adjudicators, the standard of disqualification seems to 
be less rigidly applied in American law than in English 
law. Personal bias or prejudice of administrative 
adjudicators is a ground for disqualification when it is 
substantial.<46) It is difficult to prove bias on the 
part of an administrative officer. Uniform rulings 
favouring one party or against the other do not alone 
prove disqualification: " Total rejection of an opposed 
view itself cannot impugn the integrity or competence of 
the trier of fact".< 47) In another case, the Second 
Circuit Court held: "Even assuming ••••••• that the 
examiner was biased against the respondent, we would find 
no reason, merely because of that fact, for upsetting the 
Bo~rds' order, since the respondent does not assert that 
the examiner committed any error in the admission or 
exclusion of evidence, nor is there any indication that 
he conducted himself in a manner which was· either likely 
to intimidate any of the witnesses ••••••••••••• There was, 
at most, error without prejudice; such error is harmless 
and no ground for reversal". (48) In Local JiQ., _3_ v. 
National Labor Relations Board, the court said: "the 
46. Ibid. 
47. N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S.Co. (1949) 337 U.S. 656, 
659. 
48. N.L.R.B~v. Air Association Inc., 121 F.2d. 588, 589 
(2d cir. 1941). ---
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.uniformity with which the examiner credited the negative 
testimony offered on behalf of the strikers and 
discredited the positive testimony offered on behalf of 
the employer regardless of the fact that the evidence of 
the employer was corroborated in most instances by the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, convinces us of his 
b . d h t"lit u(49) U thi d i i t 1as an os 1 y ••••••• pon s ec son, wo 
eminent American writers observed that if what the court 
said was true, the administrative order was reversible 
because not supported by substantial evidence. The reason 
for the errors, whether bias or incompetence, does not 
make any difference. "The errors and not the trial 
examiner's frame of mind, are what count in the end •••••• "(50) 
It appears that the findings of an administrative agency 
would be affirmed even if prejudice were deemed to exist 
if supported by substantial evidence. On the other hand 
some courts have preferred to. adopt a test even stricter 
than that for courts. For example, in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Phelbs the court of Appeal for the 
Fifth circuit said: 111 /Jhe} rigidity of the requirement 
that the trier be impartial and unconcerned in the result 
applies more strictly to an administrative adjudication 
where many of the safeguards which have been thrown around 
court proceedings have in the interest of expedition and a 
supposed administrative efficiency, been relaxed·. Nor 
49. Local No. 3 v. N.L.R.B. 210 F.2d. 325 (8t~ cir). Cert. 
denied 348 u.s. 822 (1954) 
50. Walter Gelhorn and Clark Byse,·Administrative Law : 
Cases and Comments·', (1974) 6th ed. P. 966. 
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wilL the fact that an examination of the record L?f an 
administrative adjudication by a reviewing cour~ shows 
there was evidence which would support the judgment, at 
all save a trial from the charge of unfairness, for when 
the fault of bias and prejudice in a judge first rears its 
ugly head, its effect remains throughout the whole 
proceeding •.•.....• Once partiality appears ••••••• it 
taints and vitiates all of the proceedings, and no 
judgment based upon them may standn.(51) 
51. N.L.R.B. v. Phelbs (5th cir. 1943) 136 F.2d. 562, 
563 - 564. 
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(B) FAMILY RELATIONSHIP : ENGLAND 
The law on disqualification of judges for relationship 
presents an uneven development. Oddly enough, the English 
courts early held that a judge was not disqualified by 
relatio~ship but a jury was.(l) In the latter case the whole 
panel of jury was quashed and withdrawn by the court when 
one Henry Vernon challenged it on the ground that the 
Sheriff who summoned the jury was related to one of the 
parties. There the court was faced with deciding what 
degree of relationship necessitated disqualification, a 
problem which in its modern context remains as perplexing 
today as it was then. It was said "that those who are so 
remote in Blood are so remote in Affection also, for else 
there would be no Bounds put to challenges, for the whole 
vrorld is of one Blood, and all the inhabitants of the Earth 
are descended from Adam and Eve, and so are cousins to one 
another" but nthe further removed Blood is, the more cool 
it isn.C2) The line was drawn in that case at the ninth 
degree. 
On the other hand, a brother-in-law relationship 
existing between the judge and one of the parties was held 
not to be a ground for disqualification. In Brookes v. 
1. Brookes v. Earl of Rivers, 1 Hardres 503, 145 E.R. 569. 
(1668), discussed below; c.f. Vernon v. Manners (infra). 
2. Vernon v. Manners 2 Plow. 425; 75 E.R. 639, (1572). 
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Earl of Rivers, a prohibition was prayed to stay a suit 
because the Earl of Derby who was the Chamberlain of 
Chester and also the judge had an interest in the suit 
property. Since it did not appear to the court that the 
Chamberlain had such an interest in the suit property, the 
prohibition was refused. It was also clear, however, that 
the judge was related to the Earl of Rivers, but the court 
said nfavour shall not be presumed in a judgen.(3) This case 
seems to be singular, and its rationale has not been 
favoured by English judges. Because shortly after this 
decision, in·l693, Holt C.J. withdrew from a case in which 
his brother was a party.<4 ) Again in 1830, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council decided in an appeal from 
Jersey(5) that the relationship which is formed by marriage 
is not dissolved by the death of one of the spouses without 
issue, so a husband even though his wife died without issue 
cannot afterwards act as a judge in a cause in which her 
nephew is a party. 
In 1866, Blackburn J. in R.v. Rand specifically 
referred to kinship as a ground for disqualification. The 
learned judge said: 
"Whenever there is a real likelihood that the judge 
would, from kindred or any other cause, have a bias in 
favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong in him 
3. 1 Hardres 503, 145 E.R. 569 (1668). 
4. Bridgmen v. Holt (1693) 1 Show P.C. 111. 
5. Becguet v. Lempriere (1830) 1 Knapp. 376; 12 E.R. 362. 
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to act, and_we are not to be understood to say, that where 
there is a real bias of this sort, this court would not 
interfere".(6) The rule applicable to courts applies 
equally to bodies other than courts. Relatively few 
cases deal with administrative officials who are related 
I 
to those interested in the proceedings. Disqualification 
for relationship lies when the near relatives are party 
themselves or belong to a body bringing collective action 
before a tribunal. A Board is improperly constituted when 
there is a likelihood of bias or prejudice on the part of a 
member: "A Board improperly constituted is a Board without 
jurisdiction".(?) The Court of Appeal in Manitoba held 
in one case that the Chairman of the Municipal Board who 
with another member set aside an order of the Winnipeg 
Zoning Board was disqualified from sitting in view of the 
fact that his wife was an executive officer of one of the 
litigants (Armstrong's Point Association). The court said 
that in such a case "it is difficult to see how Mr. Scott 
could bring to the discharge of his task that impartiality 
which is demanded of anyone who undertakes to perform a 
judicial function"(_7a) Though jurisdiction was largely 
concerned with the subject-matter of a case, the court 
6. R.v. Rand (1866) L,.R. I Q.B. 230, 232-233. 
7. Ladies of the Sacred Heart of Jesus v. Armstrong's 
Point Association (1961) 29 D.L.R. 2d 373 (Manitoba 
Court of Appeal, Canada). 
?a. Ibid, p. 382. 
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observed that; •tit may also relate to personnel - to those 
who assume to exercise the jurisdiction in question".(8) 
Unlike American law, a relationship between judge and 
counsel does not appear to be a ground for disqualification 
of the judge under English law. The English Bar has 
formulated certain rules of professional conduct to be 
observed by a barrister which inter alia restrict a 
barrister from appearing before a judge who is related to 
him under certain circumstances59 ) These rules of conduct 
state that no barrister should habitually practise in any 
county court or court of Quarter Sessions of which his 
father or near relative is the judge<9a>or Recorder,(lO) 
or habitually undertake undefended divorce cases before 
his father who is a county court judge and Divorce 
Commissioner;(ll) but there is no objection to a barrister 
practising in a court where his father is one of several 
' judges. The reason is that in such a case it is impossible 
to know beforehand which judge will in fact try a case. It 
has never been considered improper for a barrister to appear 
before his father in the High Court, Court of Appeal, or 
House of Lords,(l2) and it has long been recognised that there 
8. 
9. 
9a. 
Ibid at :P. 382. 
A.S=Annual statement of the General Council of the Bar-
Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar (5th ed.) pp. 37-38. 
A.S. 1895 - p.5. The expression "near relativen · 
includes a father-in-law: A.S. 1955. p. 21. 
10. A.S. 1956 p. 29. 
11. A.S. 1963 p. 25. 
12. A.S. 1923 p. 7. 
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is no rule ~reventing counsel from practising at a court 
of Quarter Sessions of which his father or a near relative 
is Chairman or Deputy Chairman, or one of the Justices; 
though if in any particular case counsel feels that it 
would be better for him not to appear, he should not do so~l3) 
Relationship with a witness is a ground for 
disqualification under American law. Statute has clearly 
set out the circumstances where relationship with the 
witness as well as with the party acts as disqualification~14 ) 
Under English law there is no similar statute on 
disqualification for relationship with a witness, though a 
magistrate should not sit in a case where his wife is a 
witness. If in any case he sits through oversight, and 
then it is discovered that there was the mere possibility 
of his being biased, his decision would not stand even 
though such a decision was unexceptionable because "justice 
must not only be done, but it manifestly and undoubtedly 
be seen to be done". (15) 
It is difficult to lay down any principle about the 
kinds of family relationship with a party that ipso facto 
disqualifies a judge or an administrative adjudicator under 
English law. There seems to be no clear decision on this 
point. In an Irish case it was held that neither the 
connection by marriage between the magistrate and complainant 
nor his yielding to the objection on a previous hearing of 
13. A.S. 1956 p. 29. 
14. 28 u.s.c. §.455, discussed below. 
15. A.T. Denning, 71 S.A.I. .• J. 345, 355. 
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the summons Dn the ground of bias was sufficient to 
disqualify the magistrate from adjudicating.<l6 ) "Each 
case had to be carefully scrutinised •••••• The court could 
not say that mere yielding to the objection itself showed 
bias •••••••• on the whole, it was not established that 
there had been a real likelihood of bias ••••••• "(17) 
Real likelihood test was followed in a recent commonwealth 
case.(lB) In that case an objection was raised by the 
defendant inter alia, against two members of the panel of 
the judges alleging that one of the judges was an intimate 
friend of the plaintiff and another judge was a brother in 
law to some one similarly affected by the construction of 
the statute which was under consideration before the· judges. 
The same judge was further alleged to have made 
representations to a Minister of State on behalf of his 
brother in law. But the contention was rejected on the 
ground that there was no real likelihood of bias on their 
part.(l8) On the other hand there is some authority to 
suggest that relationship would disqualify when it gives 
rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias. In a recent case, 
16. R.v. Justices of County Armagh (1915) I.L.T. 56 (K.B.) 
(A brother of the magistrate was married to a sister 
of the complainant). 
17. Ibid, at p. 57. 
18. Sallah v. Attorney General, S.C. April 17, 20, 1970; 
· (1970) C •. c. 54, 55. See University of Ghana Law 
Journal (1970) 142, 144. 
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Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd v. Lannon, the Court of 
Appeal held that there was a reasonable impression of bias 
on the part of the Chairman of the rent assessment tribunal 
and quashed the decision. The reason was that the 
Chairman of the Committee, a Solicitor, lived with his 
father in a flat owned by a company in the same group as 
the appellant landlords, and he had advised tenants in 
connection with that other company over their rents.<l9) 
19. Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon [i96~ 
1 Q.B. 577. (C.A.). However the ground of relationship 
was mixed with other grounds i.e., as he also advised 
his father and other tenants about their rents. 
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FAMILY RELATIONSHIP : UNITED STATES 
In America, every state has currently some statutory 
provision for disqualification of judges feT relationship. 
The two common law grounds for disqualification i.e. interest 
in the litigation and relationship to one of the parties, 
however, have been recognised by every state.<20) However, 
the degree of relationship which will disqualify the judge 
varies from state to state but is generally between third 
to sixth degree as calculated by civil law. In 
California, a justice or judge is disqualified from sitting 
or acting in any action or proceeding when he is related 
to either party, or to an officer of a corporation, which 
is a party, or to an attorney, counsel or agent of 
either party by consanguinity or affinity within the 
3rd degree, computed according to the rules of law. (2l) 
In Utah, a justice, judge or justice of the peace shall not 
sit in any proceeding when he is related to either 
party by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd degree 
20. E.g., N.Y. Judiciary Law§ 14, Ark. Stat. Ann§ 22-113 
(1962), Cal. Civil. Proce (West Supp) § 170, Utah code 
Annotated (1953)§78-7-1. 
21. Cal. Civil Proce. Code op. cit. 
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computed according to the rules of common law(22) 
whereas in Arkansas relationship to the 6th degree 
disqualifies. (23) Proximity of the relationship is the 
decisive factor in determining whether disqualification 
would lie. In re Eatonton Electric Company< 24 ) it 
was held that a federal judge should not sit in a cas.e 
in which he is related to one of the parties within 
fourth degree of consanguinity. In contrast with the 
English law relationship with the counsel, has also been 
considered as a ground for disqualification of the judges. 
Justice Black disqualified himself in cases involving 
the F.c.c. during the period when his brother in law 
was a member of the commission.<25) Chief Justice 
Stone heard argument by his son only upon the consent 
by the parties.<26 Y On the other hand Justice Miller 
did not disqualify himself when his brother in law and 
. (27) 
close friend W.P. Ball1nger argued cases before him. 
22. Utah Code Annotated. op. cit. 
23. Ark. Stat. Ann. op. cit. 
24. In re Eatonton Electric Co., D.C. Ga. (1930), 120F. 
1010. 
25. F.c.c. v. Woko. Inc., 329, u~s. 223 (1946). 
26. Ex parte Quirin 317 u.s. 1,5 (1942). 
27. E.g. Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 u.s. 341 (1878) See 
Frank: Disqualification of Judges 56 Yale L.J. 605, 
617 (1947). 
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The disqualification of justices and judges of the 
United States is now governed by Section 455 (as amended) 
of the Judicial Procedure. (28) Originally this 
Section provided for disqualification of a judge or 
justice when he was so related to or connected with a 
party or his attorney as to render it improper in his 
opinion to sit on the trial, appeal or other proceeding. 
However, relationship was not an absolute ground for 
disqualification as a judge challenged under Section 
455-< 29 ) was able to determine for himself whether the 
circumstances would prevent him fro~ sitting. It may be 
argued that since a biased tribunal is repugnant to due 
process of law, the constitutional guarantee od due 
process implicitly incorporates an additional basis 
for disqualification. Quite surprisingly the Supreme 
Court initially had indicated in Tumey v. Ohio 
that relationship might not affect any constitutional 
28. 28 u.s.c.§ 455 {as amended Dec. 5, 1974) Pub. L. 
93:-512, § 1, 88 stat. 1609. 
29. 28 u.s.c. §.455 (unamended). 
- 107 -
requirement of impartiality of the court: 
11All questions of judicial qualification may not involve 
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, 
personal bias, ••••••••••••• would seem generally to 
be matters merely of legislative discretion11 • (30) 
The amended Section 455 provides mandatory disqualification 
for a justice, judge, magistrate or referee in 
bankruptcy of the United States where he or his spouse, 
or a person within the third degree of relationship 
(as calculated under civil law) to either of them, or 
the spouse of such a person~ 
(i). is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, 
director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
30. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 u.s. 510, 523. (1927). But the 
Supreme Court in later cases suggested that a biased 
tribunal is violative of due process - In re Murchison 
349 u.s. 133 (1955): and in Holt v. Virginia (381 u.s. 
131, 1965). In the later case the Supreme Court 
held •tth~t motions ••••••• to escape a biased 
tribunal raise constitutional issues both relevant 
and essential" (Ibid at p. 136). This ratio 
appears to indicate, at least inferentially, the 
recognition of a constitutional right to a trial 
before a judge who is not biased or prejudiced. 
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(iii) is.known by the judge to have an interest 
that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding; or 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be 
a material witness in the proceeding.C31) 
Administrative officials are also disqualified in 
similar circumstances. In Low v. Town of Madison it was 
held that a husband was ineligible to cast a ballot in 
proceedings to re-zone his wife's land.{32) Similarly it 
was decided in~ v. Biggars<33) that a statute 
requiring viewers appointed to lay out a road and assess 
damages to land owners to be disinterested persons 
precluded. near relations by afr'inity and consanguinity such 
as a father in law or brother of the principal petitioner 
from acting as viewer. 
Where the possibility of prejudice is too slight or 
remote, the court seems to be reluctant to disqualify. In 
one case a board of adjustment granted Neiman Marcus, Inc. 
a variation in zoning to allow the department store to 
construct a parking lot. The Court of Appeal refused to 
disturb the decision even though the wife of one of the 
board members worked for the firm, and another member was a 
cousin of the President of the corporation as "their interest 
being characterized in law as too remote" to amount to a 
disqualification. (34) 
31. 28 u.,s.c.. §.455 (b) (5') 
32. 1..~ v. Madison, 135 Conn 1;60. A 2d. 774 (1948). 
33. ~ v. Biggers 66 Ark. 292(Supreme Court of Arkansas) 
50 s .w. 514 (1899). 
34. Moody v. City of University Park, 278 s.w. 2d 912, 919 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955). 
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( C) PARTICIPATION IN APPEAL. AGAINST OWN DECISION(l) : 
ENGLAND 
The general principle is that no judge who has once 
decided a question in any previous judicial proceeding 
should again sit, "or is even qualified to sit, in the 
tribunal which has to determine whether the decision is 
right or wrong".(l) This general rule was not without 
exception. Just as· the legislature may make a man judge 
in his own cause so it may also authorise the person to 
hear appeals from his own decisions. In R.v. Cheshire 
Justices,(2 ) it was held by the court that a justice of a 
borough who had been appointed a member of the quarter 
sessions under Section 5{5)' of the L.icensing Act 1904 was 
not disqualified from hearing a licensing case on the 
ground that he presided at the meeting of the licensing 
justices of the borough where the decision was taken to 
refer the question of renewal of licence to quarter 
sessions under Section 1(2Y of the Act. Section 5{5)' 
gave to all the justices of a borough, not being a county 
borough, but having a separate commission of the peace; the 
power to appoint one of their number to act on the committee 
of quarter sessions. "Legislation makes an absolute 
exception to the ordinary rule governing judicial 
1. However cases where the judges were alleged to have 
participated in prosecution or investigation of a case 
and afterwards took part in the adjudication are dealt 
in a separate section "Prosecutor Judge Casesn. 
2. R.v. Cheshire JJ. [190~ l.K.B. 362. - .--_ 
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proceedings •••••••••• There is nothing to say that he is 
not to be a justice who has already considered the matter; 
on the contrary, • • • • • • • • the whole object of the Act 
would seem to be that the justice should be a justice 
who was conversant with the matter". (3) Now the Licensing 
(4)' Act 1964 _prohibits a licensing justice from taking part 
in the hearing or determination of an appeal from any 
decision in which he took part. 
The general principle that persons who had once 
decided a question should not take part in reviewing their 
own decisions was not follow.ed by the courts of old. 
Before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, the judges 
of the Superior Courts, i.e. Queens Bench, Common Pleas 
and Exchequer, often sat with other judges of the same 
court on appeals from their own decisions. So legislation 
has been necessary to take away the power formerly 
possessed by the judges of the old common law courts to 
review their own decisions.<5) It is now specifically 
provided that in civil cases no judge of the Court of 
Appeal shall sit as a judge on the hearing of an appeal 
from a judgment or other made in any case by himself or by 
any Divisional Court of the High Court of which he was a 
member.(6)' In criminal cases, until recently there was no 
3. Ibid,P. 372 (Per Darling J.). 
4. Licensing Act 1964, s. 22(7). 
5. R.v. Cheshire Justices, supra, p. 370. 
6. Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, 
s. 68 (4). 
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rule that the trial judge should not sit on the hearing 
of appeal against his own decision in the Court of Appeal. 
'.Ilhe courts were reluctant to disqualify a fellow judge on 
this ground. In R.v. Bennett, B.v. Newton(7) on an 
application that the sentence might run from the date of 
conviction, Darling,J. said: 
" ••••••••••• the case was in the list, but 
defendants wished it to be postponed because the trial 
judge was then a member of the court. 'Fhere was, of 
course, no statutory objection to the judge sitting, and 
it would almost be impracticable to prohibit this unless 
there were more judges in that Division. T'here was 
always an investigation by a single judge before a case 
came into that court, and there must be at least two other 
judges with the trial judge. It was a great mistake to 
suppose that the trial judge would be inclined to set up 
his view against the opinions of his brethren or 'to 
fight for his own hand'. The trial judge in this case 
at once assented to the adjournment"'• (8) In R..,. v. 
Lovegrove, the applicant was convicted before Lynskey J. 
at Bedford Assizes and his· application for leave to appeal, 
which had been refused by the single judge, came before the 
Court of Appeal of which Lynskey J. was a member. The 
question arose whether in the circumstances he should sit 
while the application was being heard-. Lord Goddard, C.J. 
7. (1913) 9 cr. App. Rep. 146. 
8. Ibid, p. 157. 
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said that 11There are cases in which, no doubt, it would 
be desirable that the trial judge should not sit, but 
where the ground of appeal is nothing but an argument by 
the appellant that the verdict was wrong, there is no 
reason whatever why the trial judge should not sitn.(9) 
However, such a situation is now governed by the Criminal 
II 
Appeal Act 1966. By Sestion 2(3} it states that[n~ judge 
shall sit as a member of the criminal division of the 
Court of Appeal on the hearing of, or shall determine any 
application in proceedings incidental or preliminary to--. 
(a)' an appeal against a conviction before him or a court 
of which he was a member or a sentence passed by him or 
such a court; or (b) an appeal from a judgment or order of 
that judge when sitting in the High Court or of a court of 
II 
the High Court of which he was a member. Besides, Crown 
Courts Rules 197l(lO) disqualifies a justice of the peace 
from sitting in the Crown Court on the hearing of an appeal 
in a matter on which he adjudicated or of proceedings on 
committal of a person to the Court for sentence under 
Section 28 or 29 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 by a 
court of which he was a member. 
In administrative law, one who is in fact or in 
substance the respondent cannot sit to hear appeal against 
his own decision. Generally rules applicable to courts 
are also applied to bodies other than courts. In view of 
9. L,ord Goddard C.J. in R.v. Lovegrove ~951] 1 All E.R. 
8o4 (C .A.) at 8o5. 
10. Crown Court Rules 1971 (S.I. 1971 No. 1292) R.5. 
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the attitude of~he courts towards appeals from justices 
and of the statutory disqualifications provided in such 
cases, it would be reasonable to suppose that an 
administrator exercising judicial functions cannot in any 
circumstances take part or appear to take part in hearing 
an appeal against his own decision, unless he is so 
authorised by statute .• 
~he general principle that no man should be a judge in 
his own cause prevents administrative authorities hearing 
appeals against their own decisions. In Cooper v. Wilson, 
a police sergeant was dismissed by the Chief Constable of 
Liverpool. He appealed to the Watch Committee where his 
appeal was also dismissed. It was found that the Chief 
Constable who dismissed him was also present in the Watch 
Committee. ~he Court of Appeal declared that the 
presence of the Chief Constable invalidated the Watch 
Committee's decision. Lord Justice Scott said: 
'
11 
'L'he risk that a respondent may influence the court 
is so abhorrent to English notion of justice that the 
possibility of it or even the appearance of such a 
possibility is sufficient to deprive the decision of all 
judicail force to render it a nullityn.Cll) 
Greer L. J. said, at p. 324: 
ni ask myself what would anyone have thought who came 
into the room where the committee were sitting, after the 
plaintiff had gone out while they were considering their 
11. Coo~er v. Wilson [1937] 2 K.B. 309 Per Lord Justice 
Scott at -p. 344 
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decision, and found sitting with the committee one of the 
respondents to the appeal who had opened the case •••••••• 
such a person, if reasonable, would have been likely to 
say to himself ''There has been an opportunity here for one 
of the parties to influence the judgment of the committee, 
and it looks as if justice may seem not to have been 
done" :(12) 
However, every case of this kind depends upon its own 
particular facts and circumstances. It appears that the 
fundamental point which the Lord Justices had considered 
was that a man was acting in a double capacity i.e. being 
in the capacity of a respondent to the appeal was also 
present with the watch committee before the case came on 
and as well as during the time of deliberations. 
The mere fact that a Chief Constable was present in 
the room with the Watch Committee prior to an appeal (from 
his decision) coming on was not alone sufficient to 
invalidate the subsequent appeal provided that he had 
nothing to do with it, and that he did neither act as a 
prosecutor nor remain present with the committee during 
their deliberations. In Kilduff v. Wilson, ·· ·. which 
came shortly after Cooper's case, the Chief Constable who 
dismissed K,was present with the Watch Committee at the 
earlier stage(i.e. while they were discussing the 
procedure to be followed in such appeal). But the Chief 
Constable was not so present when, at an adjourned hearing, 
the merits of K's appeal were examined. It was held that 
there had been no irregularity in the proceedings of the 
12. Supra. 
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Watch Committee in K1s case. Had the appeal been heard 
., 
on the first day when the Chief Constable was present, 
the proceeding might have been invalidated by his presence. 
In such a case rtthere is no ground for saying that the 
proceedings before the watch committee are invalidated on 
the ground that justice had not been compiled with, in the 
sense that justice had not been manifestly seen to have 
been done'•. (13) 
Similarly the mere fact that a clerk who was present 
at the deliberation of the appeal tribunal was also present 
at the deliberations of the other committees at the earlier 
stage of the case but did not take any part in any of those 
deliberations could not be regarded as a ground for 
challenge for bias. In R.v. Architects• Registration 
Tribunal,<l4) the applicant appealed to the tribunal of 
Appeal against refusal of the Registration Council to 
register him as an architect. The tribunal dismissed his 
appeal. He then sought to quash the decision, alleging 
inter alia, that the person who acted as the clerk of the 
admission committee and of the registration council and so 
acted when the applicant 1 s application was considered by 
those bodies respectively, improperly acted as clerk of the 
appeal tribunal at the hearing and determination of the 
applicant's appeal. ]he applicant•s contention was turned 
down by the court. "Mr. Wicks (the clerk), although 
present, took no part whatever in the deliberations •••••• I 
13. Kilduff v. Wilson [1939] 1 All E.R. 429, 44o - 441 
(C.A.). 
14. R.v. Architects Registration Tribunal Ex parte Jaggar 
[1945] 2 All E.R. p. 131. 
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cannot see how either by reason of his position or his 
conduct, Mr. Wicks can be said to have anything which can 
be said to have given colour to a reasonable man to think 
(15) 
that justice was not "seen to be done", 
An appeal board is improperly constituted when an 
(16) interested person sits on it. In R,v, Mullins one L, 
who as acting Chairman of the Fire Brigade Board suspended 
and terminated the applicant's service then again acted as 
a member of the Fire Brigade Appeal Board, It was held 
in such circumstances that the decision of the Appeal Board 
could not stand, A reasonable person might well have 
thought that L. might be biased and in addition there was a 
real likelihood of bias, Justice had not manifestly and 
undoubtedly been seen to be done as L had been a judge in 
his own case, Certiorari should issue, and the clause(l7) 
15, Ibid at -p. 137 (per Lewis, J.) However there are cases 
such as R.v. Essex JJ, ~. Perkins ~1927~ 2 K,B, 
475; R,v, Sussex JJ. ~. McCarthy .Cl924.7 1 K.B. 256, 
which illustrate the principle that the court will 
quash by certiorari a case in which it is found, that the 
clerk to the tribunal is a person who has either given 
some advice, or his firm without his knowledge has given 
some advice, to one of the parties in the matter before 
the magistrates - those cases are discussed in a later 
section: "·Professional & Vocational Relationship", 
16, R,v, Mullins, Ex p. StenHouse ~1971.7 Qd, R,66 (Full 
court} and a Board improperly constituted is a Board 
without jurisdiction - Ladies~ the Sacred ~~ 
Jesus (convent of the Sacred Heart) v. Armstrong's 
Point Association 11961) 29 D.L.R. (2d) 373 discussed in 
the section,"Family Relationship". 
17. Fire Brigade Act of 1964, Second Schedule S.l9(1) (4), 
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prohibiting certiorari in relation to appeal would not 
apply since the Appeal Board is improperly constituted. 
Similarly in a Canadian case, the Ontario High Court held 
that the participation by two members of a Discipline 
Committee (of the Law Society of Upper Canada)" who earlier 
found a solicitor guilty of professional misconduct, in the 
proceedings of the Convocation which was in the nature of an 
appeal amounted to denial of natural justice. No person 
may sit on an appeal from his o~m decision and as the 
Convocation was in fact sitting in appeal, the members of 
the committee should not have participated in the 
Convocation's deliberations.(l8)" 
The presence of the prosecutor at all the 
deliberations of the appellate body is enough to vitiate 
the proceedings.(l9} In a recent case a stall holder's 
licence was terminated by the market manager. His appeals 
to the council committees were also dismissed. It appeared 
that the market manager was present with the Committees 
throughout the proceedings. The stall holder'~ application 
for certiorari was dismissed by the Divisional Court on the 
ground that the Council 1's decision was administrative and 
within its powers. The Court of Appeal held that where the 
council was exercising its discretionary power under the 
18. Re French And The Law Society of Upper Canada 25 D.L.R. 
(3d) 692. 
19. R.v. Barnsley Council, Ex p. Hook [197~ l.W.L.R. 1052 at 
P. 1057 (C.A.)'. In Taylor v. National Union of Seamen 
[196~ I W.L.R. 532 (Ch.D.) The plaintiff was dismissed 
by tlie general Secretary of the Uhion who later on took 
part in the appeal hearing as Chairman of the Executive 
Council. It was held that the decision could not stand 
as he acted both as prosecutor and judge. Discussed 
further on the Section on "Prosecutor Judge Casesn. 
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statute to regulate the common law public right to buy 
and sell in a market, it was not merely dealing with the 
contractual relationship but also with the common law right 
of a man to earn his living in the market. In such 
circumstances it was under a duty to act judicially. The 
appeal hearings had been conducted in breach of the rules of 
natural justice as the market manager was present 
t (19a) throughout the proceedings while the applicant was no • 
In administrative cases, it happens sometimes that a 
body exercising a disciplinary function refers a case to a 
committee for hearing and to report and then proceeds to 
make a final decision. Disqualification will not lie 
unless the members of the subcommittee makes a "decision" 
and then take part in the proceedings before the parent 
body which is in effect an nappeal" from their own decisions. 
So in a case where the Council making adjudication and the 
committee carrying on an investigation and recommendation 
were part of the same adjudicatory process simply divided 
into two stages, it was held that the council was not hearing 
an appeal from the investigatory committee, for under the Act 
the only appeal lay to the court.<l9b) In those circumstances 
the members carrying out the investigation were not making 
any "decision" and therefore were not precluded from taking 
part in the adjudication by the Council. 'li'here was no 
foundation for a finding of bias that would prevent members 
19a. R.v. Barnsley Council, Ex p. Hook (op. cit.). 
19b. Re Dancyger and Alberta Pharamaceutical Association 
(1971) 17 D.L.R. (3d) 206. 
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of the Committee from sitting with the Council.<20 ) Where 
an initial decision is taken by a body, and some of its 
members (who were not present when such a decision was 
taken)' participate in the so called appeal then their 
position will be as Sachs L.J. explained in Hannam v. 
Bradford Corporation: 
"No man can be a judge of his own cause. The (School) 
governors did not upon donning their sub-committee hats, 
cease to be an integral part of the body whose action was 
being impugned, and it made no difference that they did not 
personally attend the governors' meeting".(2l) In the above 
case, the school governors decided to dismiss H. a teacher. 
His appeal to the staff sub-committee of the education 
committee also failed. The Court of Appeal held that the 
decision could not stand, because three members (out of ten) 
of the sub-committee, including the chairman were governors 
of the school and although they had not been present at the 
meeting of the governors \'lhich decided to dismiss H., there 
was a real likelihood (or a reasonable suspicion)' of their 
being biased in favour of the original decision. The 
Chairman was a member of the Governors against whose 
decision the •n·so-called appealn was brought. If the facts 
had been disclosed everyone would have thought that "some 
20. Re Dane 
(3d) 206 
er and Alberta Pharmaceutical Ass'n 17 D.L.R. 
1971). 
21. [1970] 1 W.L.R. 937, per Sachs L. J ... at p. 942 (C.A.). 
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real likelihood of bias existed".<22 ) When a person "is 
used to working with other people there must be a built in 
tendency to support the decision of that committee",<22 ) 
even though the person was not present at the time when the 
decision was made. In Ward v. Bradford Corporation the 
Court of Appeal came to an apparently anomalous decision. 
'1'he distinction betl.,een initial decision and "appeaP' was 
obscured. The disciplinary committee recommended the 
expulsion of w., and the governing body approved its 
recommendation. The counsel for w.submitted that under the 
terms of the articles of government w.should have been 
given a right of appeal from the disciplinary committee. 
Lord Denning refused to accept this contention. According 
to him, the word "appeal" was used in a loose sense ,.,hich 
meant that when the governing body came to decide whether or 
not to accept the recommendation of the committee, the 
governors who sat in the disciplinary committee must not 
participate in that decision. "Natural ,justice does not 
require the provision of an appeal. So long as the party 
concerned has a fair hearing by a fair-minded man or body 
of men that is enough't. (23) It is also hard to reconcile 
this case with the Court of Appeal's decision in Hannam v. 
22. Supra,per Widgery L.J. at p. 946. (Widgery L.J. 
opined that whichever of the tests adumbrated in 
Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon [1969] l.Q.B. 
577 (real likelihood or reasonable suspicion) is 
properly to be applied in this case, the plaintiff had 
made out his allegation - p. 946. 
23. Ward v. Bradford Corporation (1971) 70 L.G.R. 27, 34, 35. 
Facts stated in the section on n·Prosecutor Judge". 
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Bradford Corporation. What Widgery L .• J. described as a 
(24) 
"built in tendency" in a body to support the original 
decision of the fellow members found no foothold in this 
case. The chance was greater here because the governing 
body also acted as complainants and in a sense judge in 
there own cause. But the court found nothing unjust or 
unfair in their procedures. Professor de Smith suggested 
that the court's moral disapproval of W's conduct was also 
(25) 
a factor in the rejection of the appeal. 
However what constitutes bias depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. It is impossible to lay 
down any fixed principle. 
24. Hannam's case, supra. 
25. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 
(3rd ed.) p. 224. 
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PARTICIPATION IN APPEAL AGAINST OWN DECISION : 
UNITED STATES 
Uhder American law, in the absence of a constitutional 
or statutory provision, a judge is not disqualified from 
sitting in an appellate court in a case tried by him in a 
lower court. In Galveston & H. Inv.Co. v. Grymes(26) 
on a motion for rehearing of the case on the ground that 
one of the justices was disqualified from participating in 
the decision of the case by reason of the fact that he 
took part in the decision of the cause in the Court of 
Civil Appeals for the first supreme judicial district, 
while a member of that court, the Supreme Court said: 
"It has been the uniform practice in this court for 
a judge who tried the case in the court below and 
subsequently became a member of this court to decline to sit 
in the case upon appeal. This has, however, proceeded 
from motives of delicacy, and not because it has ever been 
thought that the justice is disqualified to sit. The 
grounds of disqualification of the judges of the courts in 
this state are specified in the constitution, and they are 
exclusive of all others; and the fact that a judge may have 
tried the case in a lower court, or participated in the 
decision in such court, is not made one of them ........ <26) 
']:he court took the clear opinion that the judge was not 
disqualified and the motion was overruled. 
Ho\orever the constitutions and statutes of many states 
disqualify a judge of an appellate court from sitting in 
26. Galveston & H. Inv.Co. v. Grymes (Sup.Ct. of Texas, 
1901) 64 s.w. 778. 
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a case which has been tried by him as judge of a lower 
court. For example, in~ v. Hoffman( 2?) the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin held that the decision of a case on appeal 
was void as it was participated in by a judge who was 
disqualified under a statutory provision. The particular 
statute prohibited a judge of an appellate court from 
taking part in the decision of any case or matter which 
had been determined by him while sitting as a judge of any 
other court, unless there could not be a quorum without 
him. So the judge who, at circuit court, ruled on a 
demurrer to a complaint, was held disqualified from 
participating in a review of the same case by the Supreme 
Court where the same question was involved, even though the 
(28)' decision reviewed was rendered by another judge. 
The disqualification of federal judges is provided for 
by statute. 'li'he federal statute 28 u~s.c. §.47(29) 
provides that no judge of the Court of Appeals shall hear 
an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him. 
Similar provisions were contained in various predecessor 
statutes. For example in a 1891 statute (26 stat, 826, 
827Y establishing circuit Courts of Appeals and providing 
that such courts could be composed of Supreme Court 
justices, circuit judges, or district judges, it was· 
provided that "no justice or judge before whom a cause or 
27. ~ v. Hoffman (Su.Ct. of Wisconsin, 1898} 74 N.W. 
220. 
28. Ibid. 
29. 28u· •. s.c%47 (1970) .. · 
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question may have been tried or heard in a District Court 
or existing circuit court, shall sit on the trial or 
hearing of such cause or question in the circuit court of 
appeals:1 A similar prohibition was provided in S.l20 of 
the Judicial Code of 1911 (36 stat 10e7, 1132). The 
purpose of Congress in enacting s.47 and similar 
predecessor statutes was to preclude any member of a court 
of appeals panel from being in the position of having to 
pass upon his own rulings in the District Court and thereby 
to ensure that no member of an Appeals panel would be 
committed or influenced by having previously expressed or 
formed an opinion in the District Court. A judge is 
disqualified who has once heard a cause upon its merits in 
the court of first instance from sitting in the court of 
appeals on the hearing and decision of any question, in the 
same cause, or involving any question considered in the 
lower court. 
In Moran v. Dillingham(30) it was held that a judge 
who appointed a receiver in a foreclosure suit and made an 
order allowing him a monthly sum for services and also 
rendered the final decree of foreclosure and decrees for 
delivery of possession, was prohibited from sitting in the 
Court of Appeals on an appeal from the decree of another 
judge concerning the monthly compensation of the receiver 
after a certain compromise between him and purchasers on 
the foreclosure. The statute disqualifies a member of a 
Court of Appeals from hearing or determining an appeal 
because he had decided in the District Court the same 
30'. Moran v. Dillingham 174 U.S. 153. (1899). 
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ncase or issue" or~ "cause or question"· as was presented 
on appeal. The trial and disposition of a case by a 
court organised in violation of a direct provision of 
statute is a grave error and involves considerations of 
such public importance as to make it the duty of the court 
to allow a writ of certiorari without questioning the 
merits. In William Cramp and Sons Ship and Engine 
Building Company v. International Curtis Marine T. Co.C3l) 
it was held that, under section 120 of the judicial code, 
a judge who has heard the case in the first instance may not 
sit in the circuit court of appeals for the purpose of 
reviewing his own action, even though in the court below 
he merely entered a decree pro forma without expressing any 
opinion on the merits and no objection was raised by either 
party to his sitting in the Court of Appeals. The Supreme 
Court said that nthe comprehensive and inflexible 
character of the prohinition (in the statute) was intended 
to prevent resort to consent of the party or parties as a 
means of qualifying a judge to participate in the decision 
of a case in the circuit Court of Appeals, when without 
such consent, because of the prohibition of the statute, he 
would be disqualified from so doing, a purpose whose public 
policy is not difficult to understand"·. (31 J In Swann v. 
Charlotte - Mecklenburg Board of Education(~2)' a circuit 
31. William Cramp and ~ Ship and Engine Building Co. v. 
International Curtis_ Marine T. Co. 228 u.s. 645,650 
(1913). 
32. Swann v. Charlotte - Mecklenburg Board of Education 431 
F.2d:l35(CA 4 NC) (1970). · .. · 
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judge heLd that he was disqualified by §.47 from 
participating in the hearing and disposition of an appeal 
in a school desegregation case. The judge noted that when 
he had been a District Judge, he had tried a school 
desegregation case between the same parties. In later 
proceedings before a different judge whose decision was 
presently being appealed to the Court of Appeals, the same 
ultimate question as had been involved in the earlier 
proceedings was raised. The judge therefore concluded that 
§.47 prevented him from sitting on the appeal. The 
manifest purpose is to require that the circuit Court of 
Appeals be composed in every hearing of judges none of 
whom will be in the attitude of passing upon the 
propriety, scope or effect of any ruling of his own made in 
the progress of the cause in the court of first instance, 
and to this end the disqualification is made to arise, not 
only when the judge has tried or heard the whole cause in 
the court below, but also when he has tried or heard any 
question therein which it is the duty of the circuit Court 
of Appeals to consider and pass upon. ~hat the parties 
·may consent to the judge's participation in appeal would not 
make any difference at all, "for the sole criterion under 
the statute is, does the case in the circuit Court of 
Appeals involve a question which the judge has tried or 
heard in the course of the proceedings in the court 
below?"(33) 
On the other hand a district judge who had earlier 
33. Rexford v. Brunswick - Balke - Collender Co. 
228 u.s. 339.(1913). 
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presided over the dismissal of a different indictment 
against the defendant on the motion of a federal attorney 
was not disqualified from sitting as a member of a court 
of Appeals to review a conviction under Section 47 of 28 
u.s.c.<34) The reason was that the petitioner was never 
tried in that case and that the indictment as to 
petitioner was dismissed by the judge (who was now sitting 
as a member of the Court of Appeals). Therefore, the 
judge was not called upon to "hear or determine an appeal 
from the decision of a case or issue tried by him". <34 )' 
The Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c •. § 554 (d)< 35 ) 
states that "L anJ employee or agent engaged in the 
performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for 
an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually 
related case, participate or advise in the decision, 
recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 
557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public 
proceedings. This sub section does not apply 
determining applications for initial licenses:; 
(A) in 
(H) to 
proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, 
facilities, or practice of public utilities or carriers; or 
(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body 
comprising the agency". 
34. Noah v. United States 316 F. 2d, 159 at 160 (1963); 
cert. denied 375 U.S. 855. 
35. The parallel section in Administrative Procedure Act 
1946 is S.ection 5(c). 
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In agenc~ proceedings the initial decision is made 
by a hearing examiner,<36) who is very much like a judge 
who presides over a trial. After the hearing, the 
examiner prepares his proposed report, \-That the 
Administrative Procedure Act calls •ttnitialn or 
ttrecommended decision ... The document is served upon all 
the parties to the case and becomes the basis for 
exceptions and briefs addressed to the agency and usually 
for oral argument before the agency heads. The filing of 
the initial or recommended decision does not necessarily 
end his participation. After oral argument, the examiner 
may help in the preparation of the final report and when 
the agency heads confer with each other for making a 
decision he may be available to answer their questions.<37) 
It is provided under §• 557(.b) :: 
n ••••• 'When the presiding employee makes an initial 
decision that decision then becomes the decision of the 
agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal 
to or review on motion of, the agency within time provided 
by rule. On appeal from or review of the initial decision, 
the agency has all the powers which it would have in making 
the initial decision except it may as it may limit the 
issues on notice or by rule11 .(38) 
36. Previously known as hearing commissioners: K.C. Davis, 
Administrative Law Text, (3rd ed. )§'10.02 p. 220. The 
term used in the Administrative Procedure Act g.556 and 
§.557 is now "presiding employee". 
37. K.C. Davis op. cit~lO.Ol - p. 219. 
38. Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c. ~-557(b). 
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The final decision is made by the agency. The n·agencyn 
means the body of Commissioners as distinct from the staff. 
The statute also requires that an employee or agent 
engaged in the investigative or prosecuting functions for 
an agency may not participate or take part in the initial 
decision or recommend decision as well as in the agency 
review.<39) But, surprisingly, this condition does not 
apply to the agency or members of the body comprising the 
agency.<4o) One of the very exceptional cases is ,Amos 
Treat~ QQ. v. Securities and Exchange Commissian(4l) where 
the Court of Appeals Danaher, Circuit Judge, held that 
federal courts had jurisdiction, on due process grounds, to 
entertain an action on allegations that persons who had 
participated in the investigation or prosecution had later, 
as member of the commission, participated in the decision, 
and that the commission had ruled that the person was not 
disqualified, while denying evidentiary hearing on 
disqualification. 'I'he court thought that the 
Administrative procedure Act provision excepting an agency 
or its members was intended to permit one who is a 
commissioner to participate in a decision of the commission 
that an investigation go forward and even that charges be 
filed to the end that an adjudicatory proceeding might be 
initiated and in such circumstances it was the purpose of 
39. Ibid §.554 (d) ,· further discussion in section on 
"Prosecutor Judge". 
4o. Ibid. 
41. ~Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission 
306 F.2d. 260 (1962). 
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Congress,to permit a Commissioner to participate in the 
ultimate decision. But, 
"[we] are unable to accept the view that a member of 
an investigative or prosecuting staff may initiate an 
investigation, weigh its results, perhaps then recommend 
the filing of charges, and thereafter become a member of 
that commission or agency, participate in adjudicatory 
proceedings, join in commission or agency rulings and 
ultimately pass upon the possible amenability of the 
respondents to the administrative orders of the commission 
or agencyn. (42) 
Courts have expressed the view that it is not contrary 
to due process of law to allow judges and administrators 
who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal 
to confront and decide the same questions a second time 
round. As Justice Black remarked in the Cement Institute 
~,<43) a judge can try a case, render judgment in it, be 
reversed by a higher court and then hear the same case anew 
- the matter having been remanded tt·for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion"·. The United States 
Supreme Court has also ruled that a hearing examiner who 
has recommended findings of fact after rejecting certain 
evidence as not being probative was not disqualified from 
presiding at further hearings that were required when 
reviewing courts held that the evidence had been 
erroneously excluded-~LRB v. Donnelly Garment Co. 330 u.s. 
42. Ibid, 266. 
43. FTC v.Cement Institute 333 u.s. 683. (1948)'. 
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219, 236- 237.(1947lf. In this case, the Court of 
Appeals had decided that the examiner should not again sit 
because it would be unfair to require the parties to try 
•tissues of fact to those who may have prejudged them •••• " 
[151 F. 2d,854, 870 (CAB 1945tl But the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously reversed this, holding: 
"certainly it is not the rule of judicial 
administration that, statutory requirements apart •••••• 
a judge is disqualified from sitting in a retrial because 
he was reversed on earlier rulings. We find no warrant 
for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer rule, 
whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they 
ruled strongly against a party in the first hearing": 
Donally Garment Co. 330 u.s. 219. 236-237. 
One may conclude, by parity of reasoning, that 
repeated appearances of the same cases before administrators 
would not necessitate a change of personnel in the absence 
of personal involvement, relationship bias or prejudice. 
In Withrow v. Larkin, a state examining board which carried 
out an investigation and issued a "decision" finding that a 
physician had engaged in conduct prohibited by statute, was 
not held to be disqualified from holding a later adversary 
hearing of the same matter: 
"No specific foundation has been presented for 
suspecting that the Board had been prejudiced by its 
investigation or would be disabled from hearing and deciding 
on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the 
contested hearing". (44) 
44. Withrow -v. Larkin 43L.Ed.2d 712, 728. (U.S. Sup.ct., 
1975). 
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Nevertheless where the court is satisfied that bias 
exists on the part of an individual adjudicator the case 
is remanded for fresh consideration by the agency without 
the partieipation of that adjudicator. In American 
Cynamid Company v. F.T.C. where Chairman Dixon was held 
disqualified for bias, the Court of Appeals, sixth circuit, 
vacated the order and decision of the Federal Trade 
Commission and remanded the case for a de novo consideration 
of the record without the participation of Chairman 
Dixon. C45) 
45. American Czramid Company v. F.T.C. 363 F.2d. 757 
(6th cir. 1966). Similary in Metropolitan 
Properties Co. (F.G.C.) I..td, v. Lannon C.A.[!96@ 1 
Q.B. 577. when the court found a reasonable impression 
of bias on the part of the Chairman of the Rent 
Assessment Committee, it quashed the decision and the 
case was remitted to another rent assessment committee 
for rehearing. 
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( D) PREJUDGMENT, FAVOURITISM OR HOSTILITY: ENGLAND 
Prejudgment may occur in various ways. The 
disqualifying factors denominated as friendship, hostility, 
or prejudged opinion frequently occur in concert and 
usually shade into each other. It is often very difficult 
to distinguish between them. Cases where the judge or the 
adjudicator was instrumental in bringing charges against 
the party whose interests were··_invol ved have been dealt 
with under the heading "prosecutor judge'e. (l) An attempt 
has been made to arrange the various cases under each 
heading according to the emphasis indicated by the court. 
In R.v. Kent Police Authority Ex e. Godden(2) a 
medical practioner expressed an opinion adverse to police 
Chief Inspector Godden that he was n·suffering from a mental 
disorder of paranoid type" and the applicant was put on 
sick leave. However, the applicant saw his own doctor who 
sent him to a consultant psychiatrist who reported that he 
was •epsychiatrically completely normal". The police 
authority took further steps compulsorily to retire the 
applicant and selected the same chief medical officer to 
determine whether the applicant was "permanently disabled" 
1. There may be another type of prejudgment, prejudgment 
of law or policy which does not disqualify. It is 
discussed in the chapter on the exclusion of the rule. 
The remaining cases where prejudgment apparently 
occurred, but cannot be appropriately categorised 
under any other heading are dealt with here. 
2. Re Godden [197i} 2 Q.B. 662 (C.A.). 
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under regulation 70(2) of the Police Pensions Regulation, 
1971.(3) The applicant sought orders of prohibition 
and mandamus. The Divisional Court dismissed his 
application, but his appeal was allowed by the Court of 
Appeal. It was there held that a doctor's report made in 
connection with proceedings for the compulsory retirement 
of a person causing serious consequences was of 
11 judicial character" and in such a case a person "must 
beyond doubt act fairlyn.< 4) The medical practioner had 
already expressed an opinion adverse to the patient, and 
so committed himself to an opinion in advance of the 
inquiry. 1tif he was to decide the matter justice would 
not be seen to be done".(5) The court issued prohibition 
to prohibit Dr. Crosbie Brown from determining whether 
the appellant was permanently disabled, and mandamus (to 
the police authority to supply all materials and papers 
in connection with the appellant's mental illness formerly 
placed before their doctor to the appellant's medical 
consultant, in spite of the regulations in force. On the 
other hand if a decision is reached on the basis of a 
public inquiry and laid in draft and remains unaffected or 
unchanged in spite of subsequent prejudicial evidence, then 
disqualification will not lie. In R.v. Eastern Authority 
3. Police Pensions Regulations 1971, reg. 70: (2) 
"where the police authority are considering whether a 
person is permanently disabled they shall refer for 
decision to a duly qualified medical practioner 
selected by them. • ••••• n· 
4. Supra. Per Lord Denning at p. 669. 
5. Supra, p. 670. 
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Ex parte Wyatt,<6) the applicants, who were goods carriers, 
held an operator's licence authorising the use of vehicles 
and trailers. The licensing authority held a public 
inquiry concerning the applicants and his decision was put 
in draft. Before the decision was promulgated the 
authority held an inquiry into the conduct of one of the 
applicants' drivers. The applicants were not present 
at that inquiry and at which evidence prejudicial to them 
was given. Afterwards the authority published his 
decision and curtailed their licence by reducing the number 
of vehicles and trailers. The decision was challenged on 
the ground that the authority did, or there was a 
reasonable suspicion that he did, have regard to the 
prejudicial evidence given in their absence at the 
driver's inquiry. The court held that whatever test he 
applied whether real probability of bias or reasonable 
suspicion of bias, the conclusion would be that there could 
be no possibility of the driver's inquiry having 
prejudiced the authority's decision on the applicants' 
inquiry, because before he heard the evidence on the 
driver's inquiry, he had not merely made up his mind but 
had committed to paper and did not subsequently alter his 
decision. Therefore, the possibility of subconscious bias 
or prejudice could not arise, for the authority "did not 
have the two cases fluid in his mind at the same time ••• n(7) 
6. ~ 974] R • T • R. 480 • 
7. Ibid at P. 487. 
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A close personal friendship has always been regarded as a 
disqualification. nclearly a member of the tribunal who 
was a friend of the tax payer or has been personally 
concerned in his affairs is disqualified from sitting on 
the tribunal • • • • • • • This exception is founded on an 
overriding consideration of natural justice ....... <8 ) In 
Cottle v. Cottle, a matrimonial suit was brought by a wife 
against her husband. The Chairman of the bench of the 
justices was a friend of the wife's mother. It was proved 
that the wife had said' that she would obtain a summons 
to be set down for hearing, when this particular justice 
was presiding, and that he would "put him Cthe husbandJ 
through it"·. The Divisional court held that it was not 
necessary to show that the justice was in fact biased, and 
there was sufficient evidence upon which the husband might 
reasonably have formed the impression that this justice 
could not give this case an unbiased hearing. Bucknill, J. 
wrote, "The test which we have to apply is whether or not a 
reasonable man, in all the circumstances, might suppose that 
there was an improper interference with the course of 
(9) justice" if the challenged judge sat. The case was 
remitted for a new trial before a bench of which this justice 
was not a member. The court will not allow a decision :1nflllenced by 
prejudice 
8. Howard v. Borneman (No.2)' Ch.D. Cl974J I W.L .• R.l5 
(Pennyqick V .c •. )' at P. 22.- On appeal reversed on other 
grounds. 
9. i:l939~ 2 All E.R. 535, 541 (P.D.A.) Similarly in an 
American case a judge was held to be disqualified for 
long standing friendship with a party and where the 
party publicly claimed influence -
Callahan v. Callahan 30 Idaho 431; 165 Pac.ll22 (1917). 
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or partiality to stand. Personal animosity to a party 
disqualifies a judge when it gives rise to a real 
likelihood of bias. In R.v. Cork County JJ.(lO) a 
conviction by a magistrate was quashed when it was found 
that enmity existed between the magistrate and the 
defendant 1's family. But there must be a real bias to 
disqualify for animosity or favour. In R.v. Nailsworth 
Justices(ll)' it was held that although it was undesirable 
for a justice who had signed a petition in favour of a 
matter to sit as a member of a committee adjudicating 
thereon, it had not been established that there was any 
--·' real bias on the part of the justice concerned as would 
make her unfit to sit. "It is not anything that raises 
doubt in somebody's mind that is enough to set aside an 
order or a judgment of justices; there must be something 
in the nature of real bias".(ll) On the other hand in 
R.v. Abingdon JJ. a decision of the justices was quashed 
because the Chairman of the bench was a headmaster of the 
school where the applicant had been an unsatisfactory pupil 
and had earlier signed an unfavourable report about the 
applicant. Certiorari was issued to quash the decision · 
even though the court was satisfied that the chairman was 
10. R.v. Cor~ County JJ. (1910) 2 I.R. 271. 
lL. ~. Nailsworth L,icensing Justices, Ex .parte Bird 
"Q-953] 1 W.L.R. 1046, 1048 (Q.B.D.)'. 
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in no way p~ejudiced against the applicant.(l2) 
Personal hostility between the judge and one of the 
parties is to be distinguished from antipathy to a general 
class. An English judge is not disqualified for his 
activities or opinions tending to show animosity or 
favouritism for or against a class of persons to which a 
party belongs unless such expressions or feelings are so 
vehement as to make it clear that he will not be able to 
judge the matter impartially. But it is extremely 
difficult to ascertain when such feelings would amount to 
(13) disqualification and when not. In R.v. Halifax Justices, 
the renewal of a licence having been refused by a majority 
of a compensation authority, one of the justices wrote a 
letter to a local authority giving the names of those who 
voted for and against the granting of renewal and amongst 
the latter, gave the name of one w. Thereupon W.wrote a 
letter stating that he would be nothing less than a 
traitor, given his position, if he had voted for the 
renewal. w.had been secretary of a branch of the Order of 
Rechabites, who abstain from drinking and discountenance 
the use or selling of liquor. Though he (WJ filed an 
affidavit that his reference to treachery in the letter was 
to his position as a magistrate and had no reference to his 
office in the Order of the Rechabites, it was held that the 
circumstances were such as to make bias on his part so 
probable that he ought not to have taken part in the case.<~ 
12. R.v. Abingdon JJ. Ex parte Cousins, (}964] 108 ·S.J. 84o. 
13. R.v. Halifax JJ. Ex parte Robinson ~912) 76 J. P. 233. 
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On the other.hand, a very active teetotaller or a constant 
subscriber to bodies having the objective of opposing the 
grant of new licences, or a licensing justice who had 
already signed a petition to grant a licence may sit as 
judges in licensing cases. " It is impossible to suppose 
that any justice coming on to the bench at a licensing 
meeting ••••••• has not formed his own provate views as to 
whether the licence ought to be granted or refused as the 
case may be 
••••••• it cannot be said that because an 
application is refused the justice necessarily acted 
improperly because he happens to be a total abstainer. In 
all these cases it must be a question of degree".(llt) 
What amounts to a necessary degree for disqualification 
varies from case to case. In R.v. Caernarvon Licensing 
JJ.(l5) certiorari was granted to set aside a decision of 
justices refusing a licence because one of the justices was 
a deacon of a chapel which had called a meeting for the 
express purpose of considering whether the grant of the 
licence should be opposed and, although the justice did not 
actually vote at the meeting, he was present at the meeting. 
It was held that in such circumstances certiorari must be 
issued as it was of fundamental importance that justice 
should not only be done but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done. 'l1he court took the view 
that where a man has practically made himself a party to the 
llt. R.v. Nailsworth Licensing JJ., $Upra, at P. 1048. 
15. 
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group formed to oppose the licence it was not right for him 
to sit on the bench. The rule against bias does not apply 
so rigidly in arbitration or trade union cases. Bowen 
L .• J. observed in Jackson v. Barry Raih1ay Co. that there was 
no requirement of "the icy impartiality of a Rhadamanthus" 
in the case of a company's engineer acting as arbitrator, 
"who must necessarily be a somewhat biased person".(l5a) 
Similarly it would indeed be an error to demand from the 
members who sit in a trade union committee the strict 
impartiality of mind with which a judge should approach and 
decide an issue between two litigants. A mere allegation 
that the committee members were prejudiced or hostile would 
not be sufficient to invalidate a decision. An expelled 
member has to show more than that, for example, a person 
who decided his case was in form and substance both 
accuser and judge.Cl5b) 
15a. [1893] 1 Ch 238, 248 discussed later in the section 
on nprofessional and Vocational Relationship". 
15b. Taylor v. National Uhion of Seamen [1967] 1 W.L.R. 532 
Ch.D. discussed in a later section "Prosecutor Judge". 
Similarly the strict procedure applicable to courts 
is relaxed in case of educational institutions 
carrying out disciplinary actions - E.g. Ward v. 
Bradford Corporation (1971) 70 L .• G.R.27 discussed later 
in the section on "Prosecutor-Judge cases". 
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PREJUDGMENT, FAVOURITISM OR HOSTILITY-: UNITED STATES 
The common law in the United States for the most part 
has not followed the English path. While English judges 
have disqualified themselves for personal bias, on the other 
hand, the American courts early refused to disqualify judges 
for bias and prejudice. 
In Clyma v. Kennedy, (l6) a justice of the peace was 
not held disqualified, by reason of interest, from trying 
and sentencing a person on the complaint of a grand juror 
for criminal libel, though the justice was the person 
libelled. It was held that though "it was doubtless 
indecorous and unwise for him to try the case, because it 
exposed him to the appearance of seeking to revenge an 
insult to himself", nonetheless "there is no statute by the 
terms of which he was forbidden to act in the case, and we 
are not able to see that he: had any such interest in it as 
made his action void". (l7) 
Accordingly statutes had to be enacted enabling 
litigants to disqualify biased judges in situations not -
covered by earlier law. Congress in 1911 granted such 
power to litigants in the ~nited States district courts to 
disqualify judges for personal bias and prejudice by adding 
16. Clym.a v. Kennedy 64 Conn. 310; 29 Atl. 539 (1894). 
Allegations that the judge was prejudiced but which did 
not allege any of the disqualifying causes mentioned 
in the constitution should be denied - Jones v. State 61 
Ark. 88; 32 s.w. 81 (1895)' Supreme court of Arkansas. 
17. Clyma v. Kennedy, supra. 
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section 21 to the judicial code of 19i1.<18 > The relevant 
provision reenacted in 1948, is currently known as 28 
u • s . c •. s .144. It states that : "Whenever a party to any 
proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and 
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter 
is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against 
him or in favour of any adverse party, such judge shall 
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be 
assigned to hear such proceeding.'' 
.,The affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the 
belief that bias or prejudice exists, •••••••••••••• A party 
may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be 
accompanied by a certificate o-,f counsel of record stating 
that it is made in good faith". r28 u.s.c. § 144 (1970;7'. 
Now disqualification lies when a judge is biased or 
prejudiced either in favour of or against a party. Bias 
may arise from the activities or expressions of a judge 
which clearly show that the judge is biased and prejudiced 
against one of the parties. In Berger v. United States (l 9) 
the defendants, who were German Americans, were charged with 
espionage. The defendants sought to disqualify the 
District judge Landis, alleging that he was so biased 
against German Americans as to preclude any possibility 
of an impartial trial. The judge had been outspoken in 
condemning German American elements in the country during 
the First World War. The Supreme Court held by a majority 
that such remarks were sufficient to disqualify the judge 
from presiding at that trial. The court said that(l9)"the 
18. Ch 231, 36 Stat, 1090. 
19. 255 u.s. 22, 34 (su.ct.), 1921. 
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reasons and facts for the belief the litigant entertains 
are an essential part of the affidavit, and must give fair 
support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent 
or impede impartiality of judgment. The affidavit of the 
defendants has that character. The facts and reasons it 
states are not frivolous or fanciful, but substantial and 
formidable, and they have relation to the attitude of 
judge Landis' mind toward defendantsn. 
However the statute expressly states that a judge is 
disqualified for "personal bias or prejudice"·. Bias is not 
personal unless it evinces animosity towards a party or 
favouritism towards the other. In Pfizer Inc., v. Lord,C 2~ 
the petitioners sought to disqualify the trial judge on the 
ground of bias alleging, inter-alia, that the judge had 
made adverse comments regarding the petitioners' deposition 
vri tness. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' 
contention and held that such comments failed to show any 
personal prejudice towards the petitioners. The problem 
may arise, as under English law, whether a judge should be 
disqualified if his expressions tend to show bias not 
against a party before him but against a class of persons 
of which the party is a member. Under English law, as has 
been seen, such bias does not disqualify unless such 
expressions are so vehement as to make it clear that he will 
not be able to deal with the matter with impartiality.C2l) 
In Berger v. United States, Mr. Justice Day with two other 
20. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord. 456 F.2d. 532 (8th cir.) 
cert. denied 4o6 u.s. 976 (1972). 
21. R.v. Halifiax JJ. Ex p. Robinson, (supra). 
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judges refused to accept that the anti-German statements 
of the trial judge did disclose any personal bias against the 
defendants. Mr. Justice McReynolds considered that the 
affidavit failed to show "that personal feeling existed 
against any one of them ••••••••••••• Intense dislike of a 
class does not render the judge incapable of administering 
complete justice to one of its members".' 22 ) On the other 
hand, the majority of the Supreme Court justices seem to 
have concentrated on the underlying policy behind section 
(23·) 21 · - "£WeJ may say that its (Section 21} solicitude is 
that the tribunals of the country shall not only be 
impartial ••••••• but give assurance that they are impartial, 
free to use the words of the Section, from any "bias or 
prejudice" that might disturb the normal course of 
impartial judgmentn. (24)' 
Bias may arise from many factors. The fact that for 
many years a judge had had a close personal and political 
relationship with a United States Senator whose political 
interests in the past had been and in the future may be in 
conflict with the defendants, and that the defendants 
directly and openly opposed the judge's nomination to the 
federal bench was held to be legally sufficient to justify 
a judge in recusing himself on ground of bias.<25) The 
issue presented by the affidavit under Section 144 that the 
judge should disqualify himself because of prejudice is not 
22. Berger v. Uhited States, supra. at 42-43, (Per Mr. 
Justice McReynolds, dissenting). 
23. Now 28 u.s.c.~ 144. 
24. Berger. v. u-nited States_, supra. at 36. 
25. u.s. v. Moore, (D.c.:w.va. 1976) 4o5 Fed. Supp. 771• 
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whether the judge has bias or prejudice against a party 
but whether the affidavits recite sufficient facts to 
support allegations of bias and prejudice; that is, do the 
allegations contained in affidavits provide a fair factual 
support for belief that bias or prejudice exists.<25a) 
However mere political conviction will not give rise to the 
appearance of bias unless it has been vehemently expressed 
and may directly affect the outcome of the case. Justice 
Douglas, for instance, disqualified himself in a case 
challenging the grant of oil drilling permits by the Army 
Corps of Engineers in the aftermath of the Santa Barbara 
oil spill, because he had publicly expressed his views on 
the matter. <26) Similarly strong views or expressions of 
emotions for or against a matter require disqualification 
when such a matter is the subject of the dispute. Justice 
Frankfurter once felt obliged to disqualify himself from a 
case involving the practice of the Washington street car 
line in transmitting radio programmes in its vehicles, 
because he considered his emotions "so strongly engaged as 
a vict.im of the practice". <27) 
Another provision which permits disqualification is 
251. u.s •. v-. Moore, (D.c.w.va. 1976) 405 Fed. Supp. 771;28, 
u.s.c. § 144. 
26. County of Santa Barbara v. Malley 4oo u.s. 999 (1971) 
denying certiorar-i to 426 F.2d.l71 (CJth cir. 1970). 
27. Public Utility Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 u.s. 451, 467 
(1.952). 
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(28) 
28 U.s.C.§ 455. Until recently Section 455 was held 
to be inadequate. According to Judge Frank, a nstatute 
so limited was not enough. The extreme discretion left 
in the trial judge, the narrow grounds for disqualification, 
and the complete lack of disqualification for bias were 
obvious shortcomings'r. (29) 
The amended Section provides for the disqualification 
of any justice, judge, magistrate or referee in bankruptcy 
of the United States in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned and such person 
shall also disqualify where he has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party. (30)' Besides disqualification 
is also mandated where any such person has 11 personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding". (3l) The reason seems to be that judge t:s 
personal knowledge of the facts may have led him to 
evaluate their legal significance and hence to prejudge 
28. Sec.455 of Title 28 United States Code (1970) _ 
designated as 28 u.s.c. § 455. The predecessor statute 
of Section 4551 Act of May 8, 1792, ch 36, § 11, I Stat. 278 applied only to federal district judges. It was 
reenacted and expanded several times. It is amended and 
expanded recently on Dec. 5, 1974, Pub.L. 93 - 512 § 1, 
88 Stat. 1609. The unamended Section 455 permitted 
disqualification on four grounds only: (1) Interest; 
(2) Previous representation of a party; (3) Participation 
in the case as a material witness; or (4) relationship or 
connection with a party or his attorney. 
29. Frank, Disqualification of ~udges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 628. 
30. 28 U'.S .C.. §.455 (a)'. 
31. Ibid §.455 (bY (~}. 
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the application oj law to those facts. Also there is the 
possibility of danger that the judge will consider facts 
not as they are presented in a trial or appear in the record 
on appeal, but in accordance with his own recollections of 
them. In United States v. Parker,<32 ) decided a few years 
ago, a judge who had presided over a trial in which 
alleged perjury was committed also tried the perjury trial. 
The Defendant's motion to have the perjury case transferre~ 
to the Executive Committee for reassignment to a different 
judge was denied. The Court of Appeals held that such a 
denial was not an error but it would have been better 
practice to forestall the charge of bias, or appearance 
thereof, by sending the case back to the Executive Committee 
for reassignment and •tfailure to do so, although not error, 
increased the risk of prejudice to the accused".(32) Such a 
situation is now expressly covered by Section 455 (b) (1). 
Besides, a fair trial in a fair tribunal is an 
essential requirement of due process of law. Where the 
judge or adjudicator has been the target of personal 
hostility, criticism or abuse from the party, then the 
probability of bias on the part of the judge or decision 
maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable under due 
process of law. (33) In Mayberry v. P~nnsylvania,<34 ) Mayberry 
32. U.S. v. Parker. 447 F.2d 826 (1971) 829. 
33. Withrow v. Larkin 421 U.S.35, 43 L .ed 2d 712, 723, (1975). 
34. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 4oo u.s. 455 (1971). 
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was charged with having participated in prison disorder and 
was convicted. Throughout the trial he had engaged in 
slandering the court and call the judge, amongst other 
things a "fooln and a "stumbling dog". vlhen he was brought 
in for sentencing, the judge sentenced him for the crime 
of which he had been convicted but before doing so, found 
him guilty of one or more criminal contempts on eleven of 
the twenty one days of trial and sentenced him to not less 
then one year for each of the eleven. The court concluded 
that by reason of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings 
should be afforded a public trial before a judge other than 
the one reviled by the contemnor. 
In analogizing from the courts to administrative bodies, 
the tendency has been to apply the rules formulated for 
application to judges. "Cabinet officers charged by 
congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be 
flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an 
underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case. But 
both are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual 
discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy 
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances". (35) The 
court apparently reaffirmed this position in the case of 
F.T.C. v. Cement Institute(36) and Hortonville District 
v. Hortonville Education Association.(37Y In the latter 
35. United States v. Morgan, 313, u.s. 4o9, 421. (1941). 
36. F.T.C. Cement Institute 333 u.s. 683, 702-3, (1948). 
37. Hortonville :District_ v. Hortonville Education 
Association 49 Led 2d I,9 (1976). 
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case, the respondents, Hortonville Education Association, 
(REA) argued that the decision of the School Board to 
dismiss the teachers engaged in a strike was not an 
impartial decision and therefore was a denial of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the 
Board's previous participation in negotiations with the 
teacher. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this 
involvement, without more, disqualified the Board from 
deciding whether the teachers should be dismissed. This 
contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. Mere 
familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency 
in the performance of its statutory role does not, however, 
disqualify a decision maker· • (37a) Neither is a dec is ion 
maker disqualified simply because he has taken a position, 
even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute in 
the absence of showing that he is incapable of judging that 
particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own 
circumstances.(37~) Wisconsin statutes vested in the Board 
the power to discharge its employees. The Fourteenth 
Amendment permits a court to strip the Board of that power 
which the Wisconsin Legislature had given it only if the 
Board's prior involvement in negotiating with the teachers 
means that it cannot act with due process.<38:) In Texaco 
ln£. v. F.T.C. the court held that a speech by the 
Chairman of the F.T.C. which showed that he prejudged the 
merits of the case disqualified him from participating in a 
proceeding against Texaco for unfair trade practices. 
3~ Hortonville District_ v. Hortonville Education 
Association 49 Led 2d I,9 (U.S~ Sup.Ct., 1976J. 
38. Ibid. 
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while proceedings against Texaco were still in progress, 
Chairman Dixon delivered a speech before the National 
Congress of Petroleum Retailers and commented in a way that 
showed the Texaco coerced its dealers into purchasing 
tyres, batteries and accessories exclusively from a 
particular supplier. In proceedings to review a final 
order directing Texaco to stop the promotion of Goodrich 
products, the court said that the speech of Chairman Dixon 
plainly revealed that he had already concluded that Texaco 
and Goodrich were violating the law and that he would 
protect the interest of the petroleum retailers. The court 
concluded that the Chairman's participation in the hearing 
of the case amounted to the denial of due process and 
invalidated the order.<39) In American Cynamid Company 
v. Federal Trade Commission when one of the decision 
makers had already formed an opinion regarding the matters 
under consideration (that prices on certain drug quoted by 
petitioners were artificially high and collusive) as a result 
of prior investigation and dealing with the matter as 
counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee Sub-Committee 
then "any opening so formed were conclusions as to facts, and 
not merely an 'underlying philosophy' or 'crystalized point 
of view on questions of law or Policy'" and his participation 
vitiated the whole decision.(40)' The Administrative 
39. Texaco, Inc., v • .EI.Q.. 336, F.2d. 754, 760. 
(D.C. cir. 1964) vacated and remanded on other grounds 
381, u.s. 739 (1965). 
4o. American Cynamid Company v. Fed. Trade Commission 
(u.s. Ct. of Appeals, Sixth Circuit ,·1966) 363 F.2d 757. 
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Procedure Act 5 U.s.c. §.554(d)(40) states that an 
"'employee who presides at the reception of evidence 
pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the 
recommended decision or initial decision required by 
section 557 of this title", and n·such an employee may not 
(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue unless on 
notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; or 
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or 
direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance 
of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency". 
The statute contemplates that the hearing officers (now 
called presiding employees)' who are to preside over cases 
should be free from all possible influences. Again 
s.556(bY(4ll provides for the disqualification of hearing 
officers for bias or other disqualification. Such an 
officer may at any time disqualify himself, "On the filing 
of a timely and sufficient affidavit the agency shall 
determine the matter as a part of the record and decision 
in the casen.<4l) The agency's final decision is subject to 
judicial review. There are a number of cases involving the 
National Labour Relations Board and its trial examiners which 
deal with personal hostility mmllfested during the trial. In 
Inland Steel Co. v. ~' <42> in a proceeding against an employer 
4o·. The parallel section of Administrative Procedure Act 
1946 in Sec. 5(c). 
41. The parallel section of 1946 Act (supra) is Sec. 7(a). 
42. Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B. 109 ~.2d. 9, (9th cir., 
1940). 
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for unfair labour practices the record disclosed that the 
. 
trial examiner by hostile and co-ercive examination of 
witnesses demonstrated that he was acting as a partisan on 
the side of the National Labor Relations Board rather than 
in a judicial capacity. The court held that there must 
be "a trial by a tribunal free from bias and prejudice and 
imbued with the desire to accord to the parties equal 
consideration. There is perhaps no more important right 
to which litigants are entitled than they be given such a 
trial". (42a) This is not possible when the trial examiner 
becomes hostile to one party or favourable to the other. 
The Fifth circuit court refused enforcement of orders issued 
after a hearing in which the examiner become incensed by the 
testimony of one of the employees (Jewell Sanders) of the 
Company. The court said:"A careful comparison of the report 
with the evidence leaves us in no doubt that the examiner, 
relying on her was carried away with his justified wrath 
toward Fier, which he mistook for righteous indignation 
toward all the respondents".(43) Usually contentions of 
partiality against administrators are rejected by the courts. 
For example, without setting aside an order, in one case a 
court criticised an examiner because he interrupted a 
witness sixty times to ask questions and displayed "an 
42s.Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B. 109 F.2d, 9, 20 (Jth cir. 
194o). 
43. N.L.R.B. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d. 859, 868 (5th cir 
1954). 
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attitude clo~ely bordering on partisanship or even 
hostility". C44) 
Similarly in a recent case(45) the Supreme Court 
expressed the view that mere exposure to evidence 
presented in a non-adversary investigative procedure is in-
sufficient in itself to impugn the impartiality and 
fairness of the state examining board members at a later 
adversary hearing. In the above case the Supreme Court 
held that the fact that the State Medical Examining Board, 
being prevented by temporary injunction from the District 
Court from going forward with the contested hearing 
regarding suspension of the appellee physician's licence 
proceeded to formal findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that there was probable cause to believe that the physician 
had engaged in various prohibited acts, did not show bias 
and prejudgment, and the board stayed within accepted 
bounds of due process by issuing such findings and 
conclusions after investigation. The initial charge 
or determination of probable cause and the ultimate 
44. Tele-trip Co. v. ~· 340 F.2d 575 at 581 (4th cir,, 
1965). A similar view was held by the 7th circuit 
court, where it was admitted that 11 trial examiner's 
hostility detracts from the weight to be accorded 
his findings•t yet the hearing was not so unfair as 
to demand remand - A.O.Smith Corporation v. NLRB 343 
F .2d 103, 110 (7th cir .. ,l965). -
45. Withrow v. Larkin 43 Led 2d 712, 728 (1975). 
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adjudication have different bases and purposes and the 
fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that 
they relate to the same issues does not result in a 
procedural due process violation. "The risk of bias or 
prejudgment in this sequence of functions has not been 
considered to be intolerably high or to raise a 
sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators would 
be so psychologically wedded to'their complaints that they 
would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of 
having erred or changed position".(46) 
46. Ibid at 729. 
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{E) PROSECUTOR -JUDGE CASES: ENGLAND 
Nobody is allowed to adjudicate when he himself is 
the prosecutor or one of the parties to instituting the 
proceeding in question. The principle has for long been 
recognised in English common law and is applicable to 
judges, magistrates and administrative adjudicators. In 
~ Bonham's ~(1) Lord Coke struck at the power of the 
College of Physicians to summon, fine and imprison Dr. 
Bonham, a doctor of physics of Cambridge University for 
practising without the licence of the College. He then 
made the famous statement, quoted earlier, which has been 
referred to in many later cases. 
The reason is plain enough. It is most natural that 
a person will favour his own cause and the possibility is 
most when the judge is the complainant or one of the 
parties in instituting the case. Holt C.J., in City of 
London v. Wood, said: 
"It is against all laws that the same person should 
be party and judge in the same cause, for it is manifest 
contradiction; for the party is he that is to complain to 
the judge and the judge is to hear the party; the party 
endeavours to have his will, the judge determines against 
the will of the party •••• can any man act against his will 
or enforce himself to obey?n·(2) 
1. Jlr..._ Bonham's case (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 107 a. 118 a. (Discussed earlier)· The censors of the Royal college 
of physicians had not only pecuniary interest in fining 
Dr. Bonham but in fact were prosecutors. This case is 
discussed earlier. 
2. City of London v. Wood (1701) 12 Mod.669, 687. 
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The rule is that a person shall not act as a judge 
in a case in which he is in fact the accuser. Where a 
judge took an active part as a chairman of a local board 
in the institution of the proceedings against a party by 
the local board of health and then sat as one of the 
judges to decide in spite of the objection taken against 
him and convicted the person, there was certainly 
"substantial" or na real biasn on his part. He ought 
not to have sat as a judge and it was immaterial what 
part he really took in the matter. (3) Blackburn J., in 
delivering judgment, said: "We cannot go into the 
question whether the interested justice took no part in 
the matter (i.e. in the discussion of the case). The 
question is, was he so interested in the matter as that 
he ought not to have sat?n·(4) So in R.v. Gaisford, a 
justice of peace moved a resolution calling upon the 
defendant to remove the obstruction of a highway, which 
the defendant failed to do. A summons was brought against 
the defendant by the district surveyor on the same matter 
and the justice took part in the adjudication. It was 
held that the justice was disqualified from adjudication.<4a) 
The fact that he moved the resolution afforded ground for a 
reasonable suspicion of bias on his part. "It is well 
known that the same person shall not act both as accuser 
- and judge". (4'A) 
3. R.v. Meyer (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 173. 
4. Ibid, p. 177. 
4a. R. v. Gaisford !J-892) 1 Q .B. 381, 384·. 
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A statute-may remove the disqualification of 
members of a local authority from sitting as judges in 
matters where the local authority is also a party but 
such a statute "has not the effect of enabling a person 
to act as prosecutor and judge in the same matter. It 
would require express terms in an Act of Parliament to 
produce that effect:<5) In R.v. ~(5)' where a member of 
the Sanitary Committee of a town council who had taken 
part in directing a prosecution sat and adjudicated upon 
the charge, the conviction was quashed. It was held, 
that Section 258(6) did not remove the disqualification 
which attached to the justice by reasons of his having 
acted as a member of the Sanitary Committee in directing 
the prosecution. However, by the provision of a statute 
a '•justice is clearly entitled to sit unless he is a 
prosecutor in the sense of having taken an active part 
' 
in directing the pr~secutionn.(7) The mere fact that a 
judge was present at the premises when some of the members 
took the resolution to prosecute would not ipso facto 
disqualify him unless he nmade himself an active 
prosecutor in the casen.(8) 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
.R.v • .1:&.e. (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 394, 395 et seq, per Field, J. 
Ibid, s. 258 of Public HealthAdt 1875 "No Justice of 
the peace shall be deemed incapable ot acting in cases 
arising under this Act by reason of his being a member 
of a local authorityn. 
R.-v-. Pwllheli Justices Ex, parte Soane and others 
~4~ 2 All E.R. 815, 817. 
Ibid. 
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No man can be a plaintiff or prosecutor in any 
action and at the same time adjudge that case. In R.v. 
London County Council,(9)' the presence of the three 
Councillors, who instructed counsel to oppose application 
for music and dancing licences, at the hearing was held 
to have vitiated the proceedings. It was held to be no 
defence that they did not take part in the decision. The 
court will not see whether such interested parties took 
part in the deliberation. 
The administrative process often involves the 
conbined functions of investigating, prosecuting and 
adjudicating. As a result, the adjudicatory body cannot 
pass an unbiased judgment because of its relation with 
the prosecution and its interest in the result of the 
dispute. This separation of power iS fundamentally 
needed, in the Lord Chancellor's words 11not only in the 
case of courts of justice and other judicial tribunals, 
but in the case of authorities which in no sense to be 
called courts, have to act as judges of the rights of 
othersn. (lO)" In Frome United Breweries v. Bath JJ., (lOa) 
the licensing justices of Bath referred certain old licences 
for renewal to the Compensation Authority (the whole body of 
borough justices). Later they decided to oppose the renewal 
of the licences and instructed a solicitor to act for them. 
9. R.v. London County Council Ex parte Akkel'.sdyk, Ex. parte 
Fermenia [189'2] 1 Q.E.D. 190. 
lD. Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath JJ. /j92fi]A.c. 586, 
at p. 590 ( viscount cave L.C.). 
lOa. Ibitd. 
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At the meeting of the Compensation Authority, the 
solicitor appeared and opposed the renewal of one of the 
licences which was refused, but the Compensation Authority 
included three licensing justices who were present when 
the decision to oppose the licences was taken. The House 
of Lords held that the acts of the licensing justices 
invalidated the decision. In the absence of a statutory 
provision that the justices who took part to oppose the 
licences could also sit as judges, the general rule that 
no one can be both party and judge would apply and the 
justices would be subject to the principle laid down in 
R.v. Rand, i.e. whether or not there is a real likelihood 
of bias on their part. Lord Cave L.C. declared:(ll) 
n.If there is one principle which forms an integral 
part of the English law, it is that every member of a 
body engaged in a judicial procedure must be able to act 
judicially; and it has been held over and over again that, 
if a member of such a body is subject to a bias (whether 
financial or other) in favour of or against either party 
to the dispute or is in such a position that a bias must 
be assumed, he ought not to take part in the decision or 
even to sit upon the tribunal 11 • 
(lla) In Taylor v. National Union of Seamen, --the Plaintiff ,.,as 
dismissed on the ground of insubordination by the general 
Secretary of the Union and on his appeal to the executive 
Council of the union, the general secretary acted as 
Chairman of the executive Co1mcil. It was held that in 
ll • Ibid, p. 590. 
lla. /:1967 J 1 AlL E.R. 767 (Ch.D)\. 
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such circumstances the executive council was under a 
duty to act judicially and thatatthe appeal meeting for 
that purpose the general Secretary, whilst in the chair, 
had presented the case against the plaintiff and such a 
doubling of the roles of prosecutor and judge was 
contrary to the requirements of natural justice. "In 
form and in fact his role included that of presenting 
the case against the plaintiff; and in fact his role was 
of pressing the case against the plaintiff at that 
meeting and, apparently, not considering the case in any 
judicial sense at all". (llb) In Law v. Chartered Institute 
of Patent Agents the Council of the defendant institute 
approached the Board of Trade to erase Law's name from 
the Register of Patent Agents on the ground of 
'tdisgraceful professional conduct"· under rule 31 of their 
charter. Having failed in this, the council proceeded 
under another rule (i.e. rule 32) upon the same allegations 
and finding him guilty of such conduct, resolved to expel 
him from the membership of the Institute. It was held 
that their decision was viliated by the fact that the 
Council now acting as judge, had earlier been the accuser. 
Such conduct gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias 
on their part.(l21 
Since Ridge v. Baldwin, the application of the rules of 
natural justice has been considerably extended. The rule 
l~ Taylor y. National Union of Seamen [19627 l All E.R. 
767, 774 (Per ungoed.- Thomas, J.). 
12. Law v. Chartered Institute of Patent Agents [i9l~ 
2 Ch. 276. 
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of bias is applicable not only to authorities making 
judicial and quasi-judicial decisions but also to 
executive decisions. A justice acting under the 
procedure of Food and Drugs Act 1955, even though acting 
in an administrative or executive capacity, was obliged 
to act with "openness, fairness and impartiality.<l3) In 
]l.v. Birmingham Justices a local authority seized some 
sweet potatoes as unfit for human consumption. At the 
!I 
conclusion of the applicants case the justice acting 
under the Food and Drugs Act, 1955, retired with the 
local authority officials (public analyst and chief 
veterinary officer) before the decision was given and 
then announced his decision without indicating what advice 
he had received from them. It was held that the decision 
could not stand. James J. observed: 
"To leave the room with the protagonists of the 
applicants, the man who had brought in the justice to 
adjudicate, with the, person who has provided the evidence, 
namely, the certificate of analysis and then to return and 
announce a decision without indicating to the applicants 
what if any, further evidence had been given by those 
persons, in my judgement was a breach of the requirements 
that the procedure should be carried out seemingly openly 
with fairness".(l3) 
The court has always regarded it as contrary to natural 
justice that a person rtwho is in the position of a 
13. R.v. Birmingham City Justices, Ex .parte Foreign Foods 
(whole salers),Ltd. fl97q] 3 All E.R. 945, 949. 
- 162 -
prosecutor should be present at the (subsequent) 
(14) deliberations of the adjudicating committee". In 
Ward v. Bradford Corporation, several woman students in 
a teacher training college were found to have men in their 
rooms in breach of the articles of government. The 
Principal of the college was unwilling to refer the case 
to the disciplinary committee, and the governing body 
amended their rules so that they themselves should be 
entitled to refer cases to it. The discuplinary committee 
recommended that the plaintiff W. be expelled. 
committees' deliberation an officer of the local 
In the 
education authority took part and expressed strong views 
hostile to w. The governing body (members of the 
disciplinary committee not taking part) approved their 
recommendations. The governing body was the complainant 
as well as the judge but the Court of Appeal held that the 
governing body acted fairly. There should be nno reason 
why the governing body should not make a rule by which they 
themselves can refer cases to the disciplinary. committee 
so long as they are careful themselves to see that justice 
is done • • • • • • they may lay themselves open to the 
criticism that they are acting as prosecutor and judge - as 
.prosecutor in referring a case to the disciplinary 
committee and as judge in deciding whether the 
recommendation of the disciplinary committee should be 
accepted or not ••••••••• But we have seen the minutes. 
These show that the governing body, when they decided to 
14. R.v. Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte 
Hook ~1976J l.W.L.R. 1052, 1057; Cooper v. Wilson 
~1937~ 2· K.B. 309 (discussed in the section on 
"Participation in Appeal Against own Decisionn. 
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refer these cases, were careful not to discuss the merits 
of any individual cas en. (l5) About· the presence of the 
local education officer, the court held that the general 
rule that no person ought to participate in the 
deliberations of a judicial or quasi-judicial body unless 
he is a member of it,is subject to exceptions, and that in 
this case his participation did not invalidate the 
proceedings of the committee. These dicta suggest that 
the courts do not want educational institutions performing 
quasi-judicial functions in administering internal 
discipline to be fettered by the strict rules applicable 
to a court of law. It is enough that the body which tries 
the case is fair and unbiased. 
15. Per Lord Denning in Ward v. Bradford Corporation and 
others (1971) 70 .L. G .R.27. 32, 33. 
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PROSECUTOR-JUDGE CASES : UNITED STATES 
Due process is violated where a judge acts as a 
grand jury and then tries the very persons accused as a 
result of his investigations. In Re Murchison, 
Murchison and White were called as witnesses before a "one 
man judge - grand jury" and were interrogated at length 
about gambling and bribery in Detroit. The judge then 
charged both of them for criminal contempt, tried and 
sentenced them. The petitioners objected to being tried 
before the same judge, contending, inter alia,that trial 
before judge who was the complainant, indicter and 
prosecutor constituted a denial of due process of law. 
Their objection was rejected by the trial judge who held 
that due process did not forbid him to try contempt cases. 
The state'! Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's 
contention but was reversed by the United States Supreme 
Court, where Mr. Justice Black laid down the famous 
principle: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process •••••••••••••••••• No man can 
be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try 
cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That 
interest cannot be defined with precision. 
and relationships must be considered"~l6) 
Circumstances 
Having 
been a part of the accusatory process a judge cannot be 
wholly disinterested in the acquittal or conviction of the 
accused. (l7) 
16. 
17. 
In !!! Murchison 349 u.s. 133, 136, (195'5}~ 
Similar view held in R.v. L.ondon County Council Ex 
parte Akkersdyk, [1892]· 1 Q.B. 190 (supra). 
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In NLRB Y. Phelbs,<lB) where a charge was brought 
against Phelbs, Trustee of Atlas Pipeline Corporation, the 
examiner forsook his role as an impartial trier of facts 
and took the role of an investigating accuser and 
prosecutor and then caused the Chief trial examiner to order 
the hearing re-opened for the purpose of making Atlas Oil 
and Refining Corporation a respondent in the proceeding. 
Notwithstanding that no charges had been brought against 
Atlas, the examiner on his own motion entered a show cause 
order why the complaint against the trustee should not be 
amended as to make Atlas a Party. The proceedings went 
forward over the objections of the trustee and Atlas and 
their motions to disqualify him. The examiner showed 
resentment and spleen against them and expressed his 
predetermined will as to their guilt. But "Such an 
attitude, excusable if not commendable in a prosecutor, is 
a wholly improper one in a judge or an examiner who sits in 
judicial place to hear and determine facts, draw conclusions 
of law and make reports and recommendations based thereon". (l9) 
~he order of the Board was set aside and matter remanded to 
the Board for a fair and impartial trial. "When the fault 
of bias and prejudice in a judge first rears its ugly head, 
its effect remains throughout the whole proceed~ngn.(20) 
Even if the record shows that there was evidence to support 
the judgment, that would not save a trial from the charge 
of partiality. 
18. u.s. Cir.Ct. of Appeals:136 F.;2d 562 (5th cir. 1943). 
19. Ibid, p. 567. 
20. Ibid,pp. ;63-;64. 
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An administrative official may likewise be 
instrumental in bringing charges against the party whose 
interests are involved. In suc.h cases it is generally 
held that the official is disqualified for bias unless 
he merely brought them formally in the name of the group 
simply as a matter of procedural form. In Brinkley v. 
Hassig, (2l) Brinkley•·s licence t·o practise medicine had 
been revoked by the Kansas State Medical Board on the 
ground of violation of professional standards. Brinkley 
sought to set aside the revocation because the board 
members were prejudiced and had been active in instigating 
the proceedings. 'r'he court agreed that "'doubtless all 
were in fact prejudicedn·. Still it refused to give 
Brinkley the relief he sought, partly on the ground of 
necessity as the statute provided ntbut one tribunal with 
power to revoke a doctor 1 s license":. 
The combination of prosecuting and adjudicating 
functions in the same hand is repugnant to the spirit of 
just administration and a·s we have seen was vigorously 
criticised:. by the courts in England. On the other hand 
American courts are of the opinion that the combination of 
investigative and judicial function within an agency does 
(22) 
not, of itself, violate due process. The 
Administrative Procedure Act 554(d)(23) provides that.no 
21. Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d. 351(10-th cir. 1936). 
22. u.s. v. Litton Industries, Inc. (U.s.ct. of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit, 1972) 462 F,2d.l4. 
23:. Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c. 554(d). 
~ 
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employee or agent engaged in investigating or 
prosecuting for an agency in a case may, in that case, 
participate or advise in the decision,recommended decision 
or agency review except as witness or counsel in public 
proceedings. But this section expressly exempts from 
this prohibition "the agency or a member or members of the 
(23a) body comprising the agency". So.it is not surprising 
to find that ":CtheJ case law, both federal and State, 
generally rejects the idea that the combination ~of~ 
. judging ~and~ investigating functions is a denial of due 
process ••••• ..-(24) ~he decision of a Court of Appeal 
touching upon this question of bias arising from a 
combination of functions may be noted. In Pangburn v. 
CAB, (2"5)' the Board had the responsibility of making an 
accident report and also reviewing the decision of a trial 
examiner that the pilot involve~ in the accident should 
have his airline transport pilot rating suspended. The 
pilot claimed that his right to procedural due process had 
been violated by the fact that the Board was not an 
impartial tribunal in deciding his appeal from the trial 
examiners decision since it had previously issued its 
accident report finding pilot error to be the probable 
cause of the crash. The Court of Appeals found the Board's 
procedures to be constitutionally permissible: 
"!'Nil cannot say that the mere fact that a tribunal 
has had contact with a particular factual complex in a 
prior hearing, or indeed has taken a public position on the 
facts, is enough to place tha·.t tribunal under a constitutional 
inhibition to pass upon the facts in a subsequent hearing. 
23a. See§ 554 (d). 
24. K.C. Davis, Administrative La"\-.r Treatise, vol 2, ~.13.02. 
25. 311 F.2d 349(CA1 1962). 
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We believe that more is required. Particularly is this 
so in the instant case where the Boards' prior contact 
with the case resulted from its following the 
congressional mandate to investigate and report the 
probable cause of all civil air accidents 11 • (26) In a 
recent case the Supreme court of the United States has 
held that the processes utilised by a state medical 
examining board empowered to warn or reprimand physicians, 
to suspend thei-r' licences, and to institute criminal 
actions or revoke licences do not in themselves contain an 
unacceptable risk of bias violative of due process of law. 
The contention that the combination of investigative and 
adjudicative functions necessarily creates an 
unconstitutional risk of bias in the administrative agency 
must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in 
those serving as adjudicators. rt [It] must convince that 
under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies 
and human weakness, conferring investigative and 
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a 
risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be 
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be 
adequately implemented"'• <27) 
26. Ibid at P. 358. 
27. Withrow v. Larkin 43 Led 2d 712, 723-4 (U.S.. Sup.ct. 
1975). 
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(F) PROFESSIONAL AND VOCATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: ENGLAND 
Bias may arise out of professional or vocational 
relationship with any party in a dispute. It is 
improper for the same person to act as an advocate and 
a judge. "One cannot be judge and attorney for any of 
. {1) 
the parties". However, in The1luson v. Rend1esham 
the House of Lords said that a counsel in a case, after 
being elevated to the Bench, is not prevented from 
taking part in the hearing and decision of the case. 
Otherwise "it might produce terrible delay and expense 
to the suitortt and sometimes "even an absolute denial of 
justice, especially if applied to a judge of the court of 
chancery11 .(2 ) The views of the House of Lords are echoed 
in the modern rule of necessity which requires judges to 
decide who might well have been disqualified for bias, if 
otherwise the case may remain altogether unheard, 
especially when a full court hearing is needed or where a 
specified number of justices are required for a quorum of 
the court.<3) 
The Thelluson case cannot be said to lay down any 
principle generally applicable to every situation. In 
Ex_ parte Whelan, a justice of the peace was also an 
1. Dr. Bonham's case (1610) 8.co.Rep.ll3 b. 118. 
2. Thelluson v. Rendlesham (1859) 7.H.L.Cas. 429, 431. 
3. The Rule of Necessity is discussed in a later chapter. 
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employee of a firm of solicitors who, acting on behalf 
of a local authority, made a complaint before the justice 
who issued a summons upon it. It was held that a 
reasonable suspicion of bias existed in that case. '~The7 
position of the employee may:.: be "compared with that which 
would arise if a member of the firm of solicitors being 
himself a justice had issued his summons",<»+Y and the order 
for certiorari was made absolute. 
Professional relationship of the Justic~clerk with 
one of the parties also invalidates the decision. Just 
as the justices may not have any professional 
relationship with any of the parties, similarly the 
justices• clarks also are precluded from any relationship 
with any party. In .R.y. Sussex Justices, .Ex_earte 
McCarthy, a summons was taken out by the police against 
the applicant for dangerous driving. At the hearing of 
the summons the acting clerk to the justices was a member 
of the firm of solicitors which was acting for one w. in a 
claim for damages against the applicant for injuries 
received in the collision. At the end of the evidence, 
the justices retired to consider their decision, and the 
clerk also retired with them. The justices convicted the 
applicant. It was held that the conviction must be 
quashed, as it was improper for the acting clerk, though 
he in fact refrained from referring to the case in any way, 
4. Per Mathew J. in R.v.Peacock, Ex,farte Whelan (1971) 
Qd.R. »+71, at p. 479. 
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to be present with the justices when they were making 
their decision having regard to his firm's connection 
with the case. Because "it is of fundamental importance 
that justice should not only be done, but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done 11 ,(5) one 
should not do anything "which creates even a suspicion".( 5) 
that justice has been improperly interfered with. 
Therefore, when a firm of solicitors had acted for 
op.e;_ -_ ·. -- .. of the parties and then later the solicitor, as 
clerk to the justices, sat with the justices on the 
hearing of the same matter and advised them, then 11 the 
necessary, or at least the reasonable impression on the 
mind of the applicant would be that justice was not being 
done"' even though neither the justice nor the clerk was 
aware of the fact that his firm had previous dealings with 
the party.(6) On the other hand in fi.v. Camborne JJ. 
the applicant was prosecuted by a county council under the 
Food and Drugs Act 1938. T.he clerk to the justices went 
to advise the justices on a point of law and having given 
his advice he returned to the court without discussing the 
case with them. The clerk was at that time a member of 
the council but not a member of the council's health 
committee before which the proceedings against the applicant 
had been discussed. An application to quash the conviction 
on the ground of bias failed as the facts did not disclose 
6. 
~rd Hewart C.J. in R.v. Sussex J~ Ex parte McCarthy 
Ll92lfl l.K.B. 256 atP. 259. 
R.v. Essex JJ. Ex parte Perkins [j927] 2 K.B. 475, 
per Avory,J. at p. 489. 
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any real likelihood of bias. Slade J. warned that the 
continued citation of Lord Hewart's dictum to cases on 
the "flimsiest"· grounds of bias would certainly lead to 
error.(7) Clerks to licensing justices are now 
prohibited by statute from acting as solicitor for a 
party.<B) 
When the facts give rise to a real likelihood of 
bias, then a judge is certainly disqualified. In a case 
where the clerk passed a police report about the previous 
conviction of the applicant to the recorder before he 
arrived at his decision, the recorder was disqualified 
from acting as judge in that case. (9 )' Again an adjudicator 
may be biased because of his personal advancement which 
might be frustrated if he makes an adverse decision 
against a party in dispute. In R.v. Barnsley Licensing 
Justices, the applicants, besides an allegation of 
pecuniary interest, also contended that the fact that the 
chairman of the bench of justices had stood for election 
as one of the directors of the society, raised a 
presumption of bias as distinct from pecuniary interest. 
Their contention was turned down by the court. Lord 
Devlin said, "we have to satisfy ourselves that there was 
a real likelihood of bias - not merely satisfy ourselves 
7. 
B. 
9. 
~v. Camborne Justices and Another, Ex p5r5e Pearce 
Ll95~ 1 Q.B. 41 (Per Slace J. at P.-;1- 2 
Licensing Act 1964,s.28(3) 
R.v. Grimsby Borough Quarter Sessions /j956_} 1 Q.B.36. 
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that was the- sort of impression that might reasonably 
get abroad ••• ••'Real likelihood·• depends on the impression 
which the court gets from the circumstances in which the 
justices were sitting".(lO) The Court of Appeal came to 
the conclusion that there was no such bias in that case. 
In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) ~. v. Lannon, 
the Chairman of the rent assessment committee determined 
the rent at substantially below the figure suggested by 
the expert called by even the tenants. The Chairman was 
a solicitor who resided with his parents in Regency Lodge 
and was advising the Regency Lodge tenants in dispute with 
their landlords who were a company in the same group as 
the appellant landlords. On appeal from dismissal from 
motion for certiorari, the Court of Appeal held that the 
court will not inquire whether a justice or a chairman of 
the tribunal in fact favoured one side unfairly,"suffice 
it that reasonable people might think he did"'• (11) The 
principle is that no man can be an advocate for or against 
a party in one proceeding: and at the same time act as a 
judge of the same party in another proce.eding. A 
barrister or a solicitor should not sit as a judge in his 
client's case.<12 ) 
A. judge should always disqualify "where there is an 
association with the victim of such a character as may erode 
10. 
11. 
12. 
R.v. Barnsley Licensing Justices ~96Q7 2 Q.B. 167, 187. 
Per Lord Denning in Metropolitan Pro~erties Co. 
(F.G.C.) ~. v. Lannon (C.A.) [196~ 1 Q.B. 577, 599. 
Ibid,at 6oo. 
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the judiciaL- officer 1 s impartiality and detachment". (13) 
Bridge J. said in R,v. Altrincham JJ. Ex parte Pennington 
that 'tif one visualises almost any sort of association 
between a justice and the private victim of an offence"· 
such association must disqualify the justice. (l4) In it 
the county council's education committee were the buyers 
under the contract with the applicant sellers who 
delivered a short weight of goods to two of the county 
council's schools. A weights and measures inspector of 
the council was the prosecutor, and the presiding judge 
was a co-opted member of the council's education committee. 
The applicants were convicted. It was held that although 
a formal connection between a justice and a prosecutor was 
not such as to disqualify a justice from hearing a case, 
justices should always disqualify themselves from hearing 
a case where they had an active interest in an organisation 
which was the victim of the alleged offence and-accordingly 
since the presiding justice had an active interest in the 
education committee, the convictions would be quashed. 
However, for adjudication in a case of arbitration, 
where the parties themselves choose their judge and 
contract to appoint the employee of the other side, then 
the opinion of the court is that in such "·special cases, 
the scales of justice need not be held in a neutral or 
.wholly indifferent handu.(l5) In Jackson v. Barry Railway 
13. 
14. 
15. 
~· Al trincham JJ. Ex parte Pennington, {i 975} 1 
Q.B. 549, 553. --
Ibid at p. 556. 
Jackson v. Barry Railway [i89~ 1 Ch. 238, at p.249 
Per Bowen L.J. 
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~ a contract was made between the contractor and the 
company and it was agreed that in case of dispute the 
matter would be referred to the Company's engineer for 
deliberation. A dispute arose and the arbitrator 
expressed his opinion in a letter, but the contractor 
brought an action alleging that the arbitrator (Mr. Barry) 
was biased. The Court of Appeal held that the fact that 
the arbitrator had already expressed an opinion on the 
point in dispute in an earlier letter after the 
commencement of the arbritration, would not disqualify 
him from adhering to that view unless on the fair 
construction of the letter it appeared that he had made 
up his mind so as not to be open to change it upon 
argument. However, undisclosed bias or the presence of 
any ·circumstances calculated to prejudice the mind of an 
arbitrator unknown to either of the parties is considered 
as a sufficient ground for the interference of the court.Cl6) 
It may be said that in ordinary cases, a judge ought not 
to have any professional or vocational relationship with 
any of the contesting parties and is expected to be 
indifferent between them. ~he question is whether the 
principle has application in such cases. In a case where 
one of the contracting parties agreed with the other that 
the surveyor of the other party should discharge the duties 
both of expert and of quasi-arbitrator, such a party could 
not claim that the surveyor must be in the position of an 
independent·arbitrator who had no other duty which involved 
16. ~ v. Rose (1858) 1 Giff. 258. 
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acting in the interests of one of the parties:·. and 
accordingly so acting he was not guilty of collusion or 
bad faith. (l7) 
17. Panamena European Navigation (Compania Limitada) 
·v~ Frederick Leyland and Company L.imited 
(J. Russel & Co.) [1947] A.C. 428 (H.L.). 
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(F) PROFESSION~ AND VOCATIONAL RELATIONSHIP: 
UNIT ED STATES. 
In the United States Supreme Court, no-one serving as a 
law cle.rk or as secretary to a justice of the Supreme 
Court shall practice as an attorney or counsellor in any 
court or before any agency of government while continuing 
in that position.Cl8) Again ex-law clerks and secretaries 
are barred from appearing as an attorney or counsellor in 
that court until two years have elapsed after they leave 
the employ of the justices. Such persons shall not even 
participate by way of any form of professional 
consultation and assistance, in any case that was pending 
in the Supreme Court during the period in which they held 
such a position.<18 Y Professional relationship of the 
judge with both the client and the case has always been 
regarded as a universal ground for disqualification. 
Because in such cases the judge would seldom have an open 
mind and so it would be improper for him to try the case.(l9) 
In California no justice or judge· shall sit or act in 
any action or proceeding when, in the action or proceeding, 
or in any previous action or proceeding involving any of 
the same issues, he has been attorney or counsel for any 
party; or when he has given advice to any party upon any 
matter involved in the present action or proceeding. He 
18. 28. U.s .c.. - Rules (Rules of the Supreme Court of 
the United States) , R. 7. 
II II 6 19. Frank : Disqualification of Judges,- 5 Yale Law 
Journal · ., .. 605, 621 etseq. 
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is also similarly disqualified from sitting and trying 
the case when he has been retained or employed as attorney 
or counse~ for any party within two years prior to the 
commencement of the action or proceeding.<20 Y A similar 
disqualification is also provided under the Utah Code 
which states that no justice, judge or justice of the 
peace shall sit in any proceeding when he has been attorney 
or counsel for either party in the action or proceeding.<2l) 
The federal statute 28 U~S. C •. § ·. 455 has significantly 
extended the grounds of disqualification. Section 455 (b) 
(2) disqualifies a justice, judge, magistrate or referee 
. . 
in bankruptcy when he has "served as lawyer in the matter 
in controversy or a lawyer with whom he previously 
practised law served during such association as a lawyer 
concerning the matter or the judge or such lawyer has been 
a material witness concerning itn.C22) 
It seems that the danger of bias or apparent bias towards 
a party or his attorney is the primary concern of the 
statute's requirement of a judge's disqualification where 
"a lawyer with whom he previously practised law served 
20. California Civil Procedure code § 170 (4) (West 
Supp. 1977). 
21. Utah Code Annotated (1953)§78-7-1. (3) But the 
provisions of this section do not apply to the 
arrangement of the calendar, or the regulation 
of the order of business, or to the power of 
transferring the action to some other court. 
22. 28 u.s.c •. § 455 (b) (2) as amended Dec. 5, 1974. 
Pub.L. 93-512, § I, 88 stat. 1609. 
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during such association as a lawyer concerning the 
matter", since in such an instance it is far from certain 
that the judge would have any familiarity with the facts 
of the case or any opinion on its merits. A party may be 
a client of the judge's law firm but may be exclusively 
dealt with by another lawyer of the firm. 'Fhe judge might 
have.no personal dealings with the party or his case at all 
while he was in the firm. If a former firm colleague 
represents before the judge a matter with which he (the 
colLeague) dealt with while the judge was a member of the 
firm, under the present statute disqualification seems 
mandatory. ~he practice has grown up with judges of 
disqualifying tn cases where they played only an advisory 
rule which terminated prior to the commencement of the 
litigation. For example, ~ustice Rehnquist disqualified 
himself inS &,E Contractors, Inc., y. United States(24) 
though in the Justice Department he played only an advisory 
role which ended before the initiation of the litigation. 
Section 455 (as amended)' disqualifies a judge where he has 
served in governmental employment and in such capacity 
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness 
concerning the proceeding or expressed any opinion with 
regard to the merit of the case in controversy.< 25) 
Earlier cases show that judges generally disqualified 
themselves in cases where they participated as government 
23. Ibid. 
24. 4o6 u.s. 1 (1972)' 
25. 28 u.s.c. §-455 (b) (3) 
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lawyers in the cases under controversy when they felt that 
previous involvement \-lith the cases was sufficient to 
render it improper to sit as judges. Chief Justice Taney 
disqualified himself in a case involving relations between 
the federal government and the Bank of the United States. 
As Attorney General, he had given the Secretary of the 
Treasury an opinion on the subject of the case.<26) On the 
other hand Justice Jackson sent on a case and voted with 
other Justices in reversing an opinion he had signed as 
Attorney General,though he hinted that he had been merely the 
"nominal author". (27) 
Judges' membership of the bar does not disqualify 
them from being present in a trial to disbar a barrister. 
Quite commonly the legislature entrusts the regulation of 
a profession to its own members. "An examination of the 
statutes discloses many instances where business or 
professions have on examining boards members of the 
business or professions to be regulated".(28) 
In Parish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State 
Bar,(29) it was held that a judge's impartiality could not 
be reasonably questioned under Section 455(a)' in the trial 
of a suit brought by a black plaintiff claiming 
discrimination in the administration of an Alabama State 
bar examination on the basis of facts that the judge had been 
President of a local bar association in which black lawyers 
were denied membership. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
~W, -7~5:e6 Y~s~e~.states, v. united states 43 u.s. c2 How) 
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 u.s. 162, 177 (1950). 
People v. Murphy (1961) 110 N.W.2d 805: 89 ALR 2d 1006. 
524 F.2d. 98 (1975). 
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If disqualification did lie in such a case then there 
would be "hardly any judge in this circuit who was not a 
member'of a segregated bar association at one time, and 
many have held a high office in the bar associations. 
The way of life which included segregated bar associations 
has been eliminated but only a new generation of judges 
will be free from such a charge. In any event, this 
circumstance will not support a claim of lack of 
impartialityn.(30) Allegations of lack of partiality must 
be supported by facts which would give rise to the 
reasonable inference of bias in relation to the issues 
(30 )' presented in the particular case. 
Similarly administrative decision makers are 
disqualified from sitting as judges in cases where they had 
earlier come into contact with any of the parties or dealt 
with the particular case as a counsel or in another 
capacity. As was held in one case, the fundamental 
r-equirement of fairness in the performance of adjudicating 
a proceeding requires at least that one who participates in 
a case on behalf of any party whether actively or merely 
formally remaining on briefs should not take part in the 
decision of that case-afterwards.C31) 
In American Cynamid Company v. Federal Trade Commission<;2 ) 
the drug companies attacked the F.T.C. order contending 
that its order was void as Chairman Dixon participated in it. 
30. Ibid, pp. 103-104. 
31. Transworld Airlines ~· Civil Aeronautics Board 254 
F.2d 90, 91. 
32. 363 F. 2d 757 (6th cir. 1966) (U.s. Ct. of Appeals). 
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The Chairman,,prior to his appointment as Chairman, had 
been counsel of a Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee which 
had investigated and commented on the very facts and issues 
concerning the same parties now·before the agency. The 
Court of Appeals for the 6th circuit held that his 
participation vitiated the whole decision. It did not 
matter that his vote was not necessary for a majority. 
Parties are entitled to have an impartial tribunal whether 
it consists of one man or many since it is impossible to 
measure quantitatively the influence of one man on others. 
However, the court emphasised that the service of the 
chairman as counsel standing alone would not necessarily 
disqualify him. The court 1·s decision was based on the 
depth of the investigation and comments as counsel which 
showed that he had already formed an opinion regarding the 
matters under consideration. (33) 
33. Ibid. 
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CHAPI'ER V :· EXCLUSION OF THE RULE 
The discussion in earlier chapters of the scope for 
application of the rule against interest and bias has 
inevitably involved a delineation of the limits of that 
application:; situations where by mention or by implication 
the rule is excluded. 
A few situations involving the exclusion of the rule 
merit lengthier and separate treatment. 
(A) BIAS Jrr ATTITUDES TOWARDS ~ OR POLICY1• 
Although, both under English and American Eaw, 
the fundamental principle is that judges and 
administrative authorities should not be biased, 
there are certain cases where the rule seems to 
have no application. It is accepted in both 
countries that preconceived opinion about issues 
of law or policy will not lead to disqualification. 
ENGLAND. 
In 1932, the Committee on Ministers'' Powers, 
while examining in detail the subject of natural justice, 
considered this aspect in paragraph 3 of Section III of 
their report. The report said:-
"Bias from strong and sincere conviction as to the 
public policy may operate as a more serious disqualification 
than pecuniary interest. The mind of the judge ought to 
be free to decide on purely judicial grounds and should 
not directly or indirectly be influenced by, or exposed 
to the influences if, either motives of self-interest or 
opinion about policy or any other considerations not 
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relevant to the issue".(!) 
The committee further suggested that 11'in any case in 
which the Minister's Department would naturally approach 
the issue to be determined with a desire that the decision 
should go one way rather than another, the Minister should 
be regarded as having an interest in the cause. In such 
a case Parliament ought to provide that the matter should 
be judged not by a Minister but by an independent tribunal"'• 
However, the view that "opinions about policy"· should 
not influence judges has since been criticised by many 
eminent judges and writers. It seems that the view of the 
committee that policy issues are never relevant to 
judicial determinations does not represent the law.<2) 
One famous American judge said:· 
"If however, 1bias 1' and 'partiality'' be defined to 
mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the 
judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one 
will ••••••••••••••••• we are born with predispositions: 
and the process of education, formal and informal, create 
attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations, 
attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances 
and which, therefore, by definition, are prejudices". (3 )' 
1. Cmd. 4o6o (1932)~ 78 •. The Committee is generally known as 
the Donoughmore Committee. The first sentence of this 
assertion was quoted with approval by the Administrative 
taw Committee of the American Bar Association 61 A.B.A. 
Rep.734 (1936). 
2. Griffith and Streeti Principles of Administrative Law~ 
(5th ed.) 1973, p. 55. 
3. In re Linahan (Frank J.)(l943) 138 F.2d 650 at 651. 
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A judge may have a sort of bias on a question of law 
insofar as it has been decided in a previous case. by 
virtue of the doctrine of precedent. It is accepted 
almost as a universal practice that a judge in giving 
judgment or a lawyer in arguing a case may well rely on 
previous decisions on that point of law. Such a practice 
is not only common in England and America but is doubtless 
found in all developed legal systems. Again bias 
springing from a judge •:s moral and ethical values is not 
only unavoidable but arguably desirable. 
Robson said: 
Thus Professor 
11Society demands that its judges be biased in certain 
directions no less fnsistently than it demands that they 
shall be unbiased in others ••••• a man who had not a 
standard of.moral values ••••••• who had no beliefs as to 
what is harmful to society and what beneficial, who had no 
bias in favour of marriage as against promiscuous sexual 
relations, honesty as against deceit, truthfulness as 
against lying •••••••••••••• constitutional government more 
desirable than anarchy, would not be tolerated as a judge 
on the bench of any Western countryrt·. (4) 
In administrative law, a Minister who arrives at a 
decision after a hearing or enquiry is not necessarily 
expected to maintain the lofty detachment required of a 
"'' judge in determining issues between parties. Naturally, 
Ministers and their departments are liable to be committed 
4. W.A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, (1951) 
p. 410, 413. "A judge who tries a theft charge may 
safely be assumed to be against theftn: Gee v. Freeman (1959) 16 D.L.R. 65,74. 
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to their own policies, which they tend to favour.< 4a) But 
a Minister is not disqualified for bias simply because he 
is predisposed in favour of a policy which he has adopted 
in the public interest. This is what is known as 
departmental bias. The fount of English authority on 
this point is the decision of the House of Lords in 
Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning.(5) In 
this case the Minister had made a draft order under the New 
Towns Act 1946 designating Stevenage a "new town". 
Objections were lodged, and a public inquiry was held. The 
Minister later confirmed the order. But before this 
procedure was set in motion, the Minister visited Stevenage 
and made a speech at a public meeting. There was heckling 
and jeering. In reply to the heckling, the Minister said, 
"It is no good your jeering: it is going to be done". The 
legality of the Minister 11S order was challenged on the 
ground, inter alia, that this remark showed that he was 
biased and had made up his mind in advance. He had 
prejudiced the issue by publicly declaring the policy 
before considering the inspector's report and thereby 
precluded himself from giving unbiased consideration to the 
report. ~he question arose whether the law required the 
Minister to give impartial consideration to the matter. 
The High Court quashed the order, holding that the law 
4a. ~he Franks Committee by implication accepted this 
point - see Committee on Administrative Tribunals and 
Enquiries (Cmnd.218) (1957}, 5, 59-61. 
5. ~1948~ A.C. 87. 
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required impartial consideration and it had not been 
given, and that the respondent had not fulfilled his duty 
to act judicially. The decision was reversed by the Court 
of Appeal. The matter was then brought before the House 
of Lords to decide. On appeal,the House of Lords held 
that in considering the report of the Inspector who held a 
public local inquiry under Schedule I para. 3 of the New 
Towns Act 1946, after objection had been made to an order 
under Section 1(1) of the Act, no judicial or quasi-
judicial duty was imposed on him, so that consideration of 
bias in the execution of such a duty was irrelevant, the 
sole question being whether or not he genuinely considered 
the report and the objections. It was also laid down that 
the public local inquiry under the first schedule to the 
Act is held with respect to objections only and it is not 
the duty of the Minister to call evidence in support of the 
order, since the object of the inquiry is to inform his 
mind and not to consider any issue between him and the 
objectors. Lord Thankerton said:(G) 
ttin my opinion no judicial or quasi-judicial duty was 
imposed on the respondent, and any reference to judicial 
duty or bias is irrelevant in the present case. The 
respondent•·s duties are in my opinion purely administrative 
but the Act prescribes certain methods of or steps in, 
discharge of that duty ••••••••• I am of opinion that no 
judicial duty is laid on the respondent in discharge of 
these statutory duties and that the only question is whether 
6. Supra at pp. 102, 103. 
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he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint 
a person to hold the public inquiry and to consider that 
person's report". Later His Lordship said: 
"My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word 
"bias" should be confined to its proper sphere. Its 
proper significance, in my opinion, is to devote a 
departure from the standard of even-handed justice which 
the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or 
those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-
judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for 
this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two 
or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an 
independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards 
one side or other in the dispute". 
His Lordship quoted from Ranger v. Great Western 
Railway, (7)" li• v. sussex JJ~ 8 ) and R. v. Essex JJ. ( 9) and 
went on: 
'~But in the present case the respondent having no 
judicial duty the only question is what the respondent 
actually did, that is, whether in fact he did genuinely 
consider the report and the objections".(lO) 
The House of Lords held that it would be a ground for 
challenging a New Towns order that the Minister has not in 
fact considered the report and the objections, or where his 
7. 5 H.L.C. 72, 89. 
8. .Cl924J 1 K.B.256, 258. 
9. f:.l927J 2 K.B. 475. 
10. L:l948~ A.C.87. 104. 
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mind was so foreclosed that he failed to give any genuine 
(11) 
consideration to them. However, such allegations, as 
the court observed are exceedingly difficult to 
substantiate. This case should be distinguished from other 
cases under the Housing Acts where it was held that the 
Minister •·s function in dealing with the inspector's report 
and in considering objections was quasi-judicial. For 
example, in Errington v. Minister of Health(l2 ) it was 
held that in deciding whether or not he should confirm a 
clearance order made under the Housing Act 1930, the 
minister occupied a quasi-judicial function and must abide 
by the rules of natural justice. In 1935, the Court of 
Appeal quashed a minister's slum clearance order because the 
inspector had consulted one side (Jarrow Corporation) but 
not the other after the close of the inquiry and the 
Corporation submitted further evidence and argument to the 
Ministry. Where a decision maker, after holding a public 
inquiry consults one party in the absence of the other it 
may be alleged that there has been a suspicion of bias.<l3) 
The view has been canvassed that the decision in Franklin 
overruled Errington and that neither the minister nor the 
inspector is required to observe the elementary rules 
11. An example of this, where the view expressed in 
Franklin was followed, is Lavender &. Son v. Minister of 
Housing ~1970~ I W.L.R. 1231. 
12. ~1935_7 l.K.B. 249. 
13. Or alternatively, there has been a breach of the audi 
alteram partem rule- see J. Jaconelli and S.J. 
Sauvain "Natural Justice after the close of an Inquiry", 
4o M.L • .R. (1977)' 87, 91. The authors rightly observe 
that in certain circumstances the line between the two 
rules is indistinct. 
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applicable to judicial functions - so long as statutory 
procedure is complied with. (l4 ) Professor Griffith ahd 
Street however reject such a contention and claim that it 
is erroneous to assume that only the statutory requirements 
must be complied with. What is required, on their view, 
is, as Lord Thankerton in Franklin •·s case said, ·a "properly 
conductedn procedure, which implies that the inspector 
carrying on inquiries must not be biased and the audi 
alteram partem rule must be observed.(l5) It is certainly 
arguable that there is a difference between the function 
of a Minister under the Housing Aqts, and that of a 
Minister acting under the New Towns Act. In the former 
case his function is to hear an appeal from the decision 
of the local authority; in the second case the Minister is 
a party throughout. He is not statutorily required to 
consider objections. Uhder the Housing Acts, the Minister 
is required to consider objections, and he is deciding a 
matter in which the original parties are the local authority 
and the objectors. Here the issues are more local in 
scope and a lesser degree of policy is involved. 
Again Planning Appeals belonging to a class and 
raising no large policy issue will be determinable by an 
inspector(l6 ) instead of the Secretary of State and appeals 
14. Lord Denning, Freedom Under The Law, pp. 121-122. 
15. Griffith and Street: Principles of Administrative Law, 
(5th ed. 1973), at 183. 
16. Town &:Country Planning Act 1971, Sched.9 (S.I.l972 No. 
1652). But appeals against compulsory ourchase orders 
cannot be determined by inspectors. 
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relating to the design or appearance of buildings and 
similar matters may be committed to an independent 
tribunal. (l7) In such cases the rule against bias and 
interest will apply. (l 8) The significance of Franklin's 
decision is that bias does not attach to persons having a 
policy and implementing it. Judges are not expected to be 
neutral towards the purposes of law. Similarly 
administrators are not expected to lack enthusiasm for the 
policies they believe to be embodied in the statutes they 
administer. In a subsequent decision, Darlassis v. 
Minister of Education, (l9) Barry J. indicated that the 
presence of two factors removes the restraints of natural 
justice from the Minister: (i) if the post-inquiry 
consultation is on an issue of policy, not fact and (ii) if 
the consultation is with a person or department which is 
not a party to the lis inter partes. In a recent case, 
Lake District Special Planning Board v. Secretary of State 
for the Environment and another,<2o) the applicants, in 
granting a company permission to station caravans on a 
camping site, imposed a time limitation. The Company 
appealed against this condition, and an inspector was 
17. Ibid s.5o. (Town and Country Planning Act 1971). 
18. 
19. 
20. 
See de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(3r~ ed.) P. 223. See a recent case Ellinas v. 
Department of Environment and Another Z:l977~ J.P.L. 
249(Q.B.D). 
(1954) 52 L.G.R. 304. 
This case is not officially reported but see The Timest 
February 17, 1975 (Q.E.D.) and ~1975~ J.P.L. 220; and 
see Purdue: "Natural Justice and the Post-Inquiry 
Procedure", Cl975J J .P.L. 445. 
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appointed to conduct a public inquiry. The Minister did 
not adopt the inspector's recommendation that the time 
limitation should stand. He waived the time limitation 
but imposed a tree-planting condition. 'Ji'he Board 
unsuccessfully tried to quash the order under Section 
245(4)'(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 and 
Rule 12(2)(2l) of the Town and Country Planning (Inquiries 
procedure) Rules 1969 and 1974. (2la) The Board contended 
inter alia, that the Minister had differed from the 
inspector on a "finding of factn' within the meaning of rule 
12(2)' and that undisclosed communication constituted a 
breach of rule 12(2)" in that it had not been raised in the 
inquiry, or alternatively that it constituted a breach of 
natural justice. 'Ji'.he Board's arguments were rejected by 
Kerr, J. ~he Minister's decision to remove the time limit 
was based on the general policy of the Department that a 
series of temporary planning permission was an inappropriate 
methodfor controlling land use and that the decision was not 
related to the further representations made in the 
undisclosed letter.(22 ) Kerr, J. observed that the concept 
of natural justice is not concerned with the observance of 
21. Rule 12(2) provides that where the Minister differs from 
his inspector "on a finding of fact"· or after the close 
of the inquiry "takes into consideration any new 
evidence ••••• which was not raised at the inquiryn 
and "by reason thereof"' disagrees with the recommendation 
of his inspector he shall give the parties the 
opportunity to make written representation or re-open 
the inquiry. 
2la. s.r. 1969 No. 1092 and s.I.l974 No. 419. 
22. 'Ji'his communication however did not fulfil the conditions 
for the removal of restraints of natural justice as 
enunciated in Darlassis v. Minister of Education, (supra). 
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technicalities but with matters of substance.(23) The test 
was whether a reasonable person, viewing the matter 
objectively and knowing all the facts would consider that 
there was a risk that the procedure adopted by the 
tribunal had resulted in injustice or unfairness. Applying 
that test, it was impossible to say that there was such a 
risk and the application was dismissed. The decision has 
given rise to controversy. It has been said(24) that 
"C the.7 test so formulated, and particularly, as applied to 
the facts of this case, runs against recent authority which 
suggests that once an official starts a hearing or 
consultative process, he may be placing himself under a 
stricter duty than would otherwise have been the case".<25) 
Perhaps the controversy may be resolved if it is accepted 
that above all, the Ministry had based his decision on the 
general policy of the Department rather than upon 
individual fact-findings. 
23. But see the comment, £.1975.:Z J. P .1. '['. 221: "while 
agreeing that purely technical breaches ••••••••••• of 
natural justice should not invalidate administrative 
decisions, it is to be hoped that this decision does 
not mean that courts will be less strict as towards 
breaches of the rules which leave a suspicion that justice may not have done". 
24. See J. Jaconelli and s.J. Sauvain, "Natural Justice 
after the close of an Inquiry"', 46 M.L.R. C 1977 .J 
87, 88. 
25 •. ']he authors of this article (supra) have referred to 
Re Liverpool Faxi Owners' Association ~1972~ 2 All. 
E.R. 589. 
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UNITED STATES 
Similarly in the United States nc·bias.J in the sense 
of crystallized point of view about issues of law or policy 
is almost universally deemed no ground for 
disqualification".<26 ) The views on this of the 
Donoughmore Committee were quoted with approval by the 
Administrative Law Committee of the American Bar 
Association,<27)' but no change in the law or in 
departmental practice resulted in America. On the other 
hand the notion that 'opinion about policy•· should not 
influence judges was criticised as n·an anachronism 
springing from a nineteenth century belief that law is 
found and not made11 while it is known that na.ll common law 
is judge made law, resting ultimately upon judicial ideas 
of policy and that much law which purports to be 
statutory or constitutional interpretation is judge made 
law necessarily growing out of judicial development of 
ideas· of policy"1• ( 28 ) 
A clear cut rejection occurred in the fourth Morgan 
case.<29) lhe case involved the validity of a rate order 
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the 
maximum rate to be charged by the market agencies for buying 
and selling livestock at the Kansas city Stockyards. The 
26. K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Text (3rd ed. 1972), s 12.01. 
27. 61 A.B.A. Rep. 734 (1936_)' supra. 
28. K.C. Davis op.cit. 
29. United States v. Morgan 313 u.s. 4o9.(1941). 
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market agencies alleged that· the Secretary was disqualified 
for bias as he ha~ strongly critised a previous court 
decision on the same matter in a letter to the New York 
Times. The Supreme Court upheld his refus~· to disqualify 
himself because of the letter and held that the fact n·that 
he not merely held, but expressed strong views on matters 
believed by him to have been in issue did not unfit him for 
exercising his duty in subsequent proceedings ordered by 
the courtn.<30) Both cabinet officers and judges nmay have 
an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case11 ~3l) 
and the presence of such a view or the expression of it, 
does not act as a disqualification. They are, nonetheless, 
11men of conscience and int~llectual discipline, capable of 
judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its 
own circumstances 11 and there was nothing in the record which 
disturbed such an assumption.<3l) 
Another leading case is Federal Trade Commission v. 
Cement Institute. (32 ) ~he Cement Institute (a trade 
association) and all of its members had been accused of 
restraining competition by agreeing to use a multiple basing 
point system of pricing. The commission before instituting 
the proceeding had made reports to the President expressing 
the opinion that the multiple basing point system was a 
violation of the Sherman Act. The companies alleged that 
the commission had prejudged the issue and so was 11 prejudiced 
and biased". The court assumed that the commission had in 
fact adopted this view as a result of its prior official 
30. Ibid, at 421. 
31. Ibid. 
32. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute 333 u.s. 638 (1948). 
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investigations, but held that the commission was not 
disqualified. A judge would not disregard the provisions 
of due process by sitting in a case "after he had 
expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct 
. ( 
were prohibited by law". 33) In this respect the position 
of the Federal Trade Commission could not be stricter then 
a court. Similarly in Skelly Oil Company v. Federal Power 
Commission, where two commissioners had expressed their 
views already in public addresses, parties sought to 
disqualify them alleging, inter alia, that they had 
prejudged an issue. The United States Court of Appeal held 
that question of disqualification for bias will not arise 
"from the fact or assumption that a member of an 
administrative agency enters a proceeding with advance 
views on important economic matters in issue". (34 ) 
In a recent case, Laird v. Tatum,C35) a motion to recuse 
was presented to Rehnquist, J., to disqualify himself from 
participating in the decision of a case on certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
circuit, which case raised a question as to the 
constitutionality of the Federal Government's surveillance 
of civilians. The Movants asserted that 
disqualification was proper because the justice, prior to 
33. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute op.cit., per Mr. Justice 
Black at 703. There was also apparent application of 
the doctrine of necessity - discussed later. 
34. Skelly Oil Co. v. F.P.C. 375 F.2d. 6,18 (lOth cir. 1967) 
modified on other grounds 390 u.s. 7~7 (1968). 
35. Laird v. Tatum 34 1 Ed 2d 50 (u.s.su.ct., 1972). 
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his appointment to the Supreme Court, had appeared as an 
expert witness for the Justice Department before Senate 
hearings on the subject matter of the case and had then, 
and on other occasions while serving as an Assistant Attorney 
General, express:ed publicly an understanding of the law as 
to the constitutionality of governmental surveillance 
which was contrary to the movants' contentions. Rehnquist, 
J. denied the motion to recuse. His explanation is 
valuable. 'L'he main point was that rt'it is not a ground 
for disqualification that a judge prior to his nomination 
expressed his then understanding of the meaning of some 
particular provision of the constitutiontt. (36)'' 
It seems therefore that in Anglo-American law, the 
rule against bias is qualified to this extent, that 
prejudgment on issue of law and policy by both judges and 
administrative adjudicators is allowed. 
36. Ibid, at 61. 
- 198 -
(: B ) THE RULE OF NECESSITY-
In England as well as in America, the doctrine 
of necessity prevents disqualification unless someone else 
is legally able to act. The rule of necessity permits a 
tribunal or a court which would otherwise be disqualified to 
decide a metter when there is no provision for an 
alternative tribunal or court. In a case of necessity 
therefore the objection of interest cannot prevail. In 
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal,(!) before a decree made by 
the Vice Chancellor could be appealed against it was 
required to be enrolled by the Lord Chancellor. It was 
held that though he was disqualified by reason of pecuniary 
interest from hearing the appeal, he was not thereby 
disqualified from ordering the enrolment, since he was the 
only person who was empowered to act. 
ENGLAND 
An earlier English case on the rule is the case of 
Parishes of Great.Charte v. Parish of Kennington. In 
that case two justices of peace made an order for removal of 
a pauper which was quashed by the court because one of the 
justices was an inhabitant of the parish from whence the 
pauper was removed. 'lr.'he judge was disqualified for interest 
because the decision affected his taxes. It was held, 
1. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3H.L.C.759. 
2. Parishes of Great Charte v. Parish of Kennington, 2 
Strange 1173 (K.B., 1742)' Historically it is interesting 
to note that in one of the earliest cases of 
disqualification, the Mayor of Hereford was reversed for 
sitting in a case involving the rights of one of his own 
lessees, even though no other party was competent to sit: 
Anonymous 1 Salk 396 (discussed in Chapter I}. 
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nevertheless, that although it was a good principle that a 
man should not be a judge and party, yet if a situation 
arose in which the only competent judge assigned by statute 
was interested in the dispute, he could and ought to 
proceed notwithstanding.(3) Disqualification of persons as 
ratepayers raised great difficulties. To remedy this 
situation, the Justices Jurisdiction Act 1742(4} was passed. 
Section I of the Act gave justices power to hear appeals 
notwithstanding any interest they might have as ratepayers, 
but Section 3 inserted a proviso that the Act should not 
authorise justices of peace for a county to determine an 
order relating to any parish or place where such justices 
were so charged. In R. v. Essex Justices<5Y. it was held 
that the Justices Jurisdiction Act 1742 enabled the borough 
sessions to hear an appeal against a poor rate notwith-
standing that the justices were interested in the result. 
The rule of necessity was recognised and acted on. It was 
held that, where they consisted of more than four, an appeal 
lay to them at sessions against a poor rate, although there 
might be less than four who were devoid of interest in the 
question. (5a)' 
In Thelluson v. Rendlesham (6 ) Lord Brougham justified ' 
the hearing of a case by a judge (himselfY who had previously 
been counsel in that case on the ground that not to do so 
3. Ibid. 
4. Justices Jurisdiction Act 1742 (16 Geo.2.c.l8). 
5. (1816)' 5 M. & S. 513. 
5a. Ibid, at 517, 518. 
6. (1859) 7 H.L.Cas.429. (discussed in chapter 4 
"Professional & Vocational Relationship"). 
- 200 -
would have caused great expense and delay to the parties 
and •talmost a denial of justice". 
However, the doctrine is applied only to prevent a 
failure of justice. Lush J. said in Sergeant v. Dale(7) 
that under common law a judge who has an interest in the 
result of a suit is disqualified from acting except in 
cases of necessity, where no other judge has jurisdiction. 
Similarly the doctrine of necessity required the judges of 
Saskatchewan to pass upon the constitutionality of 
legislation rendering them liable to pay income tax on their 
salaries.(8) Again when it is not possible to constitute a 
different tribunal, necessity would enable the interested 
members to act.< 9 Y" But when it is possible to constitute an 
alternative court or tribunal, it is clear that the necessity 
(10 )' 
rule may be avoided. In Earl of Derby 1's case it was 
decided that the Chamberlain of Chester could not give a 
decision in a case in which he was involved but in such a 
case the suit should be heard in the Court of Chancery coram 
domino rege. The doctrine may occasionally be avoided by 
creating a special forum. An interesting American decision 
provides an example. In 1925, a case came before the Texas 
Supreme Court involving an organisation called the Woodmen of 
the World. All the judges of the Supreme Court were members 
7. (1877) 2.Q.B.D. 558,566,567. 
8. The Judges v. Att. G~en. for Saskatchewan (1937) 53 T.L. 
R. 464. 
9. R. v. Peterborough Commr•·s. Ex p. Lewis (1965)' 2 O.R. 577. 
lD. Earl of Derby's: ~ (1613) 12.Co.Rep. 114. 
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of that organisation and hence the entire court was 
disqualified in a case involving that group. The Governor 
resolved the problem by appointing a special court of three 
women to hear the case.(ll) 
However reliance on this doctrine may be rendered 
unnecessary by statutory provisions. In mod-ern times the 
courts do not have to rely much on the doctrine, as in many 
cases statutory authorisation is given for interested parties 
to adjudicate. In Wilkinson v. Barking Corporation,<12 ) a 
local authority and the minister were given authority to 
decide the pension rights of employees. The Local 
Government Superannuation Act gave employees of the local 
authorities a statutory right to pensions under certain 
conditions. The local authority was in fact a judge in his 
own cause. ~he statute provided that in case of dispute the 
aggrieved party could appeal to the minister, whose decision 
on questions of fact was to be final, though he was also a 
part of the same administrative process. 'L''he Court of Appeal 
found that such a state of affairs was not consonant with 
the rule of law, but nevertheless held that there was no 
escape from the clear statutory provision.<12 ) When the legal 
duty to decide is cast upon a person and upon him alone, there 
is some authority to suggest that person should decide 
notwithstanding that he is interested in the issue. When a 
Minister hearing objections under the Housing Acts is biased 
or interested, the plea of necessity would prevent any 
complaint of pecuniary or personal bias on the part of the 
11. J.P. Frank, "Disqualification of Judges" 56 Yale L.J. (1947) 605,611 (n.ll)~ 
12. Wilkinson v. Barking Corporation ~1948~ 1 K.B. 721. 
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Minister. (l3) Similarly, in Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy 
Production and Marketing Board, the Privy Council held that 
the legislature had shown a clear intention to make an 
exception to the general rule that a person should not be 
a judge in his own cause and that the Board was required to 
determine zoning questions even though it might have a 
pecuniary interest. The statute did not provide for the 
determination of zoning questions by any body other than the 
Board. (l4 ) 
UNITED STATES 
The doctrine of necessity thus recognised has long been 
applied to judicial as well as to administrative proceedings 
under American law as well as English. The doctrine of 
necessity applies equally to the njudges and to federal and 
state administrative officers".(l5) When the impartiality 
of the Federal Trade Commission was challenged, the court 
declared "the Federal Trade Commission Act established the 
composition of the Commission and contains no provision for 
change of venue". The n·stern rule of necessity" required 
the Commission to act. (l6 ) In Evans v. Gore(l7) judges were 
called upon to consider the validity of taxing the incomeof 
13. Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law 
(5th ed.J 1973, p. 183. 
14. Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing 
Board. C196.7J A.C. 551, 565. (P.C.). 
15. K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vo1-2 p. 162 
(1958). 
16. Loughran v. F.T.C. 143 F.2d. 431, 433.(8th cir. 1944). 
17. Evans v. Gore, 253 u·.s. 245 (1920). 
. "' 
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federal judges including justices of the Supreme Court 
which obviously directly affected them. Since no other 
tribunal existed to decide the question, the judges held 
' that they were not disqualified, though interested in the 
resu~~ of the case. 
·However the doctrine is applied only to prevent a 
fa_ilure of justice. If it is not possible to constitute 
a different tribunal, the doctrine of necessity would be 
applied. Where all judges are disqualified by reason of 
being defendants in the action, none are disqualified and 
the court held that if a disqualification of judges 
operates so as to bar justice to the parties and no other 
tribUnal is available, the disqualified judge or judges may 
by necessity proceed to judgment.<l8) Nevertheless, the rule 
is held inapplicable where an alternative tribunal can be 
(19)' formed. Sometimes the rule may be avoided by resorting 
to another impartial tribunal already available. In Tumey 
(2<Y)' 
v. Ohio the United States Supreme Court did not use the 
rule of necessity because "there were available in this case 
other judicial officers who had no disqualification •••••• 11' 
The doctrine of necessity is well illustrated by Brinkley v. 
18. Turner v. American Bar Ass •n, D.C. Tex. (1975) 4o"t F. 
Supp. 451, 483. "Although this maxim would allow the 
Supreme Court to proceed where all or a quorum of the justices have been sued, it would seemingly not allow 
a District Court Judge to proceed if other judges are 
available by substitution11' - Ibid. 
19. Pyatt v. Mayor &:council, 9 N.J. 548, 89 A.2d I (1952): 
alternative tribunal formed by excluding disqualified 
members. 
20. Tumey v • .Qh!.2. 273 u.s. 510, 522-523 (1927) discussed 
earlier in Chap. 3. • · 
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Hassig.<2l) In that case, Brinkley's licence to practice 
medicine had been revoked by the Kansas State Medical Board 
upon complaints that he had undertaken the diagnosis of . 
disease over the radio, relying on the most meagre of 
systems reported by mail or telegram, and that he had in 
like manner prescribed certain prescriptions procurable 
only at named drug stores and on which he obtained 
commissions. Brinkley sought to set aside the revocation 
order on the ground that the board members were prejudiced 
against him and had been active in instigating the 
proceedings. 
The court, though agreeing that the members were 
prejudiced, nevertheless refused to give him the relief 
sought. Judge McDermott said:"•••••• The statute provides 
but one tribunal with power to revoke a doctor •·s license, 
just as the Supreme Court of Kansas is the only body with 
power to disbar a lawyer. If such powers may not be 
exercised if the members of the board or court are 
prejudiced, then any lawyer or doctor who commits an offence 
so grave that it shocks every right thinking person, has an 
irrevocable license to practice his profession if he can get 
the news of his offense to the court or board before the 
trial begins. That will not do ••••••••••• From the very 
necess·ity of the case has grown the rule that 
disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only 
tribunal with power in the premises. If the law provides 
for a substitution of personnel on a board or court, or if 
21. Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (lOth cir. 1936), 
(Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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another tribunal exists to which resort may be had, a 
disqualified member may not act. But where no such 
provision is made, the law cannot be nullified or the doors 
to justice barred because of prejudice or disqualification 
of a member of a court or an administrative tribunal". (22) 
Similarly in Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute~23 ) 
where the Commission was charged with prejudice and bias, 
the Supreme Court of the United States observed (inter 
alia)' that had the entire membership of the Commission been 
disqualified for bias in the proceedings against the 
respondents the complaint could not have been acted on 
either by the Commission or any other agency of the 
Government. "Congress has provided for no such 
contingency. It has not directed that the Commission 
disqualify itself under any circumstances ••••••••• has not 
authorised any other Government agency to hold hearings, 
make findings, and issue cease and desist orders in 
proceedings against unfair trade practices". <24) 
22. Brinkley v. Hassig, op.cit., p. 357. 
23. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute 333 u.s. 683 (1948). 
24. Ibid, at 701. 
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{_ C ) WAIVER : ENGLAND 
The right to a decision by an impartial tribunal may 
sometimes be waived by laches or delay, knowledge or consent 
on the part of the litigant. "If a litigant has himself 
induced, acquiesced in or waived the ~procedural~ 
irregularity he cannot afterwards complain of it"'• (l) In 
Hannam v. Bradford Corporation, the Court of Appeal agreed 
that the decision of the staff sub-committee could have been 
successfully attacked for bias if the right procedure had 
been adopted by the plaintiff immediately after his 
dismissal. But as he refrained from doing so, he had lost 
the opportunity of getting the decision of a "properly 
0 
constituted staff sub-committee"·. {2) In Tolputt & QQ.. Ltd 
v. Mole<3r the plaintiff sued a county court registrar in his 
own court and lost and the registrar taxed the costs which 
he had been awarded against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
appealed against the taxation to the county court judge, 
then to the Divisional Cou~t and finally to the Court of 
Appeal. The plaintiff did not invoke the principle ~ 
judex ln ~~until the case reached the Court of Appeal, 
where it was held that it was too late for him to do so. 
1. Marsh v. Marsh ~1945~ A.C. 271, 285 (P.C.). 
2. Cl970J 1 W.L.R. 937, 944 (C.A.)'. 
3; • .£1911.:7 1 K.W. 836, (C .A.)'. (The facts of the case are 
not entirely clear. See the exchange of the remarks 
between Buckley L.J. and Fletcher Moulton L.J. and the 
plaintiff's counsel at ~. 838. 
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Delay therefore, may act as a bar to obtaining the 
benefits o~ the principles of natural justice. (4 ) A party 
cannot complain later that he has been deprived of natural 
justice unless he makes a timely objection. (5) 
There is some authority to suggest that when statute 
provides a limitation period for the challenge of a 
decision, and the party brings a delayed action, then even 
if the defects in natural justice have been fraudulently 
concealed, the party will lose the right yo challenge. In 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment Ex p,Ostler,< 6 J' 
Ostler brought an action challenging compulsory purchase 
orders on the ground of breach of natural justice after the 
six week's limitation period. The Court of Appeal held, 
inter alia, that since nearly two years had passed, the 
orders were immune from any challenge to their validity. 
"Mr. Ostler is barred by statute from now questionning 
these orders. He ought to be stopped at this moment".(6) 
Lord Denning M.R. however made a distinction between an 
4. R. v. Aston University Senate Ex p.Roffey ~1969~ 2 All 
E.R. 964 (Q.B.D)' delay in bringing proceedings, certiorari 
denied. But contrast Re McColl (1974) 4 2 D.L.R. (3d} 
763 where the. British Columbia Supreme Court quashed by 
certioraro an order made 23 years previously. 
5. Ostreicher v. Secretary of State for the Environment and 
Another, The Times, 6 May, 197fi, the party seeking an 
adjournment of a hearing on religious grounds failed to 
make timely request. No adjournment was given .andthe 
party was not heard. Held, no breach of natural justice. 
6. Cl976J 3 W.L.R. 288, 297 (C.A.). 
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ouster clause which attempts to oust the jurisdiction of 
the courts altogether and a limitation clause which merely 
limits the time beyond which judicial review cannot be made. 
In Anismimic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission(?)' 
there was a statutory "no certiorarin clause which 
completely ousted the jurisdiction of the courts. 
Nevertheless it was held that the decision could be 
challenged successfully on the ground of want of 
(8)' jurisdiction. · It is commonly said that a defect cannot 
be waived if it goes to jurisdiction, because jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred by a party'!s consent or acquiescence. (9) 
Sometimes waiver of the rules. of natural justice was permitted 
on the ground that the breach of the rules did no go to 
jurisdiction. Thus in Wakefield Local Board of Health v. 
The West Riding and Grimsby Railway Company,(lO) the Railway 
Clauses Consolidation Act (1845')' s.3 stated that "'Justice"· 
shall mean "a justice acting for the county,&. c., in which 
the matter requiring the cognizance of such justice shall 
arise, and who shall not be interested in the matter". It 
7. Cl969::J 2'.A.C •. 147. 
8. For further discussion on these two cases see Chap.VI: 
Effects and Remedies. 
9. See 31 M.L.R.(l968) 138, 147.. But s·ee Simpson v. Att.Gen. 
/:195'5':.:7 N.Z.L .• R. 271 where the plaintiff brought a 
declaration challenging the validity of a general election. 
Validity of the appointment of a judge was also an issue 
in the action. The C.A. overcame the difficulty by 
obtaining the consent of the plaintiff - See the criticism 
by A.G. Davis, {195'5')' 18 M.L .R. p. 495. 
10. (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 84. 
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was held that the latter part of the definition was merely 
' 
declaratory of the common·law principle~ judex~~ 
~and could be waived by the parties, because the statute 
(llJ did not intend the disqualification to go to jurisdiction. 
On the other hand the fact that the rule against interest 
or bias can be waived does not prove that the breach of the 
rule does not go to jurisdiction. As a matter of fact in 
many cases it was held that an applicant could not attack 
a decision for bias if he knew of it during the original 
proceedings and failefr to object to it. In most of these 
cases nothing was said on the question whether the breach 
of the rule made the decision void or voidable.<12 J The 
question of waiver and question of nullity seem to be 
(13) 
mutually irrelevant. In R, v. Williams one of the justices 
was disqualified under statute. Section 15 of the Brea.d 
Act 18J6_. provided that no person who should be concerned in 
the business of a baker should be capable of acting as a 
justice of peace under the Act, and if any baker should 
presume so to do he should for every offence forfeit a 
penalty. When baker was c~ged and convicted under the Act, 
one of the two justices who convicted was a person concerned 
11, E.g., Fry v, Moore (1889)' 23 Q.B.D, 395 (C.A.): 
Substituted service was not a nullity but a mere 
irregularity which was waived by the defendant's later 
conduct. 
12 •. E.g., R1• v, Cumberland JJ. (1882) 52 J .P,. 502, 
ji. v. Essex JJ-~ Ex p. Perkins /:1927.:7 2.K.B. 475. 
13. R. v. Williams L:l914J 1 K.B. 6o8. 
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in the business of a baker. On certiorari to quash the 
conviction, the court held that the affidavit of the 
applicant did not state that any objection was taken at the 
hearing before the justices, neither did it state that at 
the date of hearing the applicant was without knowledge of 
such disqualification. Channell J. said: (l4Y 
"A -party may ·by his conduct preclude himself from claiming 
the writ ~certiorari~· ex debito justitiae, no matter 
whether the proceedings which he seeks to quash are void or 
voidable. If they are void it is true that no conduct 
of his will validate them;: but such considerations do not 
affect the principles on which the court acts in granting 
or refusing the writ of certiorari. This special remedy 
will not be granted ~ debito justitiae to a person who 
fails to state in his evidence on moving for the rule nisi 
that at the time of the proceedings impugned he was unaware 
of the facts on which he relies to impugn themre·. 
It is difficult to state with confidence the principles 
underlying this area. The fact that a defect goes to 
jurisdiction does not seem necessarily to mean that it 
cannot be waived. Certiorari and prohibition are of course 
(15)' discretionary remedies and in exercising their discretion 
14. Ibid, ff. 614, 615. 
15. Prohibition is not discretionary if the want of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record, 
consequently no waiver is possible in such a situation: 
Farquharson v. Morgan ~1~94~ i Q.B. 55 2 (C.A.); For 
discretionary nature of certiorari see~ v. Williams 
(Supra). For further discussion on discretionary nature 
of the ·prerogative orders, see in Chap. VI"Remedies: 
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the courts have withheld certiorari and prohibition when the 
applicants have waived defects including defects of a 
jurisdictional nature in the inferior tribunals. In 
Lucking v. Denning Lord Holt said that if a cause of action 
arose outside the area over which the inferior tribunal 
had jurisdiction and the defendant raised no objection 
during proceedings before the tribunal, then he would be 
(16) 
estopped from alleging want of jurisdiction. In R.v. 
Comptroller General of Patents and Designs, Ex p. Parke, 
Davis & Co. Ltd, it was observed that when 11 the defect of 
jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the proceedings, 
the order of prohibition must go as of right and is not a 
matter of discretion" but where "the defect is not 
apparent, but depends on some fact in the knowledge of 
the applicant, which he had the opportunity of bringing 
forward in the court below, and has allowed that court 
to proceed without setting up the object, • • • • • • • • • • • • the 
court has a discretion to refuse the writ ........... (17) 
Generally, the knowledge of, or consent of the parties to, 
the existence of any interest or probable bias of a judge 
or justice acts as a waiver of objectio~y the parties on 
such grounds. But if the party is not fully cognizant of 
the facts at the time when he submits to the decision of 
such a judge or justice, consent will not act as a waiver of 
disqualification. In R. v. Cumberland JJ. (l8) an appeal 
to Quarter Sessions against a rate was made by a railway 
company. A Justice on the bench remarked that he was an 
16. (1705) 1 Salk 202. 
17. Cl953:Y 2 W.L.R.760, 764 (Q.B.D •. ); See also Cox v. St. 
Albans (1672) 1 Mod. 81. 
18 • .Cl882J 52 J.P. 502. 
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ex officio g~ardian whereupon the parties waived all 
objection to his sitting; but afterwards it was discovered 
that the justice had been actively engaged at various 
meetings in defending the rate, and voting that the costs of 
defending it should be paid by his board of guardians and 
the order of the Sessions was quashed. T'he principle of 
waiver has its particular application in arbitration cases 
as in such cases the parties themselves freely choose their 
own arbitrator with full knowledge of his possible bias or 
interest so that the courts are also unwilling to interfere 
. (19)' 
with such decisions. Nevertheless undisclosed bias or 
interest in the mind of an arbitrator unknown to either of 
the parties who have submitted to his decision is held to be 
a sufficient ground for interference by the court. In an 
earlier case a builder by ~is contract bound himself to 
abide by the decision of an architect as to the amount to be 
paid for the work. Without his knowledge, the architect had 
given an assurance to the employer that the cost of the 
building should not exceed a certain specified amount and 
although he refused to guarantee that amount, the court did 
not consider the decision of the architect made under such a 
condition binding and gave directions to ascertain under 
authority of the court how much remained justly due to the 
pla:intiff. (20') 
Again if the facts are known to the party but the party 
19. For example Ranger v. Great Western Rly ("1854.) 5 H.L. 
Cas.72 (discussed in chapter III. Pecuniary interest -
Bodies other than courts}. 
20. Kemp v. Rose (1858 ·} 1 Giff. 25S:. 
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is not fully.cognizant of his right to take objection, he 
cannot be said to have waived his right by failing to 
(2oa: 
exercise it. Lord Romilly M.R. in Vyvyan v. Vyyyan said: 
"Waiver or acquiesee.nee, like election, pre-supposes that the 
person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights, and that 
being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one 
benefit instead of another, either, but not both, of which 
he might claim"·. 
Under English law, unlike American, there are very 
few instances of statutory disqualification for bias or 
interest. Again some statutory provisions have ousted the 
(21 )' 
effect of prohibitions contained in other sections. 
20a. 30 Beav. 65, 74 = 54 E.R. 813. 
21. E.g. consider the Licensing Act 1964 s. 193 (1),(2} (3J, l~4r etc., disqualifying justices on various grounds 
which may be waived by virtue of s. 193 (6)' which states· 
nNo act done by any justice disqualified by this 
section shall b.e invalid by reason only of that 
disqualification •••••••• ". 
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WAIVER :: UNITED STATES: 
Similarly under American law failure to raise the issue of 
disqualification at the proper time may result in a 
(22)1 judgment that the defect has been waived. A party, in 
order to challenge successfully the qualification of a trial 
judge, should raise that issue in a timely fashion in the 
trial court. In Ramirez v. United states, (23)' the 
defendant was convicted in the United States District court 
for the Southern District of California of violation of a 
narcotics statute. In the Court of Appeal, the 
defendant raised inter alia, the issue that the trial judge 
was disqualified. The court held that "£by:/ not having 
raised the issue in timely fashion below, the appellant has 
waived any objectionn.<24l 
Bone, circuit judge observed in one case:<25f 
"There is no merit in the contention that the sentencing 
judge should not have heard the motions. No objection was 
raised prior to or at the hearing of the motions. To 
disqualify the judge, timely objection should have been 
made; if not so made, it is waived". On the other hand 
there is some authority to suggest that an objection may not 
be always necessary when it is apparent that such objection 
22. Democrat Printing Co • .Y:• F.c.c. 202 F.2d 298, 305 (D.c. 
Cir. 1952). 
2I. Ramirez v. U.s. (C .A.Cal.l961 )' 294 F .2d 277. 
24. Ibid, p. 283. 
25. Kramer v. United States. 166 F.2d, 515, 518 (Cir. Ct. of 
Appeals, nineth circuit. ) 
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wouLd be futile. In N.L.R.B. v. Washington Dehydrated 
Food Co.<26) in a proceeding against an employer for unfair 
labor practices, it appeared that the trial examiner played 
the role of a prosecutor. His conduct deprived the 
employee of a n'fair hearingn. In setting as·ide the order 
of the National Labor Relations Board, the court said: 
nit may truly be said that the respondent made no strenuous 
objection to such conduct of the Trial Examiner during the 
course of the hearing, but such objection may not always be 
necessary - especially where it would be of no avail. 
Furthermore, 'failure of counsel ••••••••• to object may well 
have been due to their feeling that that course might 
antagonize the Examiner to the detriment of their 
clients"'~. (27,)' When the disqualification is provided under a 
statute, there is some authority to suggest that neither 
delay in making a request for disqualification nor the 
parties 11 consent to a judge 11s participation can effectively 
constitute a waiver of a statutory disqualification. Thus: 
in William Cramp &~Sons Ship and Engine Building Co. v. 
International Curtis Marine T. Co.<2a) the United States 
Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals judgment because 
of the participation of a District judge in the Court of 
Appeals who had earlier participated1 in the same case 1n the 
District Court. The Supreme Court rejected the contention 
26. 118 F.2d. 98o(u.s.ct. of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1941)\. 
2?. Ibid, at 996. 
28·. (1913)' 228 U't.S. 645. 
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that as no objection had been made to the judge ~~s 
participation in the Court of Appeals and that as consent 
had been given to his participation, therefore the 
objection was no longer open in the Supreme Court and that 
the statutory disqualification should not be applied. The 
court held that 11the comprehensive and inflexible 
character of the prohibition was intended to prevent resort 
to consent of the party or parties as a means of 
quali£ying a judge to participate in the decision of a case 
in the circuit court of appeals, when, without such consent, 
be~ause of the prohibition of the statute, he would be 
disqualified from so doingn~29) However the contention 
that a statutory disqualification cannot be waived by delay 
or consent cannot be stated with certainty. There is some 
authority supporting the view that if a party, being well 
aware of his rights, fails to make timely objection seeking 
the judge 1:s disqualification, his failure constitutes a 
waiver of any possible objection afterwards even if the 
judge is subject to a statutory disqualification. In 
(30)\ Tinkoffv. ~nited States, · the court denied a petition for 
rehearing following the affirmation of the defendant's 
conviction for attempts to defeat and evade income tax. He 
was a former revenue agent, a certified public accountant 
and a lawyer. 'Fhe petitioner (defendant)" alleged that one 
29:·. Ibid, at 65'0. 
30. 86 F.2d. 868 (1936, CA7 II.L) cert. denied 301 ur.s. 689. 
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of the appellate judges was disqualified under statute(3l} 
because he had in the district court heard the cause 
involved in the appeal. Alschuler (circuit Judge) said: 
"If one of the appellate judgei had in fact 
previously heard in the district court the n·cause or 
question"' involved on the appeal, this would not of itself 
have deprived the appellate court, of jurisdiction. An 
appellant well aware of his rights might waive the 
point ••••••• There is here no contention that the 
appellant, himself a lawyer of experience •••••• was not 
fully cognizant of the situation. ·In such situations 
it would be quite intolerable to permit him to withhold 
presentation of the point until after the hearing of the 
appeal and its decision against him"·. (32)' 
Similarly in Chance v. United States(33} the court, besides 
holding that no grounds existed for disqualifying a judge 
under s.47, (34 ) observed that at no time until a petition 
for rehearing was filed was there any mention of the 
possibility that the judge might have been disqualified f~om 
participating in the decision of the case. Furthermore, the 
31. This statute, which underwent various re-enactments 
and redesignationsi at present designated as 28 u.s.c.§ 
47 (see n.34. be ow). 
32. 86 F.2d 868 at 884. 
33. 331 F.2d 473 (1964, CA. 5 Fla)'. 
34·. 28 U.s .c. a.·. 47 provides:: "No Judge shall hear or 
determine an appeal from the decision of a case or 
issue tried by him". 
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court also referred to the governments' contention that the 
defendant's failure to make timely objection to the judge's 
qualification to sit on the Court of Appeals constituted a 
waiver of any possible objection to his acting on the panel. 
The Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.s.c.% 556(b) has 
used the word "timely" in connection with submission of 
affidavits of bias and other disqualification. A litigant 
cannot wait until an adverse decision has been made or until 
proceedings have long been in progress and then challenge 
on the ground that the administrator is biased (and so 
should withdraw) or that the decision demands reversal by 
the r~viewing court. The right to raise the issue of bias 
or interest to a reviewing court is dependent on the timely 
raising of that issue. It seems likely that except in 
unusual cases as where the grounds for a charge of prejudice 
go justifiably undiscovered until subsequent to an agency 
decision,- the word "timely"' should require that the issue 
be raised to the agency and perhaps to the individual 
adjudicator before eachts respective action.<35) "In short 
a party cannot play a game to its end in the hope that he 
will win, with the unvoiced expectation of challenging the 
umpire 1's qualifications if perchance he should lose". (36 ) 
The recent amendment to 28 u.s.c. Section 455( 37 )' has 
35. Bower v. Eastern Airlines 214 F.2d 623 (U.s. Ct. of 
Appeals, 3rd Circuit, 1954). 
36. Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Eaw~ Cases and 
Comments, (6th ed., 1974) p. 965. 
37. 28 u.s.c.§ 455 as amended Dec.5.1974. pub.L. 93-512, ~ 1, 
88 stat. 1609. 
II 
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brought changes and added further provisions relating to 
waiver of disqualification. Section 455 (e)' states: "No 
Justice, Judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy ~of 
the United States~ shall accept from the parties to the 
proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification 
enumerated in subsection (b)'". Subsection (b)' of s.455 
states. that such person shall disqualify himself: 
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
concerning the proceeding; 
(2): Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the 
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously 
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer 
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been 
a material witness concerning it;· 
(3) Where he has s:erved in governmental employment and in 
such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material 
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed: an opinion 
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; 
(4)' He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his 
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a 
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in 
a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could 
be substantially affacted by the outcome. of the proceeding; 
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of 
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a 
person: 
(i} Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, 
director, or trustee of a party; 
- 220 .;;. 
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding;: 
(iv) Is to the judge 11S knowledge likely to be a 
material witness in the proceeding • 
"where the ground for disqualification arises only under 
Subsection (a) ~i.e. he shall disqualify in any 
proceeding in Which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned;7, waiver may be accepted provided it is 
preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for 
(38-) disqualification"1• 
38.28 u-~s.c.~ 455(e). 
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CHAPTER VI : EFFECTS AND REMEDIES 
Since the main emphasis of my work concerns the scope 
and application of the rule against interest and bias, it 
would be inappropriate to attempt a full-scale examination 
of the remedies provided by English, or American, 
administrative law. But the question of the effects of a 
decision tainted by interest or bias will be considered, 
and then a general survey of remedies offered, with respect 
to both jurisdictions. 
ENGLAND~)EFFECTS(l) VOID OR VOIDABLE. 
Leaving aside a few exceptional cases, there is an 
abundance of high authority to justify the view that a 
' breach of the rule against interest and bias makes a 
decision void and not voidable. Earlier cases such as 
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co. raised the questions 
whether the defect of bias or interest is a jurisdictional 
defect and whether breach of the rule makes a decision void 
or voidable. According to Baron Parke (delivering the 
opinion of the judge to whom the House of Lords referred 
the case for opinion), the decision of the Lord Chancellor 
was not absolutely void, on account of his interest but 
1. Other effects such as whether pecuniary interest or 
bias of a single judge would invalidate the whole 
decision etc. have been discussed in earlier chapters 
where appropriate. These are not mentioned in this 
chapter to avoid repetition. Cases on waiver were 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
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voidable only~ After discussing Brooks v. Earl of Rivers( 2 ) 
and the Company of Mercers and Ironmongers of Chester v. 
Bowker(2 ) he said: 11 In none of these cases was the judgment 
held to be absolutely void. Till prohibition had been 
granted in one case or judgment reversed in the other we 
think that the proceedings were valid, and the persons 
acting under the authority of the Court \vould not be liable 
to be treated as (2a) · trespassers •••••••••••••••••.••• we 
think that the order of the Chancellor is not void, but 
we are of opinion, that as he had such an interest which 
would have disqualified a witness under the old law, he was 
disqualified as a judge; that it was a voidable order, and 
might be questioned and set aside by appeal •••••• n(3) 
According to Dr. Rubinstein, this decision has given a 
"final and conclusive ans\ver" to the question of void or 
voidability of a decision tainted by interest or bias.(4) 
On the other hand Professor H.W.R. Wade, commenting on 
the authorities cited by Parke H·., showed that none of them 
2. Brooks v. Earl of Rivers (1668) Hardr. 503. In this 
case prohibition was refused as no interest was found: 
Company of Mercers and Ironmongers of Chester v. Bowker 
(1726) 1 stra. 639, proceedings in error as one of the 
company of Mercers became :Hayer and for that reason 
judgment reversed. Both cases are discussed in chap.I. 
2a.A voidable decision remains valid until set aside and 
therefore cannot be attacked in collateral proceedings 
vJildes v. Russell (1866) E .• R. 1 C .P. 722. These dicta 
were repeated almost word for word in Phillips v. Eyre 
(1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 11 22. For detailed discussion, see M.B. Akehurst, 31 M.L.R.(l968)138 et seq. 
3. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (Proprietors of) (1852) 
3 H.L.C. 759, 785 - 786. 
4. Amnon Rubinstein; Jurisdiction and Illegality, P. 203. 
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could support ~is (Parke B~sY assertion. "Since one is a 
case of proceedings in error, analogous to a modern case 
where there is a right of appeal, and not material to the 
present argument. The other case ••••••• not only fails 
to support the proposition for which Parke B~ cites it, 
but in fact falsifies it. For it was a case \>There the 
remedy sought was prohibition ••••••• a purely 
jurisdictional remedy \oThich issues to prevent a tribunal 
dealing with a case on the ground that, regardless of the 
merits, its decision will be outside jurisdiction and a 
nulli tyn·. ( 5) It must be noted that the case of inferior 
tribunals is totally different from the situation that arose 
in the Dimes case. There the court whose order was in 
question was the Court of Chancery, and the Court of 
Chancery is a superior court. The procedure of review is 
not applicable to the decision of the superior courts and 
the only remedy was appeal to the higher court. A decision 
appealed against remains valid till set aside on appeal. 
But the act of an inferior tribunal over which the High 
Court has supervisory jurisdiction is liable to be set 
aside by the High Court because of the bias or interest of 
a judge. In the same case, Lord Campbell said:"Since I 
have had the honour to be Chief Justice of the Court of 
Queen's Bench, we have again and again set aside proceedings 
in inferior tribunals because an individual, who had an 
interest in a cause, took part in the decision".(6) 
5. H.W.R. Wade, 84 L.Q.R.95,108 (1968). 
6. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, op.cit.,793. 
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The court.s have uniformly held, whenever the question 
has arisen, that the decision of an administrative 
tribunal or authority which is vitiated by interest or bias 
is void. A clear modern example is Cooper v. Wilson.C7) 
In it, the Court of Appeal granted a declaration that the 
police sergeant's dismissal was invalid on the ground that 
the decision of the watch committee was vitiated by the 
presence of the Chief Constable in the Committee who was in 
effect the respondent. Greer L.J. said that "a claim 
for a declaration that a statutory body acted without 
jurisdiction can be dealt with by an action for a 
declaration that the decision in question was null and 
void". (7a) Further, in the important decision of Ridge v. 
Baldwin(B)_ 'l.o~hich is an important case on natural justice 
generally, though concerning the audi alteram branch of the 
rules - Lord Reid pointed out that violation of natural 
justice had "time and again" been held to render a decision 
void and not voidable. The appellant's claim for a 
declaration that his dismissal was void was awarded by the 
House of L.,ords. The principle enunciated in Ridge v. 
Baldwin is similarly applicable to the rule against interest 
and bias. According to Professor de Smith, nit would be 
incongruous to adopt a different analysis for the rule 
against interest and likelihood of biasn.C9) 
7. C 19 3 7 J 2 K .B. 30 9, ( C • A. ) • 
?a. Ibid, p. 324. 
8. ~1964~ A.c. 4o, at 8o. 
9. de Smith? Judicial Review of Administrative Action 7 (3rd ed Y p. 242. 
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One need,not, however, look for authority to the cases 
decided on the audi alteram partem principle. There are 
many decisions concerned with the effect of the breach of 
the rule against interest and bias and which clearly show 
that a biased tribunal lacks jurisdiction and the decision 
is absolutely void and not voidable. A typical example 
is R.v. London County Council Ex parte Akkersdyk Ex. parte 
Fermenia(lO) where mandamus was granted without certiorari 
to compel a county council to rehear and determine an 
application according to law as the previous determination 
was vitiated by the presence of some councillors who were 
accusers. The grant of a bare mandamus of this type 
necessarily implies a finding that the previous determination 
of the authority was void and not voidable, so that it may 
be disregarded altogether. Otherwise there could not be a 
valid re-hearing until the previous decision was quashed. 
The question whether defect of bias or interest is a 
jurisdictional defect is particularly important because a 
biased tribunal's decision can be challenged even in the face 
of statutory "no certiorari" or ouster clauses • An 
earlier decision is R. v. Cheltenham Commissioners, '"here the 
court granted certiorari even in the face of a "no certiorari" 
clause to quash the d~cision of the licensing justices on 
the ground of interest. It held that the lower court was 
improperly constituted on account of the interest of some 
of the magistrates, and the clause prohibiting certiorari 
did not operate. It is clear that the court treated the 
10. L"l892J 1 Q.B. 190. It seems that the court did not 
construe the proceedings before the council as 
'judicial' for the purposes of certiorari. Though rule 
nisi for certiorari was obtained, it was abandoned later 
on, and mandamus was thought to be the proper remedy. 
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decision of the.~ustices as one outside their jurisdiction, 
and so void. (11) 
A modern case is R.v. Mullins, Ex parte Stenhouse. (l2 ) 
A full court held that a biased tribunal was improperly 
constituted and so the statutory clause prohibiting writ 
of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against an Appeal 
Board in relation to any appeal would not apply. 
It has been said that the theory that lies behind 
granting certiorari "is that if a justice is biased, he is 
in effect a judge in his own cause, certiorari will be 
granted because the justice had no jurisdiction as he was 
sitting in a matter in which he 1...ras interested". (13) 
A leading case which suggests that defect of bias 
goes to jurisdiction and renders the decision void is 
Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commiss ioJ;3a) Section 
4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 prevented the 
determination of the Commission from being challenged in 
any court of law. The House of Lords held that the clause 
only applied to a real determination but not to a purported 
determination. Therefore, when the Commission based its 
decision on a matter \vhich it had no right to take into 
account, its decision could be brought into question and 
declared a nullity in spite of the "ouster clause". In 
this case Lord Reid said (obiter} that there are many cases 
1:1here a tribunal's decision may be declared a nullity: ltit 
11. R.v. Cheltenham Commissioners (1841) 1 Q.B. 467. 
12. Cl971J Qd.R. 66. 
13. R.v. Paddington, etc. Rent Tribunal, Ex p.Perry Ll956~ 
1 Q.B. 229 (Per Lord Goddard C.J. at 237} (obiter). 
13~ See n.l4 below. 
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may have given.its decision in bad faith ••• It may have 
failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the 
requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good 
faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to 
t (l4) It· ac ••••••• In the same way Lord Pearce equated vJant 
of natural justice with lack of jurisdiction. In the 
Court of Appeal, Diplock L.J. in his analysis of 
jurisdictional defects had specifically classified bias as 
a defect which goes to jurisdiction so that it could be 
called into question despite any''no certiorari" clause. (l5) 
The question whether, following the Anisminic doctrine, 
a compulsory purchase order could be challenged outside the 
statutoTy limitation period arose squarely before the 
court in 1976 in R.v. Secretary of State for Environment 
Ex parte Ostler(:6 ) In that case one Ostler challenged a 
compulsory purchase order claiming that he had been 
prejudiced by a secret agreement made bet\·!een the 
authorities of the Department of Environment and an 
objector, which he had no means of discovering within the 
six weeks statutory limitation period. Schedule 2 of the 
Highways Act 1959 provided that the scheme or order, unless 
challenged \vi thin six weeks, should not be questioned in 
any legal proceeding whatever. Ostler sought an order of 
certiorari to quash the compulsory purchase order on the 
ground of breach of natural justice and bad faith verging 
on fraud, nearly 2 years after they had been confirmed. The 
14. £1969..7 1 ALL., E.R. 208, at p. 213 (Lord Reid), Lord 
Pearce) at p. 233. 
15. Ll967J 3 \'l.L.R. 231, 395 (C.A.) Diplock L.J. 
16. ~1976~ 3 W.L.R. 288. 
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Divisional Coqrt ruled that he could challenge the order 
under the Anisminic doctrine, despite the limitation 
clause. However, on appeal by the Secretary of State, the 
Court of Appeal unanimously held that the orders were 
unchallengeable after the prescribed period. 
There is no doubt that with administrative decisions 
such as compulsory purchase orders the public interest has 
to play an important role, and where, say, 90 per cent of 
the demolition work has been carried out, it is extremely 
convenient that a limit should be put upon the time 
within which a challenge to the validity of the order is 
possible~ But the terms in which the Anisminic case was 
distinguished by the Court of Appeal deserve some 
consideration. It was said that in Anisminic the House of 
Lords was considering a judicial decision by the foreign 
compensation commission tribunal, whereas the present case 
involved an administrative decision. Again in Anisminic 
there was a purported decision, one which involved a 
misconstruction of the scope of the statute giving 
jurisdiction, whereas in Ostler's case there was a decision 
made within jurisdiction and the vitiating element was 
simply one involving the way the decision was reached; and, 
that in the Anisminic case the Act ousted the jurisdiction of 
the court, whereas in the present case the clause was more 
like a statute of limitation than a complete ouster on the 
court. Therefore it was held that as Ostler did not act 
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within six weeks, the court was bound by Smith v. East 
Elloe(l 7) to hold that he was barred by statute from 
questioning those orders. What is more important is that 
Lord Denning expressed his view that an order vitiated by 
lack of natural justice, "would not to my mind be a 
nullity or void from the beginning. It would only be 
voidable". (l8 ) Goff L.J. observed that a decision made in 
violation of natural justice is "an actual decision made 
within jurisdiction".<l8 ) Administrative decisions made 
within jurisdiction were voidable only if questioned within 
the prescribed time. Thereafter they were immune from any 
challenge to their validity, and accordingly the 
application for certiorari could not succeed. 
The statement of Lord Denning M.R. that breach of 
natural justice makes a decision voidable and not void is 
hard to reconcile with earlier authorities (some of which 
have been discussed) and particularly with the dicta of 
Lord Reid in Rid~e v. Baldwin. Similarly there is an 
17. Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council ~1956~ 
A.C. 736, (H.L.)' where a similar limitation clause 
prevented a compulsory purchase order being 
challenged after the specified time even on the ground 
of fraud. 
18. R.v. Environment Secretary, Ex p. Ostler (C.A. Op.cit., 
at p. 296, and Goff L.J. at p. 300. 
This decision has been vigorously attacked by lawyers 
and critics. Again the distinction which Lord Denning 
M.R. made between an administrative and judicial 
dec is ion which suggests that •touster clauses n· would 
apply to them differently has not found favour with 
commentators. See H.W.R •. Wade 93 L.Q.R. Cl977.J p.8 
et seq; C.A. Whomersley, C.L •. J. £"1977.7 p. 4 et seq: 
and Carol Harlow, Pub.L. Cl976J pp .• 304-7. 
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abundance of high authorities (again, previously discussed) 
which held defect of natural justice to be defect which 
goes to jurisdiction. Even Lord Denning himself, in a 
recent case while analysing jurisdictional defects, quoted 
and approved the view expressed by Lord Pearce in the 
Anisminic case, that lack of jurisdiction may arise if a 
(19) tribunal de,parts from the rule of natural justice. To 
hold that breach of natural justice will make a decision 
voidable and not void would lead to one serious 
consequence in that the declaratory judgment, a very useful 
remedy, would, as the law now stands, lose much of its 
efficacy, since it is of use only against an action which 
is ultravires (i.e. outside jurisdiction and void). When 
the action is intra vires, (i.e. if the error perpetrates 
within jurisdiction it is usually regarded as voidable. A 
voidable action remains lawful until set aside and 
(20) declaration would not lie. 
In conclusion, perhaps the real reason behind the use of 
the word void or voidable is as atated by Lord Wilberforce 
in Hoffmann - La Roche (F.) & Co. A.G. v. Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry: 
19. R.v. Southampton Justices Ex p. Green ~1976~ 1 Q.B. 11, 
at 21 (justices failed to consider matters which they 
ought to have done and took into consideration matters 
which they ought not to have done. Held, they exceeded 
their jurisdiction and accordingly certiorari was 
granted to quash the proceedings. 
20. Punton v. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance 
(No.2) .Cl964J I W.L.R. 226 (C.A.). The applicants 
had been refused unemployment benefit and asked for a 
declaration that the commissioner had come to an 
incorrect determination in law, and that they were 
entitled to the benefit claimed. Declaration was 
refused as the decision was intra vires and it was 
impossible to declare that there was no decision. 
Certiorari might have been a remedy, but the six 
months' time limit for certiorari had already 
expired. See also de Smith, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (3rd ed) p. 130 et seq. 
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rtrn truth when the court says that an act of 
administration is voidable or void but not ab initio this 
is simply a reflection of a conclusion, already reached on 
unexpressed grounds, that the court is not willing in 
~ to give compensation or other redress to the person 
who establishes the nullity. Underlying the use of the 
phrase •••••••••••••••• is an unwillingness to accept 
that a subject should be indemnified for loss sustained 
by invalid administrative action'~.(2l) 
21 ~1975~ A.C. 295, 358, 359 (dissenting). Appeal 
concerned a motion by the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry ("the D.T.I.") for an interim 
injunction without an undertaking in damages 
restraining the appellants from selling certain 
drugs in excess of the prices fixed by the 
Monopolies Commission. 
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.ENGLAND': (B=)' REMEDIES: PREROGATIVE REMEDIES: 
A wide variety of remedies is available against decisions 
reached in breach of the rule against interest and bias. 
~he prerogative order of certiorari is the most common and 
widely used remedy and unlike the position under American 
law, it is available against judicial as well as 
administrative bodies performing judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. One advantage of certiorari is that 
it quashes a decision not only when the decision is made 
. (22) 
outs1de its jurisdiction (treated as void or· a nullity) 
but also when it is made within its jurisdiction and 
treated as voidable~2 3) The prerogative order of 
prohibition lie& to prevent inferior courts, administrative 
tribunals or other public authorities from acting or 
continuing to act contrary to the rule against interest 
and bias. 'II.he prerogative order of mandamus lies to 
compel a person or a body to perform a public duty imposed 
on it by law. Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court provides that the applicant must first apply ex 
parte for leave to apply for the prerogative orders. The 
party must make the application before the Divisional Bench 
of the Queens Bench Division. Applicantion for certiorari 
must be made within six months of the decision impugned 
unless the delay is satisfactorily explained to the 
court.<24Y The court is unlikely to consider an application 
22. E.g., R. v. Cheltenham Commissioners (1841) l Q.B. 467 
(discussed in the earlier section of this chapter). 
23. See R. v. Secretary of State for Environment Ex p. 
Ostler, Cl976 j 3 W .L .R. 288 (C .A.) (discussed in the 
earlier section). 
24. R.s.c.0.53,r.2(2). But the time fixed by the Rules is, 
presumably, subject to the general power of extension 
given by 0.3,r.5. 
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if there is delay on the part of the applicant, (25) even 
though there is a breach of natural justice. Prerogative 
orders are discretionary. The court may in its 
discretion refuse to grant a prerogative order, even though 
it has been applied for within time. (26 Y It has been said 
in a recent case: "the court may in its discretion refuse 
to allow an order of certiorari to go even though the time 
lapse has been l~ss than six months". (27) 
The English courts have supervisory authority over 
the proceedings of inferior tribunals. If such 
proceedings are not conducted in an impartial manner either 
for bias or interest, the court may set aside the 
(28 )' proceedings by certiorari. Certiorari is also 
(29) 
available against the decisions of administrative tribunals 
or other public authorities. A local authority cannot 
take away a common law right without acting in an impartial 
manner, and that even if the decision is administrative; 
25. E.g., R.v. Aston lfniversity Senate Ex p. Roffey ~1969~ 
2 AU.E.R. 964; see discussion in Chap.V: "Waivern. 
26. E.g., R.v., Stafford JJ., Ex p. Stafford Corporation 
Cl94o~ 2 K.B. 33i R.v. Williams, Ex p. Phillips 
~1914~ 1 K.B. 60~. 
27. R.v. Inner London Crown Court, Ex p. Greenwich London 
B'O'rOugh Council Z' 1975:1 2 W .L.R. 310 (D.C.) at p. 314;· 
see also chap. V 't'Wai vern. 
28. E.g., R.v. Essex JJ, Ex p. Perkins C1927J 2 K.B. 475 
(bias);: R.v. Hertfordshire JJ. (1845)' 6 Q.B-. 753 (pecuniary 
interes~ · · 
29. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. L.annon 
.Cl969.71 Q.B. 577 (C.A.). 
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the court has jurisdiction to quash it by certiorari,(30) 
Mandamus, is issued both against judicial and non-judicial 
bodies. In R.,v, Halifax Justices where the circumstances 
were such as to make bias on the part of one w. so 
probable that he ought not to have taken part in the case 
and a writ of mandamus was granted commanding the justices 
to hear and determine an application for renewal of the 
licence according to law,<3l) Prohibition lies to prevent 
inferior courts, administrative tribunals or other public 
authorities from acting or continuing to act contrary to 
the rule against interest and bias. For example, in E.v. 
Kent Police Authority Ex p, Godden<32} the Court of Appeal 
issued prohibition to prohibit Dr. Brown from determining 
whether the Chief Inspector was permanently disabled and 
mandamus to the Police Authority to supply all materials 
to the applicant •·s own doctor so that the matter could be 
decided impartially, About prohibition and certiorari, 
Atkin, L.J, said in 1924:(33) »Both write are of great 
antiquity, forming part of the process by which the Kings• 
Courts restrained courts of inferior jurisdiction from 
exceeding their powers •••••••••••• The operation of the 
writs has extended to control the proceedings of bodies 
which do not claim to be, and would not be recognised as, 
30·, .fi. v, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough C'ouncil, Ex p, !!.Q.Qk 
Cl976J 1 W.L.R 1052, 1058 (C.A,)', 
31. 76 J .P, 233 (1912)' C.A, 
32. Cl971J 3 All E.R. 20 (C .A.); Cl971J 2 Q.B. 662. 
33. li.v. Electricity Commissioners, Ex p. London Electricity 
Joint Committee Co ~1924~ 1 K.B. 171 at p. 204; 
In Ridge v. Baldwin L"l964..7 A.C, Y-o,Lord Reid showed 
that the latter requirement n·the duty to act judicially"· 
is not additional to the former, but is to be inferred 
from the nature of the power, (Discussed in chap II: 
"Modern Application of the Rule"), 
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courts of justice. Wherever any body of persons having 
legal authority to determine questions affecting the 
rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, 
act in excess of their legal authority they are subject 
to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench 
Division exercised in these writs". The question who 
has the locus standi to make an application for a 
prerogative order has given rise to a large number of 
decisions. For example, there is some authority 
supporting the view that even a stranger may be awarded 
certi~rari.<34 ) On the other hand it has been said that 
the court "would not listen, of course, to a mere busybody 
who was interfering in things which did not concern him". (35) 
With respect to prohibition it has been held that when a 
defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the 
proceedings, the application for prohibition may be 
brought not only by a party aggrieved but also by a 
stranger to the proceedings,<36 ) and the court is not 
entitled to have regard to the conduct of the applicant. (37) 
If the defect of jurisdiction is not patent(3S) the court has a 
discretion to refuse to award prohibition to the applicant. 
34. Buxton v. Minister Qt Housing and Local Government 
L:'l961J 1 Q.B. 278, 286. 
35. R.v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex p. Peachey 
Property Corpn. Ltd. i:l966~ 1 Q.B. 380, 4ol. 
36. E.g., Worthington v. Jeffries (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 379 
But this notion that even a stranger has locus standi 
has been criticised: see de Smith, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action, 3rd ed. p. 368. 
37. E.g., Farquharson v. Morgan Cl894J 1 Q.B. 552. 
38. R.v. Comptroller General of Patents and Designs L:l953~ 
2 W .L .• R. 760, 764. 
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The trend of recent decisions is towards the development 
of a simple concept of locus standi applicable to 
certiorari and prohibition. In R.v. Liverpool 
Corporation, ~. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operator 1's 
Association, Lord Denning M.R. said·: (39) ttThe writs of 
prohibition and certiorari lie on behalf of any person 
who is a 1 person aggrieved•· and that includes any person 
whose interests may be prejudicially affected by what is 
taking place. It does not include a mere busybody who is 
interfering in things which do not concern him; but it 
includes any person who has a genuine grievance because 
something has been done or may be done which affects him"'• 
Similarly in view of the existing state of authorities, 
locus standi with regard to mandamus cannot be defined 
with certainty. There is some authority to support the 
view that the applicant must have a specific legal right to 
enforce. A person 11must show that he has sufficient 
interest to be protected and that there is no other equally 
(4o )' 
convenient remed~~. But the courts do in practice 
exercise a wide discretion in deciding the degree of 
interest required for the purpose of an application for 
39. f:~?J? 2 AlLE.R. 589 (C.A.). £1972J 2 Q.B. 299, 308-9 
4o. R.v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex p. Blackburn 
Cl968::1 1 Alf.E.R. 763 2 770, in which the applicant 
sought an ord:er of mandamus in respect of the " 
prosecution policy of the police regarding gaming 
clubs. See also Kariapper v. Wijesinha ~1968~ A.C.714. 
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mandamus.< 4l) Prerogative remedies may accompany each 
other. For example,certiorari and prohibition or 
prohibition and mandamus or all three orders can be applied 
for in the same proceedings.<42 ) In R.v. Kent Police 
Authority Ex p. Godden( 42 ) prohibition and mandamus were 
granted by the court. 
THE OTHER REMEDIES: 
Private law remedies such as injunction and declaration have 
separate proceedings, which may be begun by either by a 
writ or by an originating summons. The proceeding for 
declaration may be emitiated without leave and with no 
fixed time limit. Declaration is available to nullify 
an administrative decision made in violation of the rule 
against interest or bias.< 43) Order 15, rule 16 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court provides generally that, 11no 
action or other proceedings shall beropen to objection on 
the ground that a merely decratory judgment or order is 
sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations 
of right whether or not any consequential relief is or 
41. 
42. 
E.g., R.v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ex p. 
Blackb~and Another (No 3) Cl973:Y 1 ALL E.R. 324 
(C.A.), here the question of locus standi was not 
raised though mandamus was refu!ed on the merits. 
See D.C.M., Yardley: "Prohibition and Mandamus and 
the Problem of Locus Standin, (1957)' 73 L.Q.R. 534. 
(Supra). See also Re Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' 
Association, op.cit. Certiorari was thought 
unsuitable but prohibition was granted. Mandamus 
did not issue as there was no failure of statutory 
duty. 
Eg., Cooper v. Wilson £1937J 2 All E.R.726 (C.A.). 
Declaration is a wide ranging remedy. But the extent 
of application of it (as with other remedies) so far 
as relevant with this thesis will be discussed here. 
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( 44) 
could be claimed". The criteria to be applied by the 
court in deciding whether a party has a sufficient interest 
to entitle him to ask for a declaration sometimes appear to 
( 45J be strict • In Gregory v. Camden L.B.cr. the borough 
council, as local planning authority, had given planning 
permission for a school to be built at the rear of the 
plaintiff's property. In fact the correct procedure had 
not been followed and the grant of permission to build 
was therefore undoubtedly illegal • But Paull, J. held 
that the plaintiff, although he would be inconvenienced 
by the proximity of the intended school, had no 1~ standi 
to ask the court to declare the planning permission void ~46) 
Declaration only states the legal position and it cannot 
prohibit or quash a decision made within jurisdiction. 
In such a case , the decision impeached must first be 
quashed by certiorari.C 47) Again declaration is not 
obtainable as a method of judicial review under section 
I4(1) of the Tribunals ~nd Inquiries Act I971. 
Nevertheless it has certain advantages to the litigant 
in the public law field over other remedies available 
to him • For example a declaration may be 
44. The action for a declaration like injunction had its 
origin in a remedy given by the Court of Chancery; 
see cases referred to by I. Zamir in, The Declaratory 
Judgement, p.7; de Smith, Judicial Revi~w of 
Administrative Action , 3rd ed.,p. 425 et seq. 
45. f I966 J I w.L.R. 899 (Q.B.D.). 
46. (Supra ) • But see Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation 
f I955_7 Ch. 210, C.A., where a ratepayer obtained a 
declaration that the Corporation's free bus scheme for 
old-age pensioners was ultra vire~ ; Brownsea H~ Prop. 
Ltd., v. Poole Corporatio jl95~Ch. 574, C.A., where 
hotel proprietors challenged a one-way traffic order. 
47. pynton v. Ministry Qi Pensions and National Insurance 
No.~ op.cit.,discussed in earlier section of this chapter. 
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obtained against the crown, <48 ) while neither injunction 
nor mandamus<49 ) will lie against the crown. The power 
to make declaration against the crown is preserved by 
s.21(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, but proviso 
(a) to that subsection forbids a court to grant injunction 
against the crown. Again the proceeding for a 
declaration may be initiated without leave and without 
any fixed time limit. This remedy is however a 
discretionary one.(50) In Taylor v. National Union of 
Seamen,(5l) Ungoed Thomas J. granted a declaration that 
the expulsion from membership of the union was invalid 
but refused to grant a declaration to the effect that the 
plaintiff had continued to be in employment of the union 
as he did in fact obtain other employment. In cases of 
unfair dismissal, there is some authority to suggest that 
the courts may be disinclined to grant a declaration if the 
relationship between the employer and employee approximates 
to an ordinary contractual relationship.<52 ) On the 
otherhand there is some authority to suggest that when 
48. Dyson v. Attorney General ~19117 1 K.B.410. 
49. See J.F. Garner, Administrative Law, 4th ed., pp. 185, 
287 et seq. But it will lie against a Minister acting 
as such: Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food ~1968:r A.C. 997. 
50. Re Barnato, ~ v. Sanges Cl949J 1 All E.R. 515; and 
see J.F. Garner, Administrative Law, pp. 188-190. 
51. Cl967J 1 W.L.R. 532, 553 (Ch.D.) "Prosecutor Judge" 
case (discussed in Chapter IV). 
52. E.g., Vidoyodaya University Council v. Silva ~1965~ 
1 W.JI.,.R. 77 (dismissal of u-niversity teacher without 
hearing. This case has been treated as anomalous by 
Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation 
Cl971J 1 W.L.R. 1578, at p. 1596 (H.L.)'. 
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some element of an office or status is enjoyed by the 
employee, the court is inclined to grant declaration in 
favour of the employee dismissed in violation of 
procedural requirements. (53) •t·Injunction is an order of 
a court addressed to a party to proceedings before it 
and requiring him to refrain from doing, or to do, a 
C54Y particular act". A plaintiff seeking an injunction 
normally has to show that he is a person aggrieved.<55) 
If~member of the public wants to secure compliance 
with a purely public duty, it has been said that he 
should proceed normally by way of a relator action by 
obtaining consent of the Attorney General.<56) 
Injunctions will not be granted if other remedies are 
available. In a recent case, the House of Lords held 
that the old rule of practice that an undertaking in 
damages could not in general be exacted from the Crown 
was no longer justified since the passing of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947, although in the particular 
circumstances of the case the majority of the House were 
53. Ridge v. Baldwin ~1964~ A.C. 4o; Malloch v. 
Aberdeen Corporation (op.cit.)', (dismissal of school 
teach~rY. 
54. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 
(3rd ed.), at p. 388 •. 
55. E.g., Durayappah v. Fernando ~1967~ 2 A.C. 337 
{mayor of improperly dissolved council held lacking 
in sufficient interest to sue for an injunction to 
redress the wrong in his personal capacity). 
56. In A.G., Ex rel. McWhirter v. Independent 
Broadcasting Authority ~1973;7 1 All.E.R.689 the 
Court of Appeal set out the exceptional 
circumstances where a member of the public can bring 
a proceeding for injunction without a relator action. 
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unwilling to impose such undertaking as a condition 
for granting an interim injunction.<57Y The injunction 
is in origin an equitableremedy and the granting of it 
lies in the court•~ discretion,<5B) so that the conduct 
of the plaintiff may debar his obtaining an injunction. 
(59) In Ward v. Bradford Corporation W~ brought a suit 
for declaration that the resolution expelling her was 
null and void for breach of natural justice and an 
injunction restraining the defendants from acting on it. 
Her prayer for interim injunction was refused because her 
conduct merited such expulsion. 'R'here was no ground to 
think that she "was treated unfairly or unjustly"'• (60) 
~he remedies of injunction and declaration lie 
against public as well as private bodies. "The courts 
cannot grant the prerogative writs such as certiorari 
and mandamus against domestic bodies, but they can grant 
declarations and injunctions which are the modern 
machinery for enforcing administrative law"·. (6l )' On the 
57. Hoffman La Roche (F.)' & Co. A.G. v. Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry ~1975~ A.C. 295. 
58. For a detailed discussion see de Smith, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action, 3rd ed., p. 383 
et seq. 
59. Ward v. Bradford Corporation (1971) 70 L.G.R. 27, 
Discussed in Chapter IV. 
60. Ibid at p. 35. Similarly in Glynn v. Keele University 
Cl97~:7 2 Alt E.R. 89 (Ch.D.) G. was expelled from 
University residential accommodation without hearing. 
Injunction refused to stop expulsion. What G. had 
done merited "a severe penalty" and the decision 
against him \olas nintrinsicall¥ a perfectly proper 
onen· - Pennycuick V-C. at p. 97). 
61. Breen v. A.E.U~ £.1971J 2 W.L.R. 74-2, 750, (C.A.). 
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otherhand damages are not obtainable unless the failure 
to observe natural justice also gives rise either to a 
breach of tort or contract. For example, damages are 
obtainable when the failure to observe natural justice 
has invalidated a decision and the authority on the 
strength of that decision commits a separate tortious 
action such as trespass.<62 ) Equally there is authority 
to suggest that if there is no contracbuU link between 
the parties then even if the decision is made in breach 
of natural justice, the aggrieved party has no right to 
(63) . (64) damages. In Hannam v. Bradford Corporat1on the 
Court of Appeal refused to give damages as there was no 
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant Council • 
. His claim for damages was "totally misconceivedn,<65) 
although the court was satisfied that there was a real 
likelihood (or a reasonable suspicion of bias)' on the 
part of the sub-committee authority. Damages as a 
remedy for administrative illegality does not fall within 
the "existing remedies"<66 Y and has been excluded from 
the terms of reference of the Law Commission. 
E.g., Ho~kins v. Smetwick Local Board of Health 
(1890) 2 Q.B.D. 712. But see David v. Abdul Cader 
£1963.7 1 W .L .• R. 834 (P.C., Ceylon) where the Privy 
Council decision suggests that an applicant for a 
statutory licence may possibly have a right to 
damages for malicious refusal of licence. 
63. E.g., Abbott v. Sullivan ~1952~ 1 K.B. 189. 
64. Cl970 :7 1 w .L .R. 937 (C .A.). 
65. Ibid, at p. 948. 
66. The Law Commission Report No. 73,Cmnd. 6407, para. 9. 
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STATUTORY" REMEDIES: 
Remedies are often specifically provided for in 
Statutes.<67) For example under Section 9 of the 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 (now section 13 of the 
1971 Act) appeal lies from certain specified tribunals 
(68)' to the High Court. Similarly statute may restrict 
or oust remedies. Section 11(1) of the Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act 1958 (Section 14(1) of the 1971 Act) 
provided that any provision in any earlier Act that any 
order or determination shall not be questioned in any 
court shall not have effect to prevent an order for 
certiorari or mandamus. This section however does not 
refer to prohibition or declaration. Further, Section 
11(3) expressly prevented 11(1) from applying where an 
Act makes special provision for application to the High 
Court within a time limited by the Act and to any 
determination of the Foreign Compensation Commission and 
clearly intended to oust the court's jurisdiction in that 
matter. It may safely be submitted, ho~ever, that the 
courts tend to interpret such ouster clauses restrictively 
so as to preserve as much judicial authority as possible 
in the interests of private individuals.<69 ) 
67. E.g. 1 Under 'R'rade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, the lndustrial Tribunals are empowered to recommend 
reinstatement and award compensation to be paid by 
the employer for unfair dismissal ~Sch. I part III~. 
68. A person appealing may also apply for judicial review: 
In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Etd. v. Lannon 
(op.cit) certiorari rather than appeal was assumed to 
be the appropriate means of challenging a decision 
affected by likelihood of bias. 
69. E.g., R.v. Cheltenham Commissioners (supra); Anisminic 
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission £1969..::7 2 A.C. 
147. Discussed in the earlier section of this Chapter. 
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There may frequently be specific provision for appeal 
from the decision of administrative authorities, though a 
person availing himself of such an appeal may also apply 
to the court for other remedies. (70) Nor is it always 
necessary to exhaust any internal administrative 
remedies before corning to the court. In Cooper v. 
Wilson( 7l) the Police Sergeant did not appeal to the Home 
Secretary, but this was held to be no bar to obtaining a 
declaration from the court. There is some authority to 
suggest that if the rules of trade unions provide for an 
internal remedy of appeal, the complainant must seek that 
remedy before coming to the court. (72 ) But in later cases, 
the courts have shown less reluctance to interfere before 
the exhaustion of domestic rernedies.<73Y In the case of 
breach of the principle inside a University, the proper 
internal remedy is appeal to the Visitor.<?4) 
This wide variety of potential remedies with no clear-cut 
field of application must often create confusion in the 
?0. For example, in Ridge v. Baldwin L:l964~ A.c.4o, the 
complainant appealed to the Home Secretary and later 
obtained a declaration from the House of Lords. 
71. C 1 9 3? J 2 ALL E. R. 72 6 ( C • A. ) • 
72. White v. Kuzych £'1951J A.C. 585 (decision of a 
voluntary association is nevertheless a decision even 
though tainted with bias and the plaintiff must exhaust 
domestic remedy before coming to the court). 
73. Annamunthodo v. Oilfield Workers' T.U. 2:196~ A.C. 945, 956; Lawlor v. Union of Post Office Workers 
~1965~ Ch. ?12,333; Leigh v. National Union of 
Railwaymen Cl9?0 1 Ch.326, 334:· See also Paul 
Jackson, Natural Justice, pp. 72-74. 
74. J.W. Bridge: "Keeping Peace in the Universities", 86 
L .• Q.R. 531. 
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litigant and sometimes the wrong remains unremedied. Thus 
Sachs, L.J. said in Hannam v. Bradford Corporation:( 75) 
"To my mind he has lost the opportunity of obtaining 
the determination of a properly constituted staff sub-
committee •••• He cannot put himself into a better 
position than that as regards damages ••••••• ~ •• by having 
refrained .. ofrom seeking immediately •.••• -••••••• -~an order of 
certiorari or mandamus against the council, or an 
injunction against the governors restraining them from 
implementing the dismissal until a properly constituted 
staff sub-committee had come to a decisionn. 
PROPOSED REFORMS: 
In 1969, the Law Commission was asked nto review 
the existing remedies for the judicial control of 
administrative acts and omissions with a view to 
evolving a simpler and more effective procedure". The 
report submitted to Parliament recommended one form of 
procedure, "an application for judicial review". <76) 
Under cover of it, a litigant should be able to obtain 
any of the prerogative orders, or, in appropriate 
circumstances, a declaration or an injunction. He 
would have to specify which particular remedy he was 
seeking but if he later desired to apply for a remedy 
for which he had not initially applied he would be able 
to, with the leave of the court to amend his application. 
75. ~1970.:1 1 W.L.R. 937, 944 (C.A.). 
76. . ~aw Commission Report No. 73 Cmnd. 64o7, para. 43. 
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'R'he vital difference however, from the present system 
under order 53 would be that the litigant's choice of 
remedies in the Divisional Court would not be limited 
to the prerogative orders but would also include, in 
appropriate circumstances, a declaration or an 
injunction. The essential characteristics of the 
remedies would remain; only the procedure for obtaining 
them would change. It would ne necessary to obtain 
leave from the court to make an application.(??) The 
granting of the application will be highly discretionary 
because before granting a declaration or injunction under 
this procedure the court is to have regard to the nature 
of the relief available by prerogative orders and to the 
justice and convenience of the case in the light of all 
its circumstances. As regards locus standi the 
Commission recommended "that the standing necessary to 
make an application for judicial review should be such 
interest as the court considers sufficient in the matter 
to which the application relates 11 • (78) The court should 
have power to order discovery. As to time limits, relief 
should not be refused by the court solely on the ground 
that there has been delay in making the application, 
77. This is a controversial matter, since no leave is 
necessary for proceedings seeking declaration or 
injunction. See H.W .R.'t-1: "Remedies in Administrative 
Law", 92 L.Q.R. 334, 336. 
78. Report (op.cit.,) para. 48. 
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unless the court considers that the granting of the 
relief would cause substantial hardship or prejudice 
to any person or would be detrimental to good 
administration. The position at the moment is that an 
injunction cannot be obtained against the Crown although 
it·is possible to get a declaration.<79) But there is no 
form of interim declaration preserving the status guo 
pending the final declaration. The Commission 
therefore recommended(BO) that Section 21 of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 19~7 should be amended to provide, in 
addition to the power there.given to make a declaratory 
order against the Crown, also a power to declare the terms 
of an interim injunction which would have been granted 
bet ween sub j acts:. On an application for judicial review, 
the court,where it is satisfied that there are grounds for 
quashing a decision,should have a discretionary power in 
lieu to remit the case to the deciding authority for 
reconsideration in the light Of the COUrt 11S finding e 
If the recommendations become law, the reform will 
certainly bring a welcome element of flexibility into the 
prerogative writs, which have been stratified into rigid 
forms in English common law through the centuries. The 
litigant •·s choice of remedies would then be broader than in 
America under the federal system which does not apply 
certiorari and prohibition to administrative bodies.<Bl) 
79. Section 2l(l)'(a)' of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. 
Bo·. Report, op.cit., para. 51. 
81. See Remedies: United States. 
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UNITED STATES (A)EFFECTS 
In American law, the earlier cases· present conflicting 
decisions about the effect of bias and interest. It was 
recognised at common law that a judge who was interested 
in the action or of kin to either party was disqualified 
from sitting in a case. Notwithstanding this rule, 
however, his judgment in the cause was generally considered 
erroneous only, and not void.(l) But where it was expressly 
declared by a constitutional or statutory provision that 
in a certain specified case a judge should not sit, or 
should not act or should take no part in the decision, there 
was virtual uniformity in authorities that in such a case, 
the judgment rendered by the judge "is coram non judice and 
void, and the express consent will not aid it"'• (2 ) In 
such a case it was held to be no answer that the vote of 
the disqualified judge was not necessary to bring a 
decision in the matter. 
The same principle was applied to administrative officials. 
In one Indiana case(3) it was held that in the absence ofa 
1. ~ v. Hoffman (Su.ct. of Wisconsin 1898) 220, 221, 222. 
2. Ibid, at p. 222. Similarly it was held in William 
Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company v. 
International Curtis Marine ~ Company (1913) 228 u.s. 
645, that consent to a judge's participation who is 
disqualified under statute would not constitute a waiver 
of disqualification. 
3. Decatur To~mship v. Board of Commissioners of Marion 
City, 39 N.E.2d. 479, 482 (Ind. App.l942)'. 
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statutory provision, the pecuniary interest of a board 
member made its decision voidable and not void. On the 
other hand, it was held in Wilson v. Iowa City( 4) that the 
vote by a member of a city council on any resolution 
relating to an urban renewal project, if in violation of the 
conflict of interest provision of the Urban Renewal Law, was 
void, and the result reached by Council in such matter was 
also void, whether his vote determined the issue before the 
Council or not. At the present time however, the American 
courts do not seem to be very much concerned about the 
question of void or voidability of a decision for interest 
or_ bias, and further authority is sparse. Statutes both 
Federal and State have made provisions for disqualification 
on a number of grounds. Again the interpretation of "due 
process'~ clauses by the courts has made it clear that the 
requirement of a disinterested and impartial adjudicator, 
apart from statutes, has become a constitutional requirement. 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process which not only requires absence of actual bias 
but also interest in the outcome. ( 5) This due process 
requirement applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate 
as well as to courts. A biased decision-maker is now declared 
(6) to be constitutionally unacceptable. Besides, the remedies of 
4. Wilson v. Iowa City (su.ct. of Iowa, 1969) 165 N.W.2d 
813. 
5. In~ Murchison 349 u.s. 133 (1955). 
6. Withrow v. Larkin 43 Led 2d 712 (1975', U.S.Sup~·ct.) .. 
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declaration(?) and injunction have been used as weapons in 
reviewing biased administrative decisions. The remedy of 
declaration lies only in respect of decisions that suffer 
from jurisdictional defects and are void but not in respect 
of the decisions that are intra vires and merely 
voidable .< 8) There is some authority to suggest that when 
disqualification is mandated by statute, failure to 
' provide with statutes requirement constitutes a 
jurisdictional defect and that it cannot be waived by 
consent. (9) The amended federal statute 28 U .s .. c. ' .. § 455 
has provided specific mandatory grounds for judicial 
disqualification and has expressly stated under sub-
section (e)' that a justice, judge, magistrate or referee 
in bankruptcy of the United States shall not accept 
waiver of any ground(lO) as set forth in sub section (b) 
of Section 455. 
7. Wilson v. Iowa City,supra. 
8. See discussion in the earlier section of this chapter. 
9. William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. 
International Curtis Marine T. Co. (1913) 228 u.s. 645. 
10. 28 u.s.c .. · .§·· .455 (e) As amended Dec. 5, 1974 Pub. L. 93 
- 512, §1, 88 Stat. 1609. 
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UNITED STATES Q3)REMEDIES: PREROGATIVE REMEDIES. 
~he right to a trial before an impartial judge is a 
right that is protected by the due process clause in the 
constitution. If any decision is made by any judge in 
violation of procedural due process of law, certiorari may 
be issued to set aside such an impugned decision. The 
United States Supreme Court said in Re Murchison:(ll) 
":C']heJ importance of the federal constitutional questions 
raised caused us to grant certiorari. The view we take 
makes it unnecessary for us to consider or decide any •••••• 
questions except the due process challenge to trial by the 
judge who had conducted the secret one-man grand jury 
proceedings". Certiorari was granted and the judgments 
of the Supreme Court of Michigan affirming contempt 
convictions imposed by a judge of the Recorder 1's court for 
the city of Detroit was reversed. ~he Supreme Court has 
supervisory authority over the administration of criminal 
justices in the federal courts. In Offutt v. United 
States, (l2) a contempt conviction against a lawyer was set 
aside as the charge was entangled with the judge ''s personal 
feeling against the lawyer. The cause was remanded to the 
District Court with a direction that the contempt charge be 
retried before a different judge. 
As under English law, where it is manifest on the 
petition for certiorari that the judgment sought to be 
11. In re Murchison 349 U.S.l33, 136 (1955). 
12. Offutt v. United States 348 u.s. 11. (1954). 
- 252 -
reviewed was rendered by a court not properly organised 
because a disqualified judge participated in it, the 
reviewing court does not need to go into the merits of the 
cause. In such a case the writ of certiorari may be 
granted, the judgment reversed and the cause remanded so 
that it may be heard by a competent court.<13J 
~nder the federal procedure 28 u.s.c.§ 144 the court 
is to determine whether the allegations of bias and 
prejudice are legally sufficient or not is first by the 
judge who is being challenged. Section 144 states :· 
nWhenever a party to any proceeding in a district 
court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that 
the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal 
bias or prejudice either against him or in favour of any 
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, 
but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. 
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for 
the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be 
filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the 
term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause 
shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A 
party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It 
shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record 
13. William Cramp and Sons Ship and Engine _ · Building Co. 
v. International Curtis Marine T. Company (1913) 228. 
u • .s. 645, 650 (disqualified under statute from sitting 
in appeal from own judgment)', Similarly it was held in 
R.v. Cheltenham Commissioner (1841) 1 Q.B.467 that a 
court is improperly constituted when a disqualified judge (i.e. by reason of interest) takes part in it 
and "no certiorari" clause would not prevent the court 
from quashing such a decision. 
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(14) 
stating that it is made in good faith". 
A number of states have adopted procedures for 
disqualification of judges that are patterned on the 
federal system. For example, in Utah a litigant can file 
an affidavit of bias and prejudice to disqualify a judge. 
The matter is to be first determined by the trial judge 
but subject to review by the Supreme Court on appeal.(l5) 
In 1921, the United States Supreme Court in a leading 
case held that the affidavit will not disqualify unless 
the alleged facts are "legally sufficient" i.e. give 
"fair support" to the allegation of bias. The court said 
that the trial judge would determine whether the affidavit 
meets the procedural requirements of the section and 
whether the facts alleged give nfair support" to the charge 
of "personal bias and prejudice". But the judge should 
not determine the truth or falsity of the affidavit. For 
the purpose of the determination, the facts alleged must be 
taken as true.<16Y This ruling has been followed .in later 
cases. In a recent case it has been held that no inquiry 
14 •. Section 144 applies only to federal district. courts. 
15. Utah Code Ann.§. 78-7-1. Similar filing of affidavit 
of bias also exists in Kentucky but in a modified form. 
When either party to an action pending before the county judge, shall file his affidavit that the judge will not 
afford him a fair and impartial trial, the parties by 
agreement may elect a qualified person as special judge 
to try the action. If no agreement is reached, a 
qualified person shall be elected by member of the bar 
present and not interested in the action. (Kentucky 
Revised ptatutes §.25.14o,(l960). See also Wisconsin 
statutes 2ol.o~. · 
16. Berger v. United States, 255 u.s. (1921) 22, 33, 34. 
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into facts beyond the face of the affidavit may be made 
in connection with a motion for disqualification of a 
judge on the ground of bias or prejudice.<l7) 
Some of the states however have adopted an automatic 
disqualification procedure which is available by the timely 
filing of an affidavit by the litigant alleging that he 
fears that he cannot receive an impartial trial because of 
bias and prejudice of the trial judge. For example,in 
(18) California when either party in a trial timely files an 
affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury or makes 
an oral statement under oath that he believes that he 
cannot have an impartial trial before any judge, court 
commissioner or referee, the matter shall be assigned to 
some other judge, court commissioner or referee to try the 
cause or hear the matter. A party is not permitted to 
make more than one such motion in any one action. It has 
been suggested, however, that the automatic disqualification 
system does not furnish an effective check against improper 
use, since any deterrence possible through the threat of 
perjury prosecution is remote because of the difficulty in 
challenging a subjective belief of the party'. (l9} The 
17. U.S. v. Sciuto, (C.A.Ill., 1976), 531 F.2d. 842. 
18. California Code of Civil Procedure (West Suppl 1966) § 
170.6 as amended by stats. 1967, c.l602, p 38j2 § 2, · 
stats. 1976 c.l071, p ----,§I. 
19. New York University Law Review (1967) Vol 42: "State 
Procedures for Disqualification of Judges for Bias and 
Prejudice", p. 484, 504. 
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Federal system appears better by comparison. Under it the 
facts stated in the affidavit must give a ttfair support" 
to the allegation of bias. This requirement discourages 
frivolous petitions and in addition the affidavit must be 
accompanied by a certificate of the litigant ''s counsel of 
record stating that it was made in good faith.< 2o) Such 
a requirement provides an additional safeguard against 
abuse in that the counsel is under a threat of contempt 
or disbarment proceedings if he knowingly certifies a 
false charge of bias. (2l) If the trial judge refuses to 
disqualify himself on the ground of insufficient affidavit, 
the appellate court reviews the determination, viewing it 
as a question of law. Besides, the appellate court has 
got original jurisdiction to issue the writs of mandamus 
and prohibition thereby·forcing the trial judge to 
disqualify when a section 144 affidavit is filed. This 
power is vested in the appellate court by the nall writs" 
statute. (22 ) 
In Connelly v. United States District Court( 23) 
prohibition was issued to disqualify a jud'ge from hearing a 
motion to reduce bail. Courts also grant mandamus when 
they consider that the damage resulting from a trial 
20. 28 u.s.c § 144 (supra). 
21. Laughlin v. United States, 151 F. 2d. 281 (D.C.cir.) 
cert. denied, 326 u.s. 777 (1945). 
22. "All writs actn -· 28 u.s.c.§ 1651. The Supreme Court 
and all courts established by the Act of Congress may 
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 
and principles· of law - 28 U.s .c.§ 1651. 
23. Conn.ellYv. United States Dist:; Ct.l91 ~ F.2d. 692 
(9th cir. 1951). 
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conducted by a biased judge who is disqualified later is 
greater than the expense and delay caused by granting 
mandamus. Mandamus would be granted when the "special 
circumstances" compel immediate solution of the 
disqualification issue. In Minnesota and Ontario Paper 
(24) QQ. v. Molyneaux an affidavit was filed in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. The court granted mandamus on 
the ground that the length and complexity of the matter 
should be sufficient reasons for early resolution of the 
disqualification issue. But if the affidavit fails to 
show any personal bias against the petitioners then the 
affidavit is "legally insufficient" and the application 
for mandamus would be denied.C 25)' Mandamus and prohibition 
are extraordinary remedies and can be employed justifiably 
only when rare and exceptional circumstances are present. 
Mandamus and prohibition would not be granted if it is 
(26)' 
considered that the provision of appeal · after the final 
decision is an adequate remedy. When a judge disqualifies 
himself the case is ordered to be transferred and assigned 
to another judge for all. further proceedings. (27)' An 
aggrieved party is entitled to a new trial before an 
24. 70 F. 2d. 545 (8th cir., 1934)'. 
25. Pfizer Inc., v. ~ 456 F. 2d. 532 (U.s. Ct. of Appeals, 
8th cir., 1972) certiorari denied 4o6 u·.s. 976 (1972). 
26. Green v •. Murphy 259 F.2d. 591, (U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 
3rd cir., 1958). 
27. United States v. Moore 4o5 F .supp. 771 (D .c .w. Va. 1976). 
- 257 -
impartial judge if it is clear from the record that the 
triaL had not been conducted· in a fair and impartial 
manner. <28 )' State systems of remedies depend mainly on 
prerogative writs. For example, in the State of New York, 
under Article 78 of New York Civil Practice and Rules, the 
aggrieved party is entitled to relief in the nature of 
writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition i.e. may 
annul, confirm, direct. or prohibit certain action. In 
Bender v. Board of Regents of University of State of New 
~' it was held that though a proceeding to revoke the 
licence of a dentist is n-~dministrati ve"· rather than 
njudicial'~ and need not be conducted with the formality 
required before a judicial tribunal, but the holder of a 
licence cannot be deprived of it without due "'process of 
law"·, that is without due motive and hearing before an 
impartial tribunal. A licence to practise any profession 
should be promptly revoked whenever it is shown that the 
holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct but that "'result 
should only follow after a fair and impartial hearing"·. (29) 
In California a similar development took place with 
mandamus. Under §.1084 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure(30) the writ of mandamus denominated as "writ of 
mandate"' has been developed as the normal remedy for 
28. E.g., Killilea v. United States 287 F. 2d. 212 
(U.S~ Ct. of Appeals, lst cir., ); certiorari denied 
366 u.s. 969 (1961). 
29. (1941)' 30 N.Y.S.2d. 779 (Sup. Ct. Appellate Division, 
Third Department) Proceeding under A~t. 78 of New 
York Civil Practice and Rules. 
30. West's Californian Codes (Civil Procedure) §.1084. 
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obtaining review. In a leading case it was decided 
that certiorari cannot be issued to review a state agency 
action.(3l) Mandamus can be issued against both judicial 
and administrative authorities. Where the writ is issued 
the reviewing court shall inquire into the question, inter 
alia, whether or not a fair trial was given by the 
administrative authorities. 'Rhe n·writ of mandate" 
covers virtually the whole field of certiorari; under it, 
the court either commands the respondent to set aside the 
order or decision or denies the writ. Where the 
judgment commands that the order or decision be set aside, 
it may order the reconsideration of the case in the light 
of the courts• opinion and judgment and may order the 
respondent to take such further action as is especially 
enjoined upon it by law5J2} Section 1086 of the code 
state~ that the writ must be issued in all cases where 
there is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the 
course of law. 
31. Standard Oil Company v. State Board of Egualisa tion 
59 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1936)'. 
32. California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 (eY as 
amended by stats. 1974,c. 668 p. 1532, § 1; stats. 
1975, 2nd Ex. Sess., c.I, ~26.5. 
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STATUTORY'AND OTHER REMEDIES: 
The remedies available against administrative 
authorities in the federal courts differ substantially from 
those which are available under English law. In the 
important case of Degge v. Hitchcock(33) the United States 
Supreme Court held that certiorari was available only to 
review the decisions of the courts. It could not be used 
to review the decisions of administrative authorities even 
though they were judicial in nature. The function of 
certiorari is performed by newer, modern remedies such as 
declaration and injunction, which have advantages over 
certiorari. When an individual seeks a declaration or an 
injunction, he need not worry whether the alleged 
administrative action is judicial, quasi-judicial or 
administrative. (34 ) ~he Federal procedure differs 
substantially from the English system. U'nlike the 
position in English law it is statute law rather than 
common law that plays the primary role in judicial review 
in the federal courts. The Administrative Procedure Act 
makes extensive provision for disqualification and for 
33. Degge v. Hitchcock, 229.u.s. 162 (1913). The United 
States Supreme Court held that certiorari was the 
wrong remedy for reviewing a fraud order issued by the 
Post Master General. 
34. The muddle over the theory that certiorari lies to quash 
only judicial or quasi-judicial acts has not been reoolved 
yet in England. It is evident from a recent case R. v. 
Barnsle Metro olitan Borou h Council Ex p. Hook-
197 1 W .L,.R. 10 2 C .A.) where the District Court 
dismissed the application for certiorari holding the 
proceedings as purely administrative. On appeal, Lord 
Denning opined that certiorari would lie even if the 
proceedings were administrative (pp. 1057, 1058) while 
the majority sought to find the power as judicial so 
as to attract natural justice and admit certiorari. 
For a recent comment .on this case see T I~gman 
"Natural Justice in Barnsley"·, N.L.J.(l977J p. ~99. 
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judicial review. Section 702 states: '~A person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof"'·- Under the Act, the hearing employee 
has a right and obligation to evaluate his own 
impartiality.<35) On his refusal the agency has a right 
and duty to review de novo a challenged examiner t:s 
impartiality. Section 557 states "bn appeal from or 
review of the initial decision, the agency has all the 
powers which it would have in making the initial decisions". 
If the claimant of the prejudice is not satisfied with the 
agency decision he may raise it before the reviewing court. 
The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside the 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be 
without observance of procedure required by law or 
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
Section 556 or 557 of the Act or otherwise reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute.<36) 
Section 556 (b)" clearly empowers the agency to determine 
whether a presiding or participating employee conducting 
a hearing is subject to personal bias or other 
disqualifications. It is less clear whether a member of 
an agency participating in the final or appellate 
determination can be disqualified by his colleagues or the 
35. § 556 (bY. Discussed in chapter IV. 
36. Administrative Procedure Act 5 u.s.c. § 706. 
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matter of his disqualification is to be entrusted solely 
to his conscience. There is some authority to suggest 
that there is an inherent power in the agency to disqualify 
one of its members apart from the Administrative 
Procedure Act }37)' A person claiming bias on the part of . 
the administrative authority would first be required to 
exhaust administrative remedies. The courts do not 
normally consider assertions of administrative bias prior 
to the completion of an adjudicative proceeding. Only in 
the "exceptional case" where the court is presented with 
an undisputed allegation of fundamental administrative 
prejudice will it interrupt the progress of the agency· 
adjudicative hearing. (38) 
Apart from the Administrative Procedure Act federal 
statutes provide various forms of proceedings for review 
of administrative action. For example, petition for 
review under provisions like that of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, petition for review under the Review Act 
1950, statutory injunction in a three-judge court and so 
on. The review provisions of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act have been substantially copied into the acts of many 
37. 
38. 
The Federal Communications Commission has expressly 
recognised inherent power of the Commission to 
disqualify their fellow members. In ~ Segal and 
Smith 5 F. C.C. 3 (1937r); see also Long Beach Fed. 
Sav. &. L.oan Ass •n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. 
Supp. 589 (s •. n. Cal. 1960) where the court, while 
bas'ing its result on s. 7(a)" of the Administrative 
Procedure Act 1946, seems· to assume that even in the 
absence of the Act an administrative agency possesses 
the inherent power of disqualification and has the 
obligation to exercise it in a proper case. 
United States v. Litton Industries Inc., 462 F. 2d 14 
(9th cir 1972); see also Amos Treat & Co Inc., v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 306 F. 2d 260 (1962), 
where the appellants failed to exhaust the administrative 
remedies nevertheless the Court entertained action on 
due process grounds. 
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other agencies. Under it the petitioner obtains a review 
of the commission•s order by filing a petition before 
the circuit court of appeals. The· Act provides: ''The 
court shall have jurisdiction ••••• to make •••• a decree 
affirming, modifying or setting aside the order of the 
commission and enforcing the same to the extent that such 
order is affirmed ••••••• The judgment and decree of the 
court shall be final, except that the same shall be 
subject to review by the supreme court upon certiorari 
•••••••• ~he jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals 
to affirm, enforce, modify or set aside orders of the 
commission shall be exclusive". (39) 
The Administrative Procedure Act has had no 
substantial effect upon forms of proceedings. Section 
703 (which Uhder Section 701 does not apply to the extent 
that statutes preclude judicial review or agency action 
committed to agency discretion by law) provides:·. "the 
form of proceeding for judicial review is the special 
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter 
in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or 
inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, 
including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of 
prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus in 
a court of competent jurisdiction. Except to the extent 
that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for 
judicial review is provided by law, agency action is 
subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings 
39. 38 stat, 720 (1914} 15 u.s.c.§ 45(C) 
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for judicial enforcement". Though the phrase "~my 
applicable form of legal action"· might be thought to revive 
dormant extraordinary remedies such as certiorari or 
prohibition, that has never in fact happened, nor is likely 
to happen.(4o)' In the absence of any statutory provision 
for review, the litigant falls back on the ordinary law 
and its remedies. The means of challenging an 
administrative action is usually a suit against the 
officer for damages or for injunction or declaratory 
judgment in a district court.<4l} Injunction and 
declaration are almost always combined. The non-statutory 
remedies in the federal courts are "essentially those of 
(42)' injunction and declaratory judgment". With the 
enactment of the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act 1934, (43) 
the action for declaration was provided as a federal non-
statutory remedy. Injunction became firmly established 
in 1902 as a means of non-statutory review.< 44J As has 
been observed, the state system of remedies, by way of 
contrast, depends mainly on prerogative writs. In this 
4o. K.C •. Davis, Administrative Law T'ext, § 23.01-P.441 
(3rd ed., 1972). , 
41. For a detailed discussion see K.C. Davis, Administrative 
Law T.ext, Co:p. ~i;t~ .. , ... } p. 443 at seq. 
42. Schwartz and Wade, L.egal control of Government, p. 215. 
43. Revised in 1948, 62 stat. 964 (1948) amended, 63 stat. 
964 (1949)~28 u.s.c.§ 2201. 
44. See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 
187 u.s. 94 (1902). 
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respect state law is. much closer to the English system 
than to the federal. It has been said that "CtheJ 
state courts have often been either unable or unwilling 
to copy from the federal courts what is especially 
splendid about the use of injunction and declaratory 
judgmentn. <45) Efforts have been to reform state 
administrative procedure. The Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act, drafted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws provides for judicial 
review of contested cases on the filing of a petition 
for review. <45a) A person who has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available within the agency and 
and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested 
case is entitled to judicial ·review under that Act. A 
preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action 
is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency 
decision would not provide an adequate remedy. The 
reviewing court may affirm the decision of the agency or 
remand the case for further proceedings. It may also 
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced because the 
administrative findings or decisions are made upon unlawful 
procedure.<46l At present many of the states have enacted 
45. K.C •. Davis, Administrative Law Text, (op. cit •. ,) § 24.05. -
45a. Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, S.l5. 
46. Ibid S.l5 (g)' (3)'. 
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statutes based on the model act.<47) Unlike English 
courts, the courts in the United States have an inherent 
power to remand to the relevant agency. But under English 
law, the remedies of certiorari or declaration are 
frequently tantamount to a remand order since when a 
decision is quashed or is declared unlawful the tribunal 
or the administrative authority is under a legal duty to 
consider the matter and must decide it again but 
(48) 
correctly. The remedy of mandamus has got similar 
effect to a remand order. For example, in R.v. London 
County Council, Ex p. Akkersdyk, Ex p. Fermenia,<49J the 
Divisional court issued a writ of mandamus commanding the 
council to hear and determine the application according to 
law. This power of remand is widely used by the federal 
courts whose power is thus not only limited to affirm or 
reverse the administrative decisions. When the court is 
satisfied that the administrative decision was not 
impartial, the decision or order is vacated and the case is 
remanded for a de novo consideration of reqord without the 
participation of the officer against whom bias is alleged • 
. 
For example in American Cynamid Company v. Federal Trade 
Commission where Chairman Dixon was held disqualified for 
47. Gellhorn and Byse have provided a detailed list of 
states who have enacted statutes on this model act -: 
Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative law - cases and 
comments (6th ed. , 1974)pp. 1160 at seq. 
48. Schartz and Wade,Legal Control of Government, p. 220. 
49. [l892J I.Q.B.D. p. 190 (discussed earlier) mandamus 
was thought to be the proper remedy instead of 
certiorari against the county council. It seems that 
the proceedings were thought not as judicial though 
the court said that such proceeding ought to be dealt 
with in a judicial spirit and with a due regard to 
reason and justice. 
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bias, the Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit vacated 
the F.T.C. order and remanded the case for de novo 
consideration by the F.T.C. without the participation of 
Chairman Dixon.(50) 
The use of the discretionary remedy of injunction 
may be seen in Withrow v. Larkin. (5l) Here, the appellee 
brought an action against app.ellant board members seeking 
injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order against 
hearing of charges of professional misconduct by the 
appellant board. A three-judge District Court 
preliminarily enjoined the board from using the statute 
giving the board various enforcement powers, and held that 
the statute was unconstitutional as violative of due 
process of law in that the board could suspend the 
physician 1 s license at the board's own hearing on charges 
evolving from the board 1s own investigation (368; F. Supp. 
796). On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court said that where 
the appellee had been granted a restraining order against a 
contested hearing pursuant to the statute; the question 
before the Federal District Court was not whether the act 
was constitutional or not but whether the showing made 
raised serious constitutional questions and disclosed that 
enforcement of the act, pending final hearing, would inflict 
irreparable damages upon the complainant. A preliminary 
50. American Cynamid Co., v. EI£ (U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 
Sixth circuit, 1966) 363 F.2d 757. 
51. Withrow v. Larkin (U.S. Sup. Ct.) 43 Led 2d 712. 
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injunction against enforcement of a state statute may be 
issued when there is a nhigh likelihood of success" of the 
constitutional challenge of the statutes. But when''it is 
quite unlikely that the appellee would ultimately prevail 
on the merits of the due process issue presented to the 
District Court, •••••• it was an abuse of discretion to 
issue the preliminary injunctionn·. (52 ) 
On the whole, it may be stated that the federal forms 
of proceedings for challenging administrative decision are 
more satisfactory than states' procedure. Compared with 
its counterpart i~ England, this body of law is a 
considerable accomplishment. The statutory review in 
suits for injunction and declaratory judgments, provide 
judicial control in a more comprehensive and effective 
way than in England. 
52·. Ibid 723. 
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CONCLUSION 
A subject so general and with so many facets as 
disqualification scarcely permits of any conclusion more 
rounded than the obvious one that in both England and 
America, the rule against interest and bias grows apace. 
There are similarities as well as differences in its 
development in the two Countries. 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 
Having its origin under common law, the rule has 
been provided with constitutional and statutory 
safeguards in American law. So, while there is almost 
uniformity of opinion among the courts of England and 
America as to the major situations regarding judicial 
disqualification on grounds of interest and bias, it 
cannot be denied that statutes such as 28 u.s.c. 
Section 455 have extended the law to include a wide range 
of subjects as grounds for mandatory disqualification 
which are not provided under English law. The new 
amendment substituted "disqualification of justice, judge, 
magistrate or referee in bankruptcy" for "interest of 
justice or judge" thus broadening the application of the 
section. It also extended the grounds on which mandatory 
disqualification may be based, and added provisions 
relating to waiver of disqualification. It provides for 
voluntary disqualification in any proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These 
provisions have already been discussed in earlier chapters. 
Again, the "any other interest" test under 28.u.s.c. §.455" 
(b)(4) has certainly broadened the grounds for judicial 
disqualification. The clause referring to "any other 
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interest" includes interests other than those direct 
financial interests described in the first portion of the 
sub-section. The section calls for disqualification when 
any indirect or remote financial interest could be 
n·substantially affected" by the outcome. (1) The 
amendment has given a new life to the disqualification 
procedure. It has provided a general standard as well as 
specific mandatory grounds for judicial disqualification. 
On the whole it may be said that this section now provides 
a detailed guideline for judicial disqualification. 
On the other hand, under English law the 
disqualification of judges and justices for interest and 
bias is guided purely by the common law principles of 
natural justice. The rule against interest is clear and 
simple. It is invoked in cases where direct pecuniary 
interest is involved.(2) Unlike American law there is 
hardly any provision for disqualification for "any other 
interest" other than direct financial interest. In 
circumstances where the interest is indirect, disqualification 
will lie only if there exists a real or reasonable 
likelihood of bias.(3) The disqualification for family 
relationship under English law does not seem to be entirely 
1. Such an interpretation has been adopted by the United 
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit in Virginia 
Electric and Power Company v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry 
Dock Company 539 F.2d 357, 367, 368 (1976) discussed in 
Chap. III "Pecuniary Interest". 
2. E.g., R.v. Rand (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230, 232; see 
discussion in Chapter III on "Pecuniary Interest". 
3. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) ~. v. Lannon 
Cl969J 1 Q.B. 577, 598, 599 (C.A.), see discussion in 
Chapter IV "Bias"·. 
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clear. <4 ) Besides, the rule against interest and bias, 
being a common law principle, suffers from the inherent. 
weakness that it may be excluded by statute.<5) For its 
effective application under English law, the rule ideally 
needs statutory support (assuming the continuing absence 
of a written constitution which might include it) and a 
detailed guideline for judicial disqualification 
comparable to that of 28. u-.s .c •. g .455. 
UNITED STATES: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE : 
Again the agency has gone a good deal further in its 
enactment of a general statute such as the Administrative 
Procedure Act 1946 which provides a highly judicialized 
and formal procedure for independent administrative 
agencies. The Act has provided a corps of "semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers"·(6 ) called trial 
examiners (now presiding employees).(?) They are required 
to issue initial decisions, which become the decision of the 
agency unless there is an appeal or review.< 8 ) The A.P.A. 
4. See my earlier discussion in the Section on "Family 
Relationship" in Chapter 4. 
5. E.g., R. v •. Barnsley Licensing JJ., /:1960.:7 2 Q.B. 167. 
6. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 u.s. 
128, 131 (1953). 
7. Also known as "Administrative Law Judges". See K.C •. Davis, 
Administrative Law of the Seventies § 10.00 (1976). 
8. See Administrative Procedure Act 5 u . .s.c. § 557 ,(b)parall~l. 
section of Administrative Procedure Act 1946 .· Sec. 8ta). 
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Procedure is clearly inspired by the model of judicial 
procedure. (9) It applies in every case of 
adjudication required by statute to be determined on 
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. (lO) 
The Act is not merely limited to the regulatory 
agencies. The Supreme Court held in Wong Yang Sung 
v. McGrath that the Administrative Procedure Act 
requirement of an impartial hearing applies in every 
case where a full hearing is required bV due process, 
even though not by the enabling statute.(ll) To 
prevent any possible bias on the part of the presiding 
employee, the Act prohibits a presiding employee 
from consulting a person or a party on a fact in 
issue, unless notice or opportunity for all parties 
to participate is provided.(l2)As has been seen the Act 
has also provided for separation of investigating and 
9. E.g., They may administer oaths, issue subpenas. 
and so on. See§554(b) and § 556(c). 
10. § 554. There are certain exceptions laid down. 
11. 339 u.s~. 33, 5o (195o). 
12. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 u.s.c. § 554(d). 
See also a recent amendment prohibiting an interested 
party from making ex parte communication to any 
person engaged in the decisional process of the 
proceeding- 557 (d)(l) (as amended Pub. L. 94-
409 S 4(a), 1976. 
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pros~ting functions from adjudication.Cl3) For early 
removal and quick disposal of bias or other 
disqualification, s.556(b} of the Act sensibly provides for 
voluntary disqualification as well as a prompt decision 
on the matter by the administrative agency. If the 
defect remains unremedied, a party can raise it before the 
court. However, judicial review is based on the 
substantial evidence rule. Administrative findings are 
held unlawful and set aside if not supported by 
(14) 
substantial evidence on the record. It may be argued 
with some force that when a particular fact (in this case, 
the absence of an interested or biased trier of fact) is 
arguably a condition precedent to the constitutionality 
of administrative action, the courts may have a 
responsibility to determine this fact for themselves de ~· 
They cannot abdicate their obligation of review with an 
administrative finding on interest or bias supported by 
. (15) 
substantial ev1dence. In conclusion, it may be 
submitted that under the Administrative Procedure Act, bias 
disqualification stands thrice judged. Clearly each 
individual_ adjudicator has an.obligation to evaluate his 
own impartiality. Clearly too, on his refusal, the party 
13'. Supra, § 554(d)' discussed in "Prosecutor Judge" 
section. 
14. § 706. 
15. Professor Jaffe suggests nL When.7 a fact is the 
asserted constitutional basis for the exercise of 
the power in question, the court must itself make 
a finding of the fact and may in its discretion 
take evidence as to the fact". Jaffe, Judicial 
Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 
70 Harv.L-. Rev. 953, 953 (1957). 
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has a right to apply to the agency as a whole. Finally 
if the bias or interest remains unremedied, the party 
may raise the issue before the reviewing court. The 
better view would seem to be that since judicial review 
is founded on the principles of due process, it requires 
at least an independent finding by the courts on the issue 
of disqualification. 
ENGLAND : THE FUTURE OF THE RULE 
In England, in the absence of a constitutional 
provision or a general statute on disqualification on 
this subject, the same function has to be performed by the 
common law rules of natural justice. The common law 
principle of the rule against interest and bias 
disqualifies an administrative adjudicator in the same 
- 274 -
way as the Administrative Procedure Act disqualifies 
a trial examiner for interest or bias. It has been 
said that "'Cthe..7 special procedure that in the United 
States. are called hearings are classified in Britain 
as tribunals and inquiries".Cl6 )' But the various kinds 
of independent administrative regulatory agencies in 
America are difficult to equate with English institutions. 
Statutory tribunals ought to be as impartial as courts of 
lawand exercise similar judicial detachment. Like 
the presiding employees under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, it is axiomatic that their members must be free 
from interest and bias. A tribunal such as. a rent 
tribunal is. entitled to use its own knowledge and 
experience as to the level of rent but if there is direct 
pecuniary interest or reasonable suspicion of bias on the 
part of its' members, the court will set aside the decision~l7) 
16. B. Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade, Legal Control of 
Government, (1972) p. 143. 
17. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. 
Lannon Z l969J 1 Q.B. 577 (C .A.}. ~599 
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But public inquiries are less formal and less 
legalistic than tribunals. Whereas hearing officers 
under the A.P.A. make initial decisions, inspectors 
carrying on inquiries on behalf of Ministers in this 
country can normally make only a recommendation to the 
ministry. One of the difficult problems in 
Administrative Law is that how far the rules of 
(18) 
natural juitice are applicable to inquiry procedures. 
The judicial tendency is to hold that the rules of 
natural justice apply to statutory inquiries as well. (l9) 
The demand for administrative imparliality is no less 
strong than the demand for impartiality in the courts. 
(20) 
Errington v. Minister of Health has clearly established 
that a post inquiry communication with the deciding 
Minister could be caught by the rules of natural justice. 
Further,recent cases show that post-inquiry 
communication with one of the parties may amount to 
breach of the statutory· rules as well as a breach 
18. See the House of Lord's decision in Franklin v. 
Minister of Town and Country Planning ~1948~ A.C. 
87 discussed in Chap. V: "Exclusion of the Rule". 
See also Report of the Committee on Administrative 
Tribunals and Inquiries, Cmnd. 218 Chap. 19, Paras 
262-277. 
19. E.g., Fairmount Investment Ltd. & Another v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment ~1976-7 
1 W.L.R. ~255 (H.L.), inspector took into account 
matters not raised at the inquiry which was held as 
breach of natural justice; Hibernian Property Co. 
Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment 
~1974~ 27 P & C.R. 197, inspector took information 
in the absence of one party - held as breach of 
natural justice. For investigation by inspectors 
under The Companies Act - see Re Pergamon Press L.td. 
&1971..:/ Ch. 388. 
20. ~1935~ 1 K.B. 249. 
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1 . (21) of natura justice. In the United States the 
Administrative Procedure Act clearly prohibits a 
hearing officer or person engaged in the decisional 
process· of the proceeding from making ex parte 
(22) 
communication with an interested party. Similarly in 
'prosecutor judge' cases, what is provided by the 
Administrative Procedure Act for American law, has been 
provided in England by the rules of natural justice. 
Tihe rule against interest and bias demands that one 
who is in the position of prosecutor or complainant 
must not take part in the adjudication. (23) This 
separation of functions, the courts have emphasised, 
should be observed not only in the case of courts of 
justice and other judicial tribunals but also in the 
case of other authorities which, though in no sense 
21. E.g., Lake District Special Planning Board v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment ~1975~ 
J .P .L. 220, (discussed in section, "Bias by 
Attitude towards Law or Policy"'; see also 
Performance Cars Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
the Environment ~1977~ J.P.L. 584 (C.A.). A 
local authority refused to give copies of 
document before inquiry. Browne L.J~ considered 
it as a breach of the inquiry procedure rule and 
might also be a denial of natural justice. 
22. g 557(d)(ll supra, see also the provisions under 
§ 554-(d l supra. 
21. E •. g., R.v. Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
Ex p. Hook ~1976~ 1 W.L.R. 1052 (discussed in 
nProsecutor Judge"' section). 
- 277 -
courts nevertheless act as judges of the rights of 
others~24 ) Lacking both constitutional and statutory 
support utilised by the American courts, such a bold 
assertion by the English courts is commendable. But 
(25) English courts remain at the mercy of the legislature, 
and again it is submitted that the rule would benefit 
from being expressed in statutory form. 
Again, the existing remedies are not in a 
satisfactory state.C26 ) The Law Commission proposed 
one form of statutory procedure for obtaining remedies 
11 an application for judicial review". Under cover of 
it, a litigant should be able to obtain any of the 
prerogative orders or in appropriate circumstances a 
declaration or an injunction. In addition, it is 
submitted that it would be beneficial to have a statutory 
code of procedure for disqualification of administrative 
authorities for intetest and bias. T'he code should 
apply to every adjudication including those of 
tribunals and inquiries. Proposals for a detailed 
and formalised general code of procedure such as the 
Administrative Procedure Act have been criticised by 
some lawyers on the ground that this would likely to 
24. Frome United Breweries v. Bath Justices ~1926~ 
A.C •. 586 (discussed in "·Prosecutor Judge" section). 
25. ~he rule can be ousted by statute i.e. R.v. 
Barnsley Licensing JJ. ~1960~ 2 Q.B. ~discussed 
in Chap. III:· "Pecuniary Interest"'• 
26. See discussion on "Remedies"·. 
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lead undesirable uniformity and rigidity which would 
frustrate administrative efficiency and flexibility. (27) 
The proposal for a standard code of procedure 
applicable to tribunals is not new. As H.W.R. Wade 
observed: "Legislation now attempts to ensure that 
the fundamentals of proper procedure 'openness, 
fairness, and impartiality' -are observed and that 
uniform standards are applied to all the numerous 
different tribunals"'• (28 ) Professor Thompson said: (29 ) 
"England is still a long way from clear-cut, 
intelligible, generally applicable procedures, • • • • • • • • • 
the Uhited States has its Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act. Despite the proliferation of different 
practices, and procedure of different Ministries, there 
is no reason why a generally applicable system should 
not be devised''• It may be arguable that the widely 
varying procedures( 30) applicable to different types of 
tribunals and inquiries in England militate against such 
27 ~ E.g., J .A. Farmer, rtA model Code of Procedure for 
Administrative Tribunals - An Illusory Concept" 1 New Zealand Universities Law Review Volo4 (l970i 
p. 105 et seq. 
28. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, (3rd ed) p. 5. 
It was argued before the Franks Committee that a 
standard code applicable to all tribunals would 
be preferable to the then rather haphazard system 
- See the Evidence of the Inns of Court 
Conservative and Unionist Society (1957), Cmnd. 218, 
Minutes and Appendices, pp. 296 - 301. 
29. In a paper entitled, "The Proper Scope of Judicial 
Review"· - presented at the Commonwealth Law 
Conference at Sydney. See "'l''hird Commonwealth 
Empire Law Conference"· Sydney (1965)' 133, 136, 137. 
30. See D •. Foulkes, Administrative Law, (1976) Chap. 3 
and 4;- R.E. Wraith and P.G. Hutcheson, 
Administrative Tribunals, Chap. 6. 
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a solution. Even if the introduction of a general 
statute like the A.P.A.(3l} is not thought to be 
desirable,<32 ) there is no reason why an attempt should 
not be made to give statutory protection to certain 
basic procedural principles, for example, the 
requirement of impartiality which will influence the 
procedures adopted by the existing and future 
tribunals,<33) inquiries, statutory bodies, trade 
unions as well as other authorities. (34 ) It will merely 
be a statutory recognition of the principle followed 
by them and has been recognised by courts from an early 
period. In recent years Parliament itself has begun 
in certain spheres to give statutory protection to the 
rules of natural justice ~e.g. Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act, 1974. s. 6(13).:7, and impartiality is now 
to be observed in all types of adjudication. To this 
extent the proposal can hardly be regarded as radical 
31. 
32. 
33. 
For example, A.P.A. also regulates appointment of 
hearing officers, their dismissals etc. (see § § 
3105, 7521) and provides a high judicialized 
procedure, see (n.9 supra). 
English institutions are different from those in 
the United States. Appointment of independent 
hearing officers may not be suitable here. For 
example, inspectors carrying on inquiries are 
required to be in touch with the policy of the 
department - see Schwartz and Wade, Legal Control 
of Governemnt, op.cit., p. 171. 
Procedural rules for tribunals are made in 
consultation with the Council on Tribunals, 
(Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, S.lO). But 
one of the major weakness is its ineffectiveness 
-see Legal Control of Government, op.cit., p. 180. 
Under s. lL(l )' the L.ord Chancellor after 
consultation with the Council on Tribunals make rules 
for inquiries. 
34. See discussions in previous Chapters, particularly· 
Chap. II: n·Modern Application of the Rule". 
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or controversial.<35) This might be done simply by 
enacting statutory provisions along these broad lines: 
A) Any person engaged in a hearing or a decision-
making process shall disqualify himself when he 
knows that he has a pecuniary interest however 
small in the subjectmatter in controversy or in 
a party to the proceeding; 
B) Such person shall also disqualify himself when he 
knows that there is reasonable likelihood of his 
being biased in favour of or against any party to 
the proceeding; 
C) Such person shall also disqualify himself when 
his imparliality might reasonably be questioned; 
D) An aggrieved party has the right to challenge a 
determination or order tainted by interest or bias 
by way of judicial review. 
E) The reviewing court shall have the power to make 
independent findings of fact on the issue of 
disqualification. 
In fact the above provision-would add nothing 
substantially new to the existing practice, but would 
bring uniformity, force and strength to the principle. 
It is hoped that Parliament will see the wisdom of 
35. Hearing not required in all cases, e.g., R.v. Aston 
University Senate Ex p. Roffey ~1969~ 2 ALL E.R. 
964, at p. 973 (per Donaldson J.) at p. 997 
(per Blain, J.)'; R.v. Race Reiations Board Ex p. 
Sel vara;=an C 1975.:! W .L .R. 1686, 1694 (C .A.)', a 
board need not hold a hearing, it was enough· if it 
acted with fairness. 
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upholding this fundamental principle by means of such 
a generally applicable statutory provision for the 
greater protection of the individual. 
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